

STANISŁAW PIOTROWSKI

# HANS FRANK'S DIARY



WARSZAWA

PAŃSTWOWE WYDAWNICTWO NAUKOWE

*Designed by Natalia Jarczevska*

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## FOREWORD TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

*THIS book is a shortened version of the second edition (1957) of a work first published in Polish under the title "Dziennik Hansa Franka" (Hans Frank's Diary). Frank was a Minister of the Third Reich and Governor General of those areas of Poland occupied by Nazi Germany which were not incorporated into the Reich.*

*At the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg for the first time in the history of the world thousands of secret documents were revealed belonging to a state in the grip of the imperialist idea of world conquest. Among these documents Hans Frank's Diary occupies one of the leading positions both on account of its contents and on account of its more than ordinary length: 11,000 typewritten pages in foolscap, making up 38 volumes. Any study of the history of the last war must include a reading of Hans Frank's Diary.*

*The authentic statements of Dr Hans Frank, the former Reich Minister and President of the Nazi Academy of Law, reveal the grim day-by-day story of Nazi imperialism which in the mania of the quest for "Lebensraum" trampled underfoot the right of other nations to freedom and even to life itself.*

*This book presents a systematic record of the most important aspects of Frank's criminal activities while Governor General in Cracow. It is based on a scientific, objective and impartial analysis of the vast amount of material contained in his Diary and in documents which came to light during the Nuremberg trial. The book also includes the first analysis in legal literature of the crimes of Frank and his administration in the light of international law, with particular reference to the 1907 Hague Regulations relative to war on land. Drawing on the statements of trusted representatives of the Nazi authorities, Dr Piotrowski has presented a detailed picture of the system of taking and shooting hostages practised by the occupying power.*

*After a reading of Hans Frank's Diary it is easier to understand*

*the attitude of the Polish nation to the regeneration of the Nazi forces of nationalism, militarism and revisionism in West Germany.*

*The writing of this book was facilitated by the fact that the author was a member of the Polish delegation to the International Military Tribunal from the very beginning of the trial of the major Nazi war criminals, that is from November, 1945; from May 1946 till sentence was passed on 1 October, 1946 he was the only Polish delegate at the Tribunal.*

*Hans Frank's Diary was handed over to the Polish authorities after the close of the Nuremberg trial and is now in the archives of the Ministry of Justice in Warsaw.*

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## INTRODUCTION

THE TRIAL of the chief Nazi war criminals at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, which began on 20 November, 1945, came too soon after the end of hostilities for it to have been possible to collect and prepare all the evidence necessary.<sup>1</sup>

Warsaw was burnt and in ruins. The archives in which evidence of all the Nazi crimes committed in Poland had been carefully hoarded during the occupation were destroyed and their contents scattered. When the Polish delegation left for Nuremberg in November, it took with it only a handful of depositions and a few documents, which could give only the barest idea of the extent of Nazi crimes in Poland.

The indictment against the chief Nazi war criminals first set out the crimes which the defendants had committed collectively; it then dealt with each of the twenty-four accused in turn. In this listing of their individual crimes, Frank, the former Reich Minister and Governor General of occupied Poland, held sixth place. Thus all the evidence of Nazi crimes in Poland had to be linked to the person of Frank, who was their visible representative in the dock. During the proceedings against Frank, the court would witness the creation of a martyrology of the Polish nation and the sentence should express its supreme condemnation of the Nazi regime for the crimes committed in Poland.

Professor B. S. Mankovsky, the legal adviser of the Soviet delegation, which was instructed in the indictment with presenting evidence of Nazi war crimes against humanity committed on territory east of Berlin drew my attention to one essential: Frank, as the Reich representative in occupied Poland, could not be responsible for all the crimes committed by his subordinates in the administration of the former General Government, unless they were the outcome of his express orders or unless a close connection between the person of the former governor

and the actual committer of the crime could be proved. Nor was the signing by Frank of illegal orders published in the daily ordinances of the General Government enough to charge him with absolute responsibility for crimes committed by a third party on the basis of those orders. Professor Mankovsky's opinion was shared by the other Soviet legal adviser, Professor A. N. Trainin. In the light of these opinions, there was insufficient evidence to connect Frank personally with many of the crimes committed in the General Government.

In the difficult situation, caused by lack of sufficient evidence of Frank's personal responsibility, it was the accused himself who came to our rescue with his "Diary" kept by him as Governor General of occupied Poland.

The former Governor General of Poland, Dr Hans Frank, kept this diary from the moment he took up office in Łódź on 25 October, 1939 up to his flight from Cracow on 17 January, 1945 "in the sunshine of a beautiful winter's day". He even continued his Governor General's "Diary", after his flight to Germany up to 3 April. The "Diary" covers the minutes of meetings of executives of the General Government and of the NSDAP party, as well as the governor's journal in the strictest sense of the word—that is the daily record of his office work, receptions, regulations and official journeys. Minutes of meetings sometimes appear in this part as well. Most of those volumes of the "Diary" containing minutes are taken up by the governor's addresses and declarations at the meetings. There are less of them in the journal proper. The complete "Diary" takes up 38 volumes, of which 33 are bound in linen. There was no time to bind the remaining five which cover 1944, the last year of Frank's rule and these have been preserved in file-covers. To one of these has been attached a note-book with entries from 16 January, 1945—the day preceding Frank's flight from Cracow—up to 3 April, 1945. Ten bound volumes and one file are taken up by minutes; nineteen volumes and four files by the journal; in addition there are four volumes of a detailed index to the journal for 1940-3. <sup>1</sup>

Frank stated during the trial that the "Diary" consisted of 43 volumes.<sup>3</sup> The transcript of Frank's examination before the trial, on 8 October, has 36 as the number.<sup>4</sup> There were, in fact, 38 volumes preserved. It would however be difficult to determine whether some of the volumes might not have been lost when the International Tribunal first went to work in Nuremberg and separate volumes of the "Diary" were borrowed, without issue of a receipt, by various members of the U.S. Chief of Counsel's office from the "Document Room".<sup>5</sup> The accuracy of Frank's own estimate of the number of volumes making up by the "Diary" [43] is impugned by the statement of his stenographer, August Mohr, that what was called "Frank's Political Diary" amounted finally to over 30 volumes. The whole of Frank's "Diary" was typed, from shorthand, onto foolscap and contains over 11,000 pages. The volumes containing the journal have their original page-numbers, covering the whole year. In the volumes covering minutes of meetings, each set of minutes has its separate numbering. Only the volume entitled "Government sessions, 1943" has page-numbers for the whole volume, as in the journal, apart from the separate numbers for the minutes of each session. American military officials pencilled in temporary page-numbers for each complete volume on the microfilm they made of the "Diary". In the early stages of the trial, the "Diary" was in a very well-preserved condition; unfortunately, before it was over, I had noticed that some of the sheets were missing from the file-covers for the period from 1 August to 17 December, 1944: these were the first sheets of a session held on 1 August, which contained a preliminary address by Frank, and several sheets containing notes from 12.30 P.M. on 14 August to 4 September. The cause of this was negligence in looking after the file-covers during the trial.

There is usually a list of those present, with their signatures, attached to the minutes of meetings; at their head is the signature of Frank. On the first page of the minutes the number of copies of them made and the persons to whom they were given is also indicated. August Mohr, who held the post of second stenog-

rapher in the Governor General's office in Cracow from 23 July, 1941 to July, 1944 stated that it was his duty and that of the first stenographer, Dr Gnauck, on Frank's express orders, to maintain his political diary. The whole contents of the "Diary" for that period were entered from shorthand notes taken by one or other of them and, before July, 1941, by Meidinger. Mohr and Gnauck attended the sessions, the minutes of which appeared in the "Diary". On rare occasions they were given shorthand reports, ready for entry into the "Diary", of the almost daily conferences of Frank with Dr Bühler, his Secretary of State, and SS General Krüger, and, in particular, with SS General Koppe. Sometimes the reports were later dictated by Frank himself. The shorthand notes made by Mohr and Gnauck were later dictated by them to a typist. After the typescript had been checked, it was handed to the official in charge of the chancery, who read and then filed it; at the end of the year Gnauck worked on the binding of the papers for the whole year.

Mohr testified that, in his capacity as stenographer, he had read almost every page of the "Diary" between 1941 and 1944, and could say that what appeared in it corresponded exactly to what in fact took place and was said. Finally he admitted that to the best of his knowledge this was equally true of the parts of the "Diary" covering from October 1939 to July, 1941 and from July, 1944 to the end of the war.<sup>6</sup>

But the best evidence of the credibility of the "Diary" is Frank's own statements. In 1942, Frank, having announced his resignation, entered into the "Diary" a comprehensive explanation of his attitude to the Führer and the NSDAP. In it appeared the following paragraph concerning the "Diary":

"I have perpetuated the main features of all that has been done in these territories since 1939 in diaries and in the shorthand reports of my speeches. This chronicle of my work, the only one of its kind, will be evidence for all time of the gravity with which I undertook the tasks entrusted me and the great zeal with which my valued colleagues carried out their duties."<sup>7</sup>

In July, 1944, when considering ways of saving the important,



secret documents in his archives, Frank put his Governor General's "Diary" at the top of the list and said that he himself would undertake its preservation. He also put forward a plan for donating it to the Bavarian State Library.<sup>8</sup>

At his examination on 8 November, 1945 in Nuremberg by an officer from the United States Chief of Counsel's office, when asked about the authoritativeness of particular volumes of the "Diary", Frank replied:

"I won't hide anything. It is a historic document."

Later, asked whether all the facts in the "Diary" were correct and accurate and whether they actually occurred to the best of his knowledge and belief, he replied:

"To the best of my knowledge; in particular, to the best of my knowledge."<sup>9</sup>

At the beginning of May, 1945, Lt. Walter Stein of American Intelligence, descended from German immigrants, brought Frank's Diary from his chancery in Neuhaus—where he had moved after his flight from Poland—to the U. S. 7<sup>th</sup> Army's Central Document Office, located in the library of Heidelberg University. Another lieutenant in American Intelligence, Gerhard Schäfer, who had left Nazi Germany because of the persecution of the Jews and was now attached to the office of the United States Chief of Counsel for War Crimes in Europe, drew attention to Frank's "Diary" in the Central Document Office and took it in September to the document library of the office of the U. S. Chief of Counsel in Nuremberg. This was located in the same huge building—once the Bavarian Palace of Justice—as the International Military Tribunal and all the delegations to it—both the chief ones, that is the British, American, French and Soviet, and the other minor delegations, including that from Poland.

It was my task on our arrival in Nuremberg on 10 November as a member of the Polish delegation, to examine the "Diary" and take down all the more important paragraphs and sentences which could provide incriminating evidence in the case against Frank. I had extracts made from the "Diary" and tried to form

a complete picture from it of the life of Poland under the Nazi yoke during the General Government.

The department of Professor Robert Kempner<sup>10</sup> in the Office of the U. S. Chief of Counsel was working on the documentary evidence for the separate charges in the indictments against each of the chief war criminals — charges which had been dealt with only superficially in the basic indictment of them collectively. Professor Kempner had just reached the case of Frank, as Reich Minister and Governor General of occupied Poland. After familiarising himself with the nature of my work, he willingly gave me technical assistance in preparing extracts from the "Diary". However he was a victim of the general haste in which the trial was being prepared and so was unwilling to make use of all my extracts considering that just a part of them was sufficient to sentence Frank to the extreme penalty. At that point the Soviet delegation came to my assistance; it had just arrived in Nuremberg and in the nature of things had started work later than the Americans\*. Shortly after its arrival, it also started on the preparation of evidence against Frank.

The Soviet delegation took both the extracts already authorized by Prof. Kempner and those later made by me and sent them all to Leipzig in the Russian Zone, where they were printed in the original German and in Russian as the language of the delegation which was to present this document before the Nuremberg Tribunal. It was to be one of the few printed documents laid before the Tribunal.

In the preface to the German and Russian language edition of the extracts, signed by General Roman Rudenko, the Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R., it was said that they had been made by a representative of the Polish Government — the author of this work — and by an officer in the Soviet delegation — Major Kveselava — who had been put in charge of the translation into Russian and the technical side.

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\* Nuremberg was in the American Occupied Zone and so the technical preparation of the trial had fallen to the American authorities.

At the end of this book appears a somewhat abridged version of the "Excerpts from Hans Frank Diary", published in Leipzig by the Soviet delegation and presented by it to the International Military Tribunal as document "SSSR — 223" after correction of typographical errors and omissions. I have tried as far as possible to avoid setting down in my selection from the "Diary" single sentences torn out of their wider context so that there can be no complaints that these sentences do not give the actual sense contained in the context. In the Leipzig edition it was not possible for technical reasons fully to observe this principle.

This work sets out the most important fields of the criminal activity and responsibility of Frank as Governor General in the light of his "Diary". It draws on parts which appear in the "Excerpts" as well as those which do not. The latter I transcribed during the court proceedings in Nuremberg after the presentation of the "Excerpts" by the Soviet delegation.



Polizeisitzung

am 25. Januar 1943, Vormittag  
10 Uhr, Schloß Belvedere zu  
Warschau

Teilnehmerliste:

Frank	Meinhold
Bittler	Mügg
Dr. Bräppler	Reichner
Dr. Aler	Dr. Meyer
Baumhauer	Meinhold
	J. K. K.
Dr. T. J.	St. J.
J. J.	St. J.
	St. J.



## Chapter I

# THE LIFE OF HANS FRANK

HANS Frank was born on 23 May, 1900 in Karlsruhe, Baden. He was conscripted in June, 1918 but never reached the front, though he remained in the army for another year after the defeat in November. After leaving secondary school, he studied law and political economy at the universities of Kiel and Munich. He took his doctor's degree at Kiel in 1924 and in 1927 he was called to the bar and also became assistant professor at the Polytechnic in Munich. He had come into contact with political life in 1919 at the lectures of the National Socialist, Feder, which Hitler had also attended. Frank had then joined the German Workers' Party — the forerunner of the NSDAP — and enlisted in the SA. He took part in the Nazi coup of November, 1923 as a SA dragoon and had to flee the country to escape arrest; but soon afterwards the proceedings against him were lifted. According to the statement made by Frank on 1 September 1945 in Nuremberg, he was supposed to have read an advertisement in the papers that the NSDAP was seeking a lawyer who would defend its members free of charge. Frank answered it and this well-calculated step was to be the starting-point of his political career.

According to his own statement, Frank entered the NSDAP in 1926 only to leave it in the same year because of ideological differences that are still unclear. The following year he joined it once again and remained a member till the overthrow of Nazism.

As the defence counsel of NSDAP members, Frank became Hitler's legal adviser and emerged as the leading Nazi lawyer. In 1928 Frank formed a union of Nazi lawyers and became their "Führer" or leader. The following year Hitler made Frank the

director of the legal department in the headquarters of the NSDAP (Reichsleitung). In 1930 he entered Parliament on a NSDAP ticket. The same year he acted in the trial by the Reich court at Leipzig of officers from Ulm who had formed a Nazi cell in their unit. Frank called Hitler to testify that the NSDAP would seek political victory only by legal means. The Reich court accepted the pledge offered and Hitler fraudulently swore that he would seek power only by legal paths.

Frank always prided himself on this triumph and accounted it his greatest service to the NSDAP.<sup>1</sup>

After Hitler had taken power on 30 January, 1933, Frank rapidly climbed to the highest rungs of a political career. He became Bavarian Minister of Justice and Reich Commissioner for making uniform the administration of justice in each state of the Reich and for reforming the whole legal system in the spirit of Nazism, replacing "a law Byzantine in origin and partly Jewish in spirit" by one that was native and German.<sup>2</sup>

As a leading representative of Nazism and a Bavarian Minister, Frank accompanied Kerrl, the Prussian Minister of Justice, and Freisler, the vice-minister, on a propaganda visit to Vienna. The Dollfuss Government announced that the presence of Nazi Ministers in Austria was undesirable and expelled Dr Frank from Austria.

At Hitler's bidding, Frank, on 1 June, 1933, started the "German Legal Front" (Rechtsfront) — an organization that was to be a federation of professional lawyers, judges, prosecutors, counsel etc. Also in June he established the Academy of German Law, whose task was the preparation of a Nazi legal system.

In September, 1933, Frank as the head of the Nazi lawyers called a national congress of lawyers from all over the Reich under the rallying-cry: "Through National Socialism a German Law for the German Nation".

To round off this exceptionally active period, Frank, now the leader of all the Reich lawyers (Reichsjuristenführer), proclaimed in December, 1933 a German legal estate (Deutscher Rechtsstand) in accordance with the principles of the division of society in



a Nazi state.<sup>3</sup> In August, 1939, Hitler named Frank president of the Academy of German Law.

After Frank had completed the task of integrating the administration of justice by putting it under a single Reich Minister of Justice, Hitler made him a member of the Reich cabinet as Minister without Portfolio.<sup>4</sup> The zenith of his political career coincided with the zenith of Frank's devotion to Hitler. At the annual meeting of the Academy of German Law in 1935, he declared in Hitler's presence: "For the first time in the history of the nation, affection for the Führer has become a legal concept".<sup>5</sup>

In February, 1936, two years after the Poland of Józef Pilsudski had concluded a ten-year agreement with Hitler's Germany concerning the amicable settlement of disputes, under which both governments obliged themselves under no circumstances to resort to force in the settlement of disputes between them, Frank visited Poland at the invitation of the Polish Committee for International Intellectual Co-operation. He was to deliver a lecture in Warsaw on "Zwischenstaatliche Rechtspolitik" (International Legal Policy).

It was in character that Frank changed the subject of his lecture out of hand. Not a word did he say on international legal policy but talked only about the principles and trends of the internal policy of the Third Reich. He spoke of honour — how the restrictions imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles with regard to armaments could not be reconciled with the nation's sense of self-respect and that this was why the Führer had declared that clause was no longer binding. But, he reassured his audience, Nazi Germany wanted to devote her freedom to arm to the cause of universal peace, as the Führer himself had emphasized more than once.

In his peroration Frank hypocritically paid homage to the Polish nation for the way it had heroically survived centuries of slavery until the victory of law over force and illegality. Frank recalled, also, the symbolic handshake between Pilsudski and Hitler as the beginning of a new era in the relations between the two countries.<sup>6</sup>

Frank's words of friendship proved to be cynical trickery just as the strong guarantees of Polish-German agreement proved to be mere scraps of paper.

In April, 1936 Frank gave a lecture in Rome on legislation and administration of justice under National Socialism. He was also received by the king and by Mussolini. Captivated by Fascism, he revisited Rome several times.

In 1936 Frank changed the name of the Lawyer's Union to "Union of Guardians of Law" (Rechtswahrerbund) and his own title from "Leader of Reich Lawyers" to "Leader of Reich Law" (Reichsrechtsführer).

At the 1936 annual congress of lawyers Frank declared that the only authority in Germany was the authority of the Führer, which was based on the mandate given him by the German people to rule in its name. This authority was indivisible.

"Our Führer has redeemed the German Reich, the German nation and German law. Apart from the authority of the state, no legal authority exists".

A separate department of police law was opened in the Academy of German Law. At its inaugural session Frank declared that both the police and the law were equal safeguards of the German national community.<sup>7</sup>

At the 1938 Congress of National Socialist "Guardians of Law" Frank sent Hitler a telegram asking him to "continue to have confidence in his National Socialist Guardians of Law so that they could guarantee law and order and the healthy development of the nation by means of National Socialist laws".<sup>8</sup>

Such was the course of Frank's career as a Nazi up to the outbreak of the Second World War.

Frank was a man of exceptional ambition with an exaggerated idea of his own ability and importance. Lt. Walter Stein, who arrested Frank and, in the course of searching his house, removed the "Diary", has related that Frank had kept a personal diary from early youth and that at the age of twenty he had written in it that he would like to become the future head of the German nation. Without doubt the dreams of his youth made Hans Frank's

ambitions turn to politics. He became a Reich Minister, President of the Academy of German Law and the official chief of Nazi lawyers, even of Reich law if we are to translate literally his last title before the war of "Reichrechtsführer". The war brought Frank the post of Governor General of Occupied Polish Territories but that by no means satisfied his ambition.

While still Reich Minister without Portfolio and Leader of Reich Law, Frank tried to make the significance of the law the chief question in German community life under the Nazi system. In a closing address in Leipzig on the first National Guardians of Law Day in 1939 Frank declared the following principles:

"No one can be sentenced without having had the chance of defending himself."

"No one can be deprived of his dignity, freedom, life or income unless sentenced by a court of law."

"A defendant must have the chance of choosing his counsel."

"No one should be considered an enemy of society at large without proof of his guilt." (25 May, 1939).<sup>9</sup>

Frank took these precepts from ancient Germanic law and based his attempts to make them effective in the Nazi system on article 19 of the NSDAP programme which declared that Roman law should be replaced by German universal law (German community law).<sup>10</sup> This article was in Frank's own words the German nation's Magna Carta and on it he also based his whole struggle for the law. This opinion was expressed in a speech made on 19 November, 1941 to representatives of the National Socialist Union of "Guardians of the Law". He pointed to various attempts that had been made by the authorities of the Reich—and not only the SS and the police—at shirking their duty of upholding the law. He called on the "Guardians of the Law" to fight for the realization of Article 19 and referred to his years in the service of the party, his position in the NSDAP executive and the confidence placed in him by the Führer. In Frank's opinion, it was all the more incumbent on the Union to defend the authority of the law, since the state itself and the individual ministries were inadequate for this task, as the connection between them

was too loose and the cabinet had already ceased to meet. He included a criticism of the Führer himself as Chancellor of the Reich. Frank had set his sights high.<sup>11</sup>

Of course, this was wholly an internal affair and had nothing to do with the Nazi administration of the General Government. But it has to be emphasized as strongly as possible that in all this Frank was guided solely by the desire to raise himself above the other Nazi leaders and to gain greater popularity than them with the rank and file of the NSDAP. For when he was made Governor General he became a champion and advocate of the offences and crimes committed against the Polish people.

This campaign of Frank's cannot be by-passed because in his defence at the trial reference was made to his supposed striving for legality. In point of fact he was merely keeping up appearances since Nazi law itself was the supreme example of illegality and brute force. It meant little that a man could not be arrested without a court order, if the court order itself was going to be illegal; or that the principle of "nullum crimen sine lege" was in force, if the law itself was going to be illegally passed (for example, the Nuremberg Laws).

As hopes of a quick victory for Hitler in his aggression against the Soviet Union grew less and less realistic and general dissatisfaction and disbelief in ultimate victory gained the ascendancy in the Reich, Frank realized that he had to intensify his campaign for the supremacy of the law within the state; in the summer of 1942 he gave a series of lectures in Germany over a short period on the meaning of the law.

On 9 June, 1942 Frank addressed the lecturers and students of Berlin University on the idea of the law and the national community: "The idea of a state without law or against the law has always been unthinkable. The state and the law, as the history of the world shows, form a whole... I believe it is possible to reconcile an authoritarian system of government with an independent judiciary. I believe it is possible to reconcile an authoritarian system of government with the security of the law in its widest sense... There can be no doubt that the Führer is the

supreme judge of the German nation... A judge is the custodian of the law... Were this institution to disappear, the citizen would suddenly be left without protection and help... Just as a nation cannot exist without the law, so it cannot live without freedom. But freedom also means having an opportunity for spiritual development..."

In his opening remarks, Frank had spoken of Hitler as the greatest lawgiver in German history to protect himself from the charge that he—the leading representative of Nazi lawyers—had intended his speech to be an attack on the illegality and police terror of the Nazi government.<sup>12</sup>

On 1 July Frank lectured at the Vienna Academy of Sciences on "The Law and the European Revival". After paying his homage and compliments to Hitler and his respects to Mussolini, and after criticizing the principle of unlimited sovereignty of small nations, whose aim rather should be to gain from the leaders of Europe a guarantee of their own national development, he passed onto the subject of what part he considered the law should play in the state. He reiterated his principle: there is no state without law, no law without a judiciary, no judiciary without the inherent power handed down to it of administering the law.<sup>13</sup>

At Munich University on 20 July Frank spoke on "The Law as the Basis of a National Society". Larding his discourse with a quote from one of the Führer's speeches about the torch lit a thousand years ago on the Acropolis and still shining in our times, he emphasized the importance of individuality in the development of European culture and expressed the opinion that it was the task of the law to protect the free operation of such creative individuality. Then he repeated his defence of an independent judiciary.<sup>14</sup>

Reference has already been made to the counterfeit nature of Frank's postulates of legality. The same has to be said about his postulate of an independent judiciary in the system of the Third Reich. What meaning could there be in an independent judiciary if it was to administer Nazi justice?

An idea of what Frank himself thought of his proposal for



an independent judiciary in the Reich can be got from his own words, addressed to the Nazi judiciary, in his famous speech about the AB campaign, the object of which was the murder of the leading sections of Polish society. Frank had said then that he would regard it as criminal if any court of law should so lose its senses as to prosecute the police for any action under the AB campaign. (cf. *inf.* Ch. IV. Direct Extermination).

The very next day (21 July) at Heidelberg University Frank again spoke about the idea of law and the new order in Europe.

"We are not setting up the new order in Europe for the purpose of extermination of nations and terrorization..." Frank, in glaring contradiction of his declarations in the General Government, declaimed only to stress a moment later: "The German nation and state is on the point of acquiring the largest area of territory it has ever occupied in its history."

After his opening remarks about the new attitude of the conquered nations of Europe—remarks, which he would never at that time have made to the Poles under the General Government, Frank passed on to what was the real subject of his lecture—conditions in the Reich. He spoke once more about Article 19 of the NSDAP programme, about the guarantee to the German people of German community law; he eulogized Hitler as the greatest lawgiver in German history and turned to the postulate of an independent judiciary and its power of action on the strength of the law.<sup>15</sup>

To compare this with the methods proclaimed and used by Frank in the General Government, as far as the Polish people were concerned, it is enough to recall a speech made only a few months earlier, on 18 March, at an NSDAP meeting in Cracow, in which he included the following: "We do not shrink from any thing and stand dozens of people up against the wall."

In the course of a few weeks, Frank made four major speeches in defence of the law, the independence of the judiciary, the individual and personal liberty. He spoke for humanitarianism and against the police state—though that was just what Hitler's Reich was. Between the things Frank said in the General Govern-

ment and addressed to the Polish people and his lectures in the Reich there was an unbridgeable gulf. Why then did Frank become an advocate of axioms that not only ran against but even made pure nonsense of the Nazi system?

Too confident of his own strength, Frank wanted to gain the recognition and popularity in the Reich which could carry him to the top of the hierarchy of the Nazi leadership and place him next to the Führer; while, if the war were lost, it could help him escape trial and punishment.

Dr Lasch, the former governor of Lwow, after his arrest for embezzlement testified during his interrogation in Wroclaw that Frank was the enemy both of SS Reichsführer Himmler and of Bormann, the chief of Hitler's party H.Q., and intended once the war was over to enlist the support of the army and the SA in his struggle against the influence of Himmler and the SS. He planned to found after the war a Ministry of Law which would merge the Ministries of the Interior, Justice and Religious Affairs and several other departments. It would form a vast headquarters issuing regulations concerning every sphere of life in the Reich, since everything would turn on the law which would be the "summum bonum" of the nation. Identifying morality with the law, Frank sought to get the whole of German public life under his administration as the head of the law in the Reich and to this end even ceased to use the title of Leader of the Guardians of the Law in the Reich. In this way he also wanted to gain control of legislation which was an expression of the will of the Führer or of the nation through legal statute. He also counted on the Führer giving him special authority for this.<sup>16</sup>

Frank was well aware of the growing dissatisfaction in large circles of German society with government by police terror. So he tried to win his personal struggle with Bormann and Himmler by playing his hand as a champion of "legality".

Hitler however realized what was the ultimate aim behind Frank's moves in the defence of justice and reacted speedily. Dr Lammers, a minister in the Reich chancery, told Frank, in

Hitler's name, to give up his posts of Leader of the Union of National Socialist Guardians of the Law, President of the Academy of German Law and Head of the Legal Office of the NSDAP. At the same time Hitler absolutely forbade Frank to make any public speeches except those made in his capacity as Governor General and concerned with his official business.

Hitler also appointed Thierack, the President of the People's Tribunal, as Minister of Justice. This post had been vacant since the death of Dr Gürtner on 20 January, 1941 and Frank had lived in the hope of being his successor. At the same time Thierack was named Leader of the Guardians of the Law and President of the Academy of German Law. Finally Hitler abolished the Head Legal Office of the NSDAP in the Reich and the District Legal Offices (Gaurechtsämter) and gave Thierack authority not to be bound by the written law.

Having lost the Führer's confidence, there was no course for Frank to take except to send in his resignation from the post of Governor General and write up the whole business in the Diary. This he did and the entry for 29 August is a long statement signed in his own hand, in which he reviews his services to the NSDAP and says that as a National Socialist he had always resolutely stood by Article 19 of the Party's programme, which had assured the German nation of a universal German law. He wrote that it was not till 1939 that, with the development of the Gestapo machinery, his difficulties over propagating the idea of legality began. At the same time the Führer's attitude to lawyers began to grow increasingly hostile. Frank's attempts to reason with the Führer came to nothing. So he had decided to come out publicly in defence of the law in four major speeches at universities which had always been the most distinguished centres of defence of human dignity, the fate of the individual and the ideal state. As a result he had been forced to resign his legal guidance of the Reich.

Having sent in his resignation to Dr Lammers Frank entrusted his official duties to Dr Bühler until the situation was cleared up. At the end of his statement he expressed the hope that he



would be able to appeal to the Führer at some future date as he should be better informed. He still considered himself Hitler's loyal colleague.<sup>17</sup>

Discussing his work in the General Government, Frank wrote in his extensive 16-page explanation that his work had not been all joy and sunshine; the most burdensome worries had often cast their dark shadow over it and robbed him of a peaceful night's sleep. Immediately following this, he wrote: "It is completely impossible to express in words what the case of Governor Lasch meant to me... In this respect I trust that the future will pass a just verdict and I know that it will be one that is just to me"<sup>18</sup>.

The intrusion of this sentence about the case of Dr Lasch was a skilful attempt on Frank's part to clear himself in his journal once again of charges levelled at his actions as Governor General, which could weaken his position and bring about his recall.

Dr Karol Lasch, Governor of the Lwów District in Galicia had through a subordinate acquired for himself out of state funds a large number of carpets and objets d'art in Holland and France. In addition he had taken advantage of the law of confiscation at the disposal of district governors to amass a fantastic quantity of carpets, objets d'art, coffee, etc. in his villa. The prosecutor's office had this store of goods photographed and in January, 1942 Lasch was arrested and placed in custody in Cracow.

Nevertheless Lasch had remained on friendly terms with Frank, whose wife had received from him a gift of a piano for their house in Bavaria.

Even earlier, large-scale abuses had come to light in Frank's chancery on Wawel. The deputy head of administration, SS Untergruppenführer Loev, was arrested and given a life sentence by an SS court. In its confidential judgement, it emphasized that a death sentence had not been passed because the same charges could have been brought against members of the Governor General's family and closest friends. The court president, nevertheless, had a special report sent to SS Reichsführer Him-

mler. A similar report was received by Bormann. In them Frank was charged with an exceptionally ostentatious way of life and abuses in providing for the three brothers of his wife. One of them was the administrative director of the Academy of German Law, another occupied an exceptionally highly-paid post in the General Government and the third who had taken Swedish citizenship in 1939 had been given permission to enter the General Government for business purposes. Frank was further charged with maintaining out of State funds a store of furs worth 75,000 marks intended as presents and for the personal use of his family. In addition he had in his possession a whole stock of goods—tea, coffee, chocolate, tinned food, textiles and alcohol—for his own use. Frank had bought at ridiculously low prices various articles from the Jewish community of Cracow. He had sent to his property in Bavaria the whole stock of fruit from an estate in the General Government, 200,000 eggs and a large quantity of sheets. He had also taken various sculptures, statues of Our Lady, of angels etc. from various churches in the General Government and had them sent to Bavaria. His wife had bought a large number of expensive furs from a Jew called Apfelbaum and his sister had bought diamond rings from Jews for 25 marks or even less.

Dr Lammers summoned Frank to his office in Hitler's headquarters to clear up these charges. Frank tried to make light of the whole case and sent Dr Bühler in his place. Lammers refused to see him and warned Frank that Himmler and Bormann wanted to consult him (Lammers) over the possibility of withholding, for the time being, information about the whole business from the Führer but that their decision would depend on a meeting with the Governor General. As a result of this presentation of the case Frank went to headquarters and in March, 1942 conferred with Lammers in the presence of Hitler and Bormann.

Frank stated that he disapproved of his wife's conduct about which he had been inadequately informed. He was on bad terms with his sister. His two brothers-in-law would leave the General Government. He would make every effort to set the General Government in order for the future. These accusations had

stirred Frank deeply though he tried to look as if he attached very little weight to them.

At this conference the case of Dr Lasch was also raised. Frank repudiated him in strong language and expressed his wish that he be tried in the Reich. It was decided to assign the court in Wroclaw to investigate the case. At the time no one yet knew whether the Lasch affair would not also involve Dr Bühler and Governor Fischer.

Frank had sent Lammers an explanation in writing, dated 10 March, 1942, in which he tried to raise the question of the sentence passed on Loev. As for the charges of his way of life being too ostentatious, these he answered by saying it was necessary to live and entertain on a grand scale because of the hostile attitude of the population. "Only men of a truly patrician disposition can rule in the East", he wrote. He tried also in a specious way to justify the shameful exploitation by Loev and his family of the tragic situation of the Jews in the General Government—particularly Loev's purchase of an expensive gold fountain pen in the Warsaw Ghetto for 100 zlotys and a fur for three. The pen was intended as a Christmas present for—the Governor General! The fur had been bought for three zlotys by mistake. After it had been cleared up, the bill had been regulated. Frank considered Loev's sentence unfair, since he was acting in his official capacity as deputy chief of the Governor General's Chancery, though he did not make so bold as to come out with a proposal for its revision.<sup>19</sup>

Frank did not neglect to denounce Lasch back in the General Government. But he tried to extenuate his guilt by saying that he had made his money from dealings in carpets and pictures. The fact that he had ordered his arrest did not mean that there was widescale corruption in the General Government (7. 3. 1942).<sup>20</sup> At a party meeting on 18 March, 1942 Frank stated that it was the height of calumny to claim that there was a crisis prevalent in the economic or any other life of the General Government.<sup>21</sup>

When Lasch learnt of the attitude adopted by Frank towards him, he resolved to pay Frank back and on 25 April, 1942 made

the statement, already referred to, in which he exposed all he knew about Frank and his circle. Lasch described the lavish life led by Frank and his closest colleagues. There was no question of a just division of rations. While everyone else had to be satisfied with their ration cards high officials could get anything without restriction and lived better than before the war. They were an oasis completely untouched by the war. Frank's family was guided by the principle of getting rich at any price.

"He was not", said Lasch, "an example to us. He spent his time wandering from palace to palace in a magnificent limousine with a guard of honour, listening to music, entertaining, and attending banquets. There is nothing about him that is natural, nothing that is straightforward; everything is a theatrical pose, serving to satisfy his arrogance and intoxication with power. His flatterers have persuaded him of his resemblance to Mussolini, assuring him that he is destined to play the same role as *il duce*".

Giving various uncomplimentary details of the conduct of Frank's family, Lasch stated that the Governor General's parlour car regularly transported paintings and large quantities of food to the Reich. Dr Fischer, the Governor of Warsaw, had offered Frank an original Rembrandt from a Polish collection.<sup>22</sup>

A comparatively large amount of space has been devoted to Frank's abuses so as to show the sort of man he really was and how far removed he was in his daily private life from that respect for the principles of law and justice which he preached with such vigour and enthusiasm.<sup>23</sup>

All the same, the revelation of abuses in circles closest to Frank and Lasch's compromising statement did not bring about Frank's recall from Cracow. Presumably such high Nazi officials as Himmler, Bormann and Lammers realized that they themselves were not guiltless and so could be frightened that Frank might, in the last resort, level charges of a similar nature against them. Lasch had talked in his statement of the critical comments made by Frank's circle about high-ranking members of the NSDAP such as Dr Ley, Dr Goebbels, and Minister Funk. It is recorded

in the "Diary" that Hitler invited the Governor General to lunch at the Reich Chancery on 23, May 1942 on the occasion of his birthday and that he was given the place of honour next to the Führer. As a mark of his satisfaction and appreciation, Hitler spent the whole of the lunch discussing with the Governor General reconstruction in the General Government.<sup>24</sup>

It is possible that his emergence unscathed from the situation, caused by the case of Dr Lasch, increased Frank's self-confidence and also led him to undertake his lecture campaign in the Reich in order to distract public attention from the aura of corruption surrounding the Governor General.

Hitler, in the end, did not accept Frank's resignation as Governor General for reasons of foreign policy; Frank was informed of this decision on 3 August by Dr Lammers and on 16 September he resumed his duties in Cracow on his return from Munich.<sup>25</sup>

Hitler took satisfaction in the fact that any influence Frank might have had in the Reich had been neutralized and eliminated; all the same he did not want it to appear that it might have been Frank's policy towards the Polish people that had led to his dismissal.

Frank tried once more, purely as a gesture, to send in his resignation in November, 1942. He informed Dr Bühler with great satisfaction that the Führer refused to accept this second resignation as well. Frank's self-confidence increased all the more, because he took this second rejection of his resignation as a re-affirmation of Hitler's trust and was all the more resolved to establish his supreme authority in the General Government beyond all doubt.<sup>26</sup>

At an NSDAP meeting in December, 1942, Frank said that as an obedient party member he accepted its repudiation of the principles he had declared concerning the supremacy of the law in public life and the organization of the state; at the same time he expressed his hope that Hitler would nevertheless reenforce article 19 of the NSDAP programme, on which Frank had based his interpretation of the law's significance in the State.<sup>27</sup>

The following May Hitler received Frank and conferred with

him for a long time. Afterwards Frank was to boast that his tête-à-tête with Hitler had lasted two-and-a-half hours. As proof that he had regained Hitler's confidence, he added that he had been given the honorific title of "great Realpolitiker of the East".<sup>28</sup>

Hitler also endorsed Frank's appointment as president of the International (Fascist) Chamber of Law; in this position Frank expected—as he boasted—to guide the development of the law in Europe. Hitler probably thought that, as president of a body that would function mainly outside the Reich, Frank would be unable to increase his influence within the Reich. After the Hess disaster, Hitler wanted to avoid any possible impression that there was a new conflict in the NSDAP brought about by Frank's removal from Party offices.<sup>29</sup>



Hans Frank—the Governor General



Hans Frank — in jail







# THE POST OF GOVERNOR GENERAL

ON 15 SEPTEMBER, 1939 Hitler appointed Hans Frank, who was at the time doing his army service in Potsdam as a lieutenant of the reserve in the 9th Infantry regiment, to the post of chief of the civil administration of the occupied Polish territories attached to Army Headquarters. Frank took up his duties in Poznań but, as a result of the incorporation of the eastern part of occupied Poland into the German Reich, he moved his office to Łódź.

By a decree issued on 12 October the Führer named Frank Governor General of occupied Polish territories. He was put in charge of all branches of the administration and was directly responsible to the Führer.

Hitler's decree was to come into effect as soon as the military administration of the territory was wound up: this happened on 25 October. From that day Frank took over, as Governor General, the administration of occupied Polish territories with Hitler as his immediate superior<sup>1</sup>. Frank's first ordinance on the basis of this decree which was issued on 26 October and was concerned with the administration's re-organization appointed as his immediate subordinates a Governor General's Chief of Office and an SS and Police Chief. Under the Chief of Office were the directors of the various branches of administration; while the SS and Police Chief had as his immediate subordinate the Chief of the Regular Police and the Chief of the Security Police.<sup>2</sup>

The General Government consisted of four districts: Cracow, Lublin, Radom and Warsaw. Later Galicia, with Lwów as its centre, was added to them. Each of the districts was administered by a District Governor.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Hans Frank's

Frank made German the official language with Polish only under sufferance. The daily ordinances were issued in both German and Polish but the German was considered the authoritative version.<sup>4</sup>

Hitler's decree of 1 February, 1940 gave the Chief of Office the title of Secretary of State<sup>5</sup>. On 31 July, 1940 Frank on Hitler's authority changed the "General Government of Occupied Polish Territories" into the "General Government".<sup>6</sup> This second ordinance, dated 1 December, 1940, which dealt with the organization of the administration, and in particular its integration, substituted for the "Office of the Governor General" the "Government of the General Government" and gave the Governor General integrated control over each branch of the administration.

The work of the Government was controlled by the Secretary of State who was immediately responsible to the Governor General; under him were the various departmental chiefs.<sup>7</sup> However the SS and Police Chief was immediately responsible to the Governor.

In his third ordinance, dated 16 March, 1941, concerning the administration, and the composition of the Government in particular, Frank emphasized at the beginning that the Government constituted an integrated authority. It was to be made up of the Secretariat of State and twelve Head Administrative Departments.

The Secretary of State, the SS and Police Chief, the Under-Secretary of State, the Director of the Issuing Bank, the President of the Supreme Board of Control, the Chiefs of the Head Administrative Departments, the Director of the General Monopoly Office, the Chief of the Regular Police and the Chief of the Security Police formed, under the direction of the Governor General, or his deputy, the Government as a professional advisory organ.<sup>8</sup>

This together with Frank's very first ordinance concerning the administration of occupied Polish territories which stated that the General Government was a separate territory governed

by its own laws and regulations and that it was represented by the Governor General and the departments authorized by him—all this makes it clear that Frank was trying to make a separate 'state' of the General Government and himself the head of it; the Secretary of State was the Prime Minister of the Cabinet, made up of the department chiefs, that is the heads of the ministries within the Cabinet. Later they were called Presidents of Departments.<sup>9</sup>

A decree issued by Hitler on 7 May, 1942 authorized the establishment of a State Secretariat for Security within the General Government, with the SS and Police Chief being appointed Secretary of State in charge of it; as before he was to be the immediate subordinate of the Governor General. According to the decree, the Secretary of State for Security had to get the approval of the Governor General before carrying out orders received directly from Himmler, concerning security and the consolidation of German 'folkdom'; in turn he had to get Himmler's approval before carrying out those of the Governor General's orders, which had a bearing outside the General Government and affected the overall interests of the Reich. Any disputes were to be settled by the Führer.<sup>10</sup>

A separate decree issued by Hitler on the same date made the Secretary of State for Security the Governor General's permanent deputy in matters of security and his deputy in all matters, if the Secretary of State in the General Government was unable to perform this function.<sup>11</sup>

Field Marshal Göring who had been authorized by a decree of 4 December, 1939 to carry out the Four-Year-Plan gave Frank full powers to act in his place in the General Government; as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers for Defence of the Reich, he appointed Frank Defence Commissioner in the General Government.<sup>12</sup>

On 30 January, 1940, Hitler as Führer and Chancellor issued a decree which gave Frank power of reprieve on occupied Polish territories.<sup>13</sup>

On 6 May, 1940, Frank in his capacity as a member of the

Reich Leadership of the NSDAP (Reichsleiter) started a General Government area of the Party, with himself in charge of its activities.<sup>14</sup> Following a proposal of Lutze, the SA Chief of Staff in the Reich, he also made himself responsible for SA members in the General Government.<sup>15</sup>

The fundamental principles of the National Socialist organization, apart from that of supreme authority, included the subordination and incorporation of party organizations into one overall body and the integration of regional organizations.<sup>16</sup> Frank in numerous declarations stated that out of consideration for these principles he had carefully protected his authority in the General Government, which had been decreed him by Hitler on 12 October, 1939, and would not permit it to be divided with anyone.

At a session of departmental chiefs on 8 March, 1940 Frank announced emphatically: "One thing is certain: the authority of the Governor General, as the representative of the Führer and of the will of the Reich in this area, is indeed strong and I have never left it in doubt that I would allow anyone to trifle with this authority".

Frank went on to give two examples of how he had managed to have two orders made by the central authorities in the Reich annulled in the General Government: one was the order of Field Marshal Göring concerning the sequestration of Polish state property, the other that of Himmler concerning the reservation of confiscated Polish art treasures for the SS.<sup>17</sup>

These principles were re-stated on several occasions—for instance, on 12 July, 12 September and 19 December, 1940.<sup>18</sup>

In order to put an end, once and for all, to any attempts on the part of the central authorities, or other special departments, at direct interference in General Government affairs, Frank obtained a final ruling from the executive; on 25 March, 1941, he announced at a meeting of his government that he had been given almost unlimited plenary powers, according to which all departments in the General Government with the exception of the armed forces were under his orders. As a result, he forbade

compliance with any orders whatsoever coming from any other authority. The General Government was a self-contained unit in the Greater German sphere of power. He warned that he would make use of the authority vested in him by the Führer to take the severest disciplinary action against any official who disobeyed him.<sup>19</sup>

On 23 October, 1943 Frank delivered a lecture on "The Leadership Principle in Administration" at the Nazi Academy for Administrative Law, which trained Nazi officials. In it he developed his viewpoint in accordance with Nazi ideology: "As a country adjoining the Greater German Reich, the General Government is—in the eyes of national and international law—part of the Greater German sphere of power in Europe . . . The General Government fulfils its legislative and executive functions as a state. Sovereignty over this area is vested in the Führer of the Greater German Reich and is exercised in his name by the Governor General, who combines in himself, in the form of a deputy, all the Führer's rights".

Discussing the principle of leadership, he said: "To lead means to bear responsibility—nothing more . . . To bear responsibility means deciding about direction and method, the allotment of tasks with regard to time and subject, deciding who is to carry them out and what has been achieved. These six principles are inherent in the concept of responsibility."<sup>20</sup>

This description of the administrative organization of the General Government shows Frank's dominant, supreme position as Governor General and the master part he played in the Nazi regime there. This in fact was completely consistent with the principle of leadership in administration, to which he was so slavishly devoted.

The excerpts from Frank's Diary presented by the Soviet Delegation to the International Military Tribunal as Document SSSR No 223 provide evidence, from Frank's own statements as Governor General or NSDAP chief in the General Government, of the attitude he adopted towards the Polish population in various matters of day-to-day policy.

In his own words, as they are recorded in the Diary, Frank was a model of loyalty to Hitler and the National Socialist Party. In August, 1942 he had a comprehensive political act of faith entered in the Diary and signed it with his own hand.

"Since 1920," he said, "I have constantly dedicated my services to the NSDAP." He went on to review his career in the Party, regarding its climax to be the trial of the Armed Forces in Leipzig by the Reich Tribunal. "Thus I was, am and shall remain the representative jurist of National Socialism's period of struggle."<sup>21</sup>

At a Party meeting in Cracow in 1944, Frank claimed he was one of the few representatives of National Socialism's infancy and boasted of his loyalty to the Führer. "I have now been with him for 25 years; during many difficult hours, we were bound to each other." In Frank's opinion the execution of Hitler's programme met with opposition from the same front as had defeated Germany in 1918: the Jews, the Jesuits and the Freemasons. (17. 2. 1944)<sup>22</sup>

In Warsaw on 31 January, 1943, the tenth anniversary of Hitler's seizure of power, Frank declared: "We will win since we have on our side a man like Adolf Hitler... Adolf Hitler is the sort of man who appears on the scene only once. He is not Julius Caesar, nor Napoleon Bonaparte and it would be a mistake to make any comparison between him and any figure from history. Adolf Hitler is Adolf Hitler. He is a man apart whose like has never been seen among the statesmen of the whole world."<sup>23</sup>

Hitler had already clearly expressed in 'Mein Kampf' the line that Nazi foreign policy would take: expansion eastwards in the search for 'Lebensraum'. Frank took up this idea and propagated it constantly in his speeches. As early as the first conference of departmental chiefs on 2 December, 1939, Frank had made clear that the administration should be guided by the will of the Führer that the area of the General Government become the first colonial territory of the German nation.<sup>24</sup>

After the capture of Paris and the capitulation of France,



Frank received Hitler's permission to delete "of the Occupied Polish Territories" from 'General Government of the Occupied Polish Territories' and informed his co-workers of Hitler's reasons for the change: "The new name is to show that the General Government is an integral part of the German Reich and will remain so for ever . . . The Führer has told me", Frank gave emphatic assurance, "that he will not give up one square kilometre of this area."<sup>25</sup>

In March 1940, Frank had attended, on Hitler's request, a conference with foreign reporters in Berlin, at which he declared that his Government was "the only legal Government of the Polish people in existence in the world at this time."<sup>26</sup>

From statements made by Frank at a session held on 30 May, 1940 it seems that Hitler had told him early in October, 1939 that he wanted to preserve the area of General Government as a sort of 'rump' state which would eventually be given back to the Polish Nation; but by the beginning of the following November he had told Frank: "We will keep the General Government; we will not give it back ever."<sup>27</sup>

In a speech delivered on 7 July, 1942 to mark the visit of the Hitler Youth leader, Arthur Axmann, to Cracow, Frank declared: "This country is and will for all time remain German."<sup>28</sup>

Frank was so bemused by Hitler's temporary success that during a mass Party demonstration held in Lwów on 1 August, 1942, just like some robber baron from the Middle Ages he emphasized the lucrative aspects of the war: "The beauty of this war is that what we once possess we shall never again give up." He went on to restate in all candour Hitler's imperialist notion of 'Lebensraum': "We must be clear about the fact that the whole war means for us the natural enlargement of the living space of our people . . .

"We stand today on the Vistula and on the Dniestr; tomorrow perhaps we will be in the same position on the Volga as our ancestors were 800 years ago on the Elbe. At that time the Slavonic belt cut deep into what is now the German Reich. They did not hesitate or tremble either at that time but said that this land



would be made German, first by the German sword and then, finally, by the German plough. And they succeeded.<sup>29</sup>

In several speeches Frank repudiated the independence of Poland following the principle of aggressive war as a means of putting into practice the theory of 'Lebensraum'. During an NSDAP demonstration held in Warsaw on 19 June, 1943 Frank declared to the usual storm of Nazi cheers: "The Polish Republic or any really Polish state—however constituted—will never rise again."<sup>30</sup>

In Frank's opinion this state of affairs was not affected by the fact—which he himself admitted on 12 January, 1944—that the Germans, including the police and everything else, made up only one per cent of the population of the country while governing 99 per cent.<sup>31</sup>

Once more—and after the turning point of Stalingrad (30 January, 1944) at that—Frank, perhaps for the last time, committed himself to the theory of subjugation:

"I confirm that the Polish problem in Europe has been settled for all time by victorious Germany taking over the direction of this territory."<sup>32</sup>

## THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF POLICY TOWARDS THE POLES

AFTER he had taken up his position as head of the civilian administration of occupied Polish territories at Army Headquarters, Frank held a conference in Poznań on 3 October, 1939; he outlined the tasks given him by Hitler and the economic and political principles on which he intended to base his administration in Poland.

These required the ruthless exploitation of the country, the removal of all war resources, raw materials, machinery, factory equipment, etc., needed by the German economy, the deportation of manpower to the Reich, the slackening of the whole Polish economy to the minimum necessary for keeping the population alive, the closing of all educational institutions, particularly universities and colleges, to prevent the emergence of a new crop of educated Poles. Poland was to be treated as a colony and the Poles were to be the slaves of the Greater German world state. Frank disagreed with the representatives of the German armaments industry who considered that the Polish armaments industry could be a valuable supplement to German war production. For political motives, he promised his assistance but only in cases which involved supplies of raw materials, machinery, etc. His view seems to have been that since the war would not last long, it was necessary to bring assistance as rapidly as possible to German industry which was suffering from a shortage of raw materials, machinery and manpower. But he also considered that the destruction of Polish industry would make its reconstruction after the war difficult or impossible and that in this way Poland could be redirected to her proper course—that is, an agricultural country dependent on imports of industrial goods from Germany.<sup>1</sup>

The principles of Nazi policy in Poland stated by Frank were endorsed at a conference on future German-Polish relations between Hitler and the Chief of the Armed Forces Headquarters on 17 October, 1939. It was decided that the civil administration's task was not to turn Poland into a province or state on the German model nor to repair its economy and finances. It was to ensure that the Polish intelligentsia never became a class with any social authority; the Poles were to be left with a low standard of living and Poland was to be a source only of manpower. All opportunities of forming national organizations were to be denied.

The administration was to issue regulations on its own initiative and must be completely independent of Berlin. Poland was not to copy Berlin, said the directive, and responsibility for what was done there would not be borne by ministries in Berlin, since they were not dealing with a German unit of administration.

The Governor General should permit the Polish nation only a modest standard of living and his primary concern was to maintain military security in the area for which he was responsible; any tendencies towards normalization of conditions in Poland were to be suppressed. The Government of the area must help to purge the territory of the Reich of Jews and "Polacks". Resettlement was to be the only field of cooperation between it and the new lands of the Reich.

These principles could not be followed in practice without a remorseless national struggle and a complete disregard for law. Methods of this sort, it was clearly stated at the conference, would obviously be at variance with the principles otherwise adhered to by them. The last words of this directive of 17 October, 1939 say that the necessity of once again going to war on account of Poland must be avoided by waging this national struggle wisely and ruthlessly.<sup>2</sup>

Frank was present at this conference.<sup>3</sup>

Inhuman as this directive was, the cold-bloodedness of its tone and the brutality of its contents were nothing in comparison

with the lecture on policy towards the Poles given to Frank by Hitler himself at a conference held in his Berlin home on 2 October, 1940—the end of Frank's first year of office. Hitler declared that the Poles in the General Government were not even to be skilled workers and that the manpower to be sent to the Reich was to consist of casual farm labourers, road gangs and other workers employed in the most menial tasks. The Poles were to be treated as if they had been born to these tasks and were to be given no opportunity for rising to some higher station; on the contrary their standard of living should be low. The General Government was to be a reservoir of manpower for the lowest type of work like road-building or brick-construction.

The vast landowners in the Reich needed cheap seasonal labourers who would not consume during the year a major portion of the harvests gathered by them. The Polish gentry was to be liquidated. Hitler emphasized that for the Poles there must be only one master—the German. Two masters could not exist side by side and that was why it was necessary to liquidate all the representatives of the Polish intelligentsia. However hard this seemed, Hitler stated that it must be a rule of life. The General Government was to become a vast labour camp. The Poles were not to be permitted a higher level of life because then they would become anarchists or Communists. A rigorous German administration was needed to keep this reservoir of manpower in order.

Frank pointed out that Polish workers in the Reich were earning too little to be able to send even one mark home and that this meant that he himself had to support their families; he was answered by Koch, who was the head of one of the districts in the Reich, that the wages of the Poles were 60 per cent of those of the German workers and that this was perfectly just. In addition it should be compulsory for part of their earnings to be sent to the General Government.

Hitler summed up by saying that even the lowliest German worker or peasant must always be at least 10 per cent better off economically than any Pole. Even were the Pole to work

a 14-hour day, he should earn less than a German. The ideal situation would be for the Poles to have only a tiny plot of land of their own and be forced to work in Germany to provide food and clothing for their families.

The Poles should be permitted to retain their Catholicism. Their parish priests were being fed and paid by the administration and in return their sermons should "comply with our wishes". Any priest who resisted should be dealt with without ceremony. Thus it was the duty of the priests to keep the Poles quiet, stupid and backward. That was in their interests, Hitler explained. For if the Poles were to improve themselves intellectually, they would cease to be the source of manpower needed by Germany.<sup>4</sup>

The subject of the Nazi policy in Poland cannot be discussed without mention of the testimony given to the International Military Tribunal by General Erwin Lahousen, a member of German Intelligence. He said that on 12 September, 1939 Hitler held several conferences on board his special train in Jelowa, Lower Silesia. They were attended by Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister, General Keitel, the head of Military Headquarters, Jodl, the German chief of staff, Admiral Canaris, the chief of intelligence and Lahousen himself.

During this conference Lahousen took notes for the diary kept by Canaris. The conference, according to his testimony, discussed plans for the murder of the Polish intelligentsia, gentry, clergy and in general all elements which the Nazis thought could be regarded as representing the national resistance movement.

On Ribbentrop's suggestion Keitel gave Canaris the task of provoking an uprising by the Ukrainian population of the Galician Ukraine, which would make possible the murder of Poles and Jews. The decision to exterminate these sections of the population was in the first instance taken by Hitler himself and he termed it the political 'cleansing of the area' (Politische Flurbereinigung). Ribbentrop told Canaris in Lahousen's hearing that during the 'uprising' all Polish farms should be burnt, while the Jews must be murdered.

Though Frank did not attend these conferences, he must have

been well aware of what was discussed; according to Lahousen Hitler had decided that an appropriate civil official be attached to each military command-post for the purpose of carrying out these plans for murder, apart from those for the 'uprising' in Galicia. This official, according to Lahousen's notes, was to be responsible for the mass murders in his district.<sup>5</sup>

To judge by the statements made by Frank in various speeches, he carried out these instructions to the letter.

Frank advised his subordinates to treat the Poles with an iron hand (15. 12. 39)<sup>6</sup>: "Fate has decided", he explained, "that we are the masters here, and the Poles our subjects entrusted to our protection... There must be a difference between the standard of living of the master race and that of its subjects". (12. 9. 1940)<sup>7</sup>. The policy of the General Government should be guided by the principle that Poland never rise again. The Führer had said that the task of this neighbour of Germany was to finish with the Poles once and for all. (6. 11. 1940)<sup>8</sup>. "We bear the enormous responsibility", Frank instructed them, "of seeing that the backbone of the Poles is broken for all time". (2. 3. 1940)<sup>9</sup>.

Frank did not shift this basic policy, even when fortune began to desert Hitler in the war and the Third Reich was facing the prospect of defeat; except that for tactical reasons he thought it better to take a less rigid line with the Poles so that they could work for the Reich undisturbed.

At a Party meeting on 16 May, 1944<sup>9</sup> Frank declared that the existence of the NSDAP in the General Government was for him a guarantee that all the concessions that had to be made at that time were not final, since the primary goal was the realization of the National Socialist programme. "One was forced", he explained, "to be equivocal: on the one hand, 16 million people had to be kept working; on the other hand, a National Socialist had to say how nice it would be if one could do everything absolutely differently. The Party did not need to bother itself with these political necessities. It could say: very well, this is all necessary politically, but the programme is in the drawer".<sup>10</sup>



On 14 January, 1944, Frank had said: "Once we have won the war, mince-meat can be made of the Poles and Ukrainians..."<sup>11</sup>

These are only some of the many statements made by Frank which corroborate this presentation of his policy towards the Poles.

At a Government session on 16 December, 1941, he announced that the General Government would eventually become a special 'Vandalengau', since the Vandals had planted in Poland the seeds of German civilization. Frank considered the historical defamation of the Vandals as the masterpiece of all the anti-German propaganda of the last two thousand years.<sup>12</sup>

On 1 August, 1942, he declared that the Poles had only themselves to blame for their misfortunes, and that these were inevitable since sooner or later "we would have had to wipe Poland off the map".<sup>13</sup>

On 30 January, 1944, Frank addressed a Party demonstration in Lwów.

"I confirm that the Polish problem in Europe has been settled for all time by victorious Germany taking over the direction of this territory."<sup>14</sup>

Here in a nutshell were the Nazis' reply to the Teheran Declaration, their devout wishes and the essence of the policy on the Polish question which they put forward in answer to the idea of Polish independence.

A few months after taking office in Cracow Frank had reviewed the future fortunes of the General Government. He had said that as far as international law was concerned it was a protectorate, something like Tunis.<sup>15</sup> As his Government's fortunes slumped with the visible approach of the Reich's defeat, for all his repeated slogans about the new Polish policy, he never in fact stepped outside the limits defined right from the start: a colonial protectorate on the lines of pre-war Tunis; "satisfaction of the living and material needs" of the population and its representatives' participation in the administration of the occupant. This was the best fate that the German ruler had in store



for the Polish nation, a nation of more than twenty five millions with a history of statehood reaching back a thousand years; a nation which produced Sobieski and Kościuszko, Copernicus, Mickiewicz and Chopin.

But the real fate awaiting the Polish nation were the Nazi Reich victorious, the reader can judge from the chapters that follow.

## DIRECT EXTERMINATION

ACCORDING to the directives given Frank by Hitler on 2. 10. 1940, the harsh law of life was that the whole of the Polish intelligentsia be exterminated. This merely repeated what had been decided by Hitler on 12 September, 1939 when he had discussed in his special train at Jelowa, the murder of whole sections of the Polish population—primarily the intelligentsia—which he had called “Politische Flurbereinigung”. It can be seen from Nazi documents that Hitler’s grim instructions were put into practice. On 7 September, 1940, Reichsführer SS Himmler addressed the officers of the SS corps who acted as Hitler’s life-guards; he reminded them that in Poland “we had to harden our hearts at the shooting of thousands of leading Poles. We had to be so ruthless or otherwise we would have had to pay for it later. (This is something that you ought to hear, but it is also something you should forget rightaway).” These words applied to the western territories; but documents have been discovered which show that the same thing happened in the General Government.<sup>1</sup>

On 6 November, 1939, the Commander in Chief of the German army in Łódź sent a letter to the Governor General in Cracow. In it he wrote that several army units had reported that the civilian authorities were taking hostages and shooting them without informing the appropriate army units. He asked the Governor General to be so kind as to instruct his subordinates of the necessity of promptly informing the local army commanders of all regulations and notices concerning the Polish population. For his part he had ordered the military to keep in close touch with the civilian authorities and to inform them immediately of everything that happened.<sup>2</sup> This letter demonstrates that the civil administration had also made effective Hitler’s decision concerning the mass-murder of the population of a military-occupied

Propagandaministerium, aus dem Auswärtigen Amt, aus dem Innenministerium, ja sogar von der Wehrmacht vernehmen zu müssen, daß das ein Mordregime wäre, daß wir mit diesem Grauel aufhören müßten usw. Dabei war es natürlich klar, daß wir auch die Erklärung abgeben mußten, wir würden es nicht mehr tun. Und ebenso klar war es, daß bis zu dem Augenblick, wo das Weltcheinwerferlicht auf diesem Gebiet lag, von uns ja nichts Derartiges in großem Ausmaße geschehen konnte. Aber mit dem 10. Mai ist uns nun diese Grauelpropaganda in der Welt vollkommen gleichgültig. Jetzt müssen wir den Augenblick benutzen, der uns zur Verfügung steht. Wenn jetzt in jeder Minute und Sekunde draußen im Westen Tausende des besten deutschen Blutes geopfert werden müssen, dann haben wir als Nationalsozialisten die Pflicht, daran zu denken, daß sich nicht etwa die polnische Nation auf Kosten dieser deutschen Opfer erhebt. Daher war es auch der Zeitpunkt, wo ich in Anwesenheit des SS-Obergruppenführers Krüger mit dem Kameraden Streckenbach dieses außerordentliche Befriedungsprogramm besprach, ein Befriedungsprogramm, das zum Inhalt hatte, nunmehr mit der Masse der in unseren Händen befindlichen auführerischen Widerstandspolitiker und sonst politisch verdächtige Individuen in beschleunigtem Tempo Schluß zu machen und zu gleicher Zeit mit der Erbschaft des früheren polnischen Verbrechertums aufzuräumen. Ich gestehe ganz offen, daß das einigen tausend Polen das Leben kosten wird, vor allem aus der geistigen Führerschicht Polens. Für uns alle als Nationalsozialisten bringt aber diese Zeit die Verpflichtung mit sich, dafür zu sorgen, daß aus dem polnischen Volk kein Widerstand mehr emporsteigt. Ich weiß, welche Verantwortung wir damit übernehmen. Aber es ist klar, daß wir das tun können, und zwar gerade aus der Notwendigkeit heraus, den Plankenschutz des Reiches im Osten zu übernehmen. Aber mehr noch: SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger und ich haben beschlossen, daß die Befriedungsaktion in beschleunigter Form durchgeführt wird. Ich darf Sie bitten, meine Herren, uns mit Ihrer ganzen Energie bei der Durchführung dieser Aufgabe zu helfen. Was von mir aus geschehen kann, um die Durchführung dieser Aufgabe zu erleichtern, wird geschehen. Ich appelliere an Sie als nationalsozialistische Kämpfer, und mehr brauche ich wohl dazu nicht zu sagen. Wir werden diese Maßnahme durchführen, und

zwar,



country—a decision unprecedented for a head of state in modern times. Thus everything went in accordance with General Keitel's instructions to Admiral Canaris at the conference in Jelowa on 12 September, 1939.

As for Frank's position in all this, as head of the civil administration he lent his authority to the shooting and even signed the orders personally, to his great satisfaction afterwards.

When he was informed by the Chief of the Cracow District, Wächter, that propaganda posters had appeared to mark Poland's Independence Day on 11 November, 1939, Frank gave orders that one man should be taken from every house which displayed such placards and shot.<sup>3</sup>

On 6 February, 1940, Frank was interviewed by Kleiss, a correspondent of the leading organ of the NSDAP, 'Völkischer Beobachter' and told him that the practice adopted in Prague of putting up posters for every seven Czechs shot could not be followed in the General Government as there were not enough trees to produce the paper which would be needed if bills were posted for every seven Poles shot. "We had to act harshly", explained Frank.<sup>4</sup>

The mass shooting of the population in the Polish territories occupied by the Nazi aggressors aroused enormous indignation throughout the world and even affected the central authorities in Berlin. This was later borne out by Frank himself at a session on 30 May, 1940: "For me and for every one of you it was terrible during these months continuously to hear the Propaganda Ministry, the Foreign Office, the Ministry of the Interior, even the Armed Forces, saying that this is a regime of murderers, that we must stop these atrocities, etc. It is obvious that we had to state that we would no longer do it. And it was also clear that while the searchlight of the world was trained on us, we could not do such things on a large scale."<sup>5</sup> These words help to explain why Frank for tactical reasons found it necessary to adopt a milder tone at a session on 8 March, 1940. "I have received instructions from the Führer", he told his colleagues, "that the General Government is to be considered the Polish nation's

<sup>4</sup> Hans Frank's

place of domicile. That is why any form of Germanization is out of the question. I want you to pay the strictest attention in your departments to the question of bilingualism. I also want you to issue instructions in the districts and countries that force is not to be used to interfere with this guarantee that the Poles are to lead their own lives. As far as this goes, the Polish nation has, in a certain sense, been entrusted by the Führer to our care and protection. After all, his policy towards the Poles is the card that the Führer intends to play in his coming trial of strength with the Western powers. The Third Reich's growing consciousness of its imperial destiny has found its first expression in the General Government. This consciousness has obliged us to guarantee the peoples and nations who have come under German rule their individuality provided it does not clash with the interests of the German nation. How else would other nations be willing to come under German protection? It is obvious this is another reason why we have certain responsibilities here. For this reason," and here at last is the key sentence amidst all this mildness, "I have also, on the Führer's express orders made all executions dependent on my previous authorization. From this moment mass executions should cease".<sup>6</sup>

Were these remarks about the repudiation of Germanization and the Poles' guarantee of their own way of life really dictated only by tactics? Did Hitler, in March, 1940, really not intend to create some sort of 'rump' Polish State? An answer to this can be found in Frank's famous speech of 30 May, 1940, when he explained the evolution of Hitler's opinions on the Polish question. "It is true that at the beginning of October the Führer told me that he wanted to preserve the integrity of this area as an area left to the Polish nation, as a sort of 'rump' state, which we would one day give back to the Polish nation. However, partly because of reports which had been reaching him from the country about its potentialities in the field of agrarian policy and industry and about the opportunities for massive German colonization and then because of his being struck by the fact that the Polish nation proper, that is to say the lower spheres

—the workers and peasants, are as a rule inclined to work under an iron hand—because of all these reports, the Führer told me and I remember it as if it was yesterday, though it was the beginning of November—that we would keep the General Government and never give it back. Because of this change, it was necessary to draw up a new programme. And the topic which the Führer has discussed with me several times, then became to a far greater extent the subject of our discussions—that is, that the area of the General Government would remain within the sphere of German authority not as a protectorate or something of that sort, but as a creature of the authority of the German Reich, a creature in which the absolute control of the Germans over the Polish lower working strata is guaranteed in every way and in which once the process of Germanization is completed and Germans re-settled in the country on the Warta, Germanization in Western, Southern and Eastern Prussia and in Upper Silesia will be carried out on a large scale.”<sup>7</sup>

From this it can be clearly seen that the conciliatory remarks made by Frank on 8 March, 1940 and the guarantees he gave then of the Poles preserving their own way of life were no more than a tactical manoeuvre calculated for its effect abroad. In fact Frank did not deviate from the line marked out by Hitler in the savage instruction which had been discussed at the conferences of 12 September and 17 October, 1940. Frank's declaration at this same session (8. 3. 1940) is equal evidence of this. Later in his speech, he said that he had given orders for several hundred members of Polish underground organizations to be put out of the way for three months for the sake of peace; at the same time he threatened a formidable mission of destruction should the Poles start anything. “I would not shrink then from a regime of terror with all its consequences.”<sup>8</sup> These orders—the pretext for which was the scotching of an alleged plot against the occupant—for the confinement of several hundred suspected members of secret organizations, was only the prelude to what was called the AB action, which he planned in secret with only the help of SS and police representatives; this was to be a awe-



some campaign against the leading members of the intelligentsia which involved their total extermination.

At a conference on 16 May, 1940, attended by only five of his colleagues, of whom two—SS Brigadführer Streckenbach and Colonel Müller—were representatives of the police, Frank discussed some extraordinary measures for preserving peace and order in the General Government, which was seriously threatened by an uprising allegedly planned by the Poles against the Nazi regime. Here apparently Frank was thinking of his speech of 8 March in which he had forecast that the resistance of the intelligentsia would grow and announced that he had ordered the ‘incapacitation’ of several hundred suspected members of secret organizations just in case.

As if to deprive the resistance movement of its leadership, safeguard the authority of the Führer and the Reich, and maintain peace, Frank charged Streckenbach, the Chief of the Security Police, with carrying out an extraordinary pacification programme. “The ways and means of putting this programme into action will”—according to the official minutes of the session in the “Diary”, “be related to the guiding principles discussed”.

The minutes are purposely confined to generalizations and to vaguely-defined guiding principles. Purely to preserve an appearance of legality—as can be seen from the minutes of the session of 30 May—a warning was given that “any arbitrary action was to be most strictly guarded against”. At the same time a sort of general dispensation was given with the words: “The motive for every action should be defence of the authority of the Führer and the Reich”. Later according to the minutes, “the more important details of the action were discussed and SS Brigadeführer Streckenbach was formally given the necessary authority by the Governor General.” What these “important details” were the minutes do not say. Finally Frank ordered a report to be made on 30 May. The action was to last until 15 June, 1940.<sup>9</sup>

It is not until 30 May that we learn just what all this meant.

At this session, officially devoted to a discussion of police affairs, Frank laid his cards on the table.

At the beginning of his speech Frank emphasized that he had purposely called this meeting after the beginning of the western offensive on 10 May, because any problems of a political nature could be discussed much more freely and in the minutest detail since the interest of the world in what was happening in the General Government had died the moment the offensive had started.

He pointed out that he could carry out the policy decided by the Führer only with the veterans of the NSDAP guardsmen of the SS and Police—no one else, not even the army; in fact these things could only be talked about in the closest circles. The tasks facing them were exceptionally onerous and responsible.

He explained that as soon as the German offensive had started, he had ceased to pay any attention whatsoever to world opinion in what he did. It was necessary only to take advantage of the situation. While German blood was being spilt in the west, it was the duty of National Socialists to make sure that the Poles did not raise themselves at the expense of these German martyrs. It was the right moment for carrying out the extraordinary programme of pacification. Its object was to eliminate without ado political activists and politically-suspect persons then in the hands of the police. This decision had been taken in agreement with SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger and SS Brigadeführer Streckenbach. He frankly admitted that this would cost thousands of Poles—and primarily the intelligentsia—their lives. He told the gathering that he was acting on the orders of Hitler, who had told him that he must destroy the leaders in Poland, discover the new body that took its place and then destroy that within a suitable period.

He went on to explain his idea of how this task could be carried out in practice. He considered it going to unnecessary trouble to send those arrested to concentration camps in Germany, since it would be the 'simplest' thing in the world to carry out a policy of liquidation in Poland.

Frank himself admitted that it would be a terrible task for the rank and file of the police and SS to carry out the executions and no less terrible to entrust them to decent German soldiers. To preserve appearances before these soldiers, policemen and SS men, he had arranged with Streckenbach, who had been given special authority on 16 May, 1940 to put the AB plan into action, that sentences would be passed by summary courts to avoid any impression of arbitrariness. This makes it easier to understand just what Frank meant by his statement on 16 May that any arbitrary act would be punished.

In his concern for the well-being of the soldiers in the execution squads Frank asked the officials at the conference to observe the regulation issued by Dr Siebert,\* under which the physical condition of the soldiers who were due to carry out the executions had first to be examined.

Frank excluded any possibility of reprieve during the AB action. The Reprieves Commission which he had set up had no part to play in this since the AB action was outside the normal procedure and was exclusively the concern of Krüger, the Higher SS and Police Chief, and his subordinates.<sup>10</sup>

In his turn, Streckenbach presented a report on how the AB action had gone so far. It had not really started until the end of March, when about 2,000 men and a few hundred women allegedly belonging to the Resistance were in the hands of the police. Those arrested had been invariably tried by summary courts which meant that there were only a few persons left on whom sentence had yet to be passed. The police had a further 2,000 persons on their books and their arrest had already begun. They, too, would be tried summarily. The action covered a total of 3,500 persons.<sup>11</sup>

Streckenbach's report might suggest that there was perhaps some factual basis for the arrest and summary trial of the persons caught in the AB action. Such suspicions were dispelled by Gover-

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\* Chief of the Department of Internal Affairs in the Governor's Office at that time.

nor Dr Zörner, who expressed the wish that peasants and workers be excluded from the action, as he considered them politically active only to a limited extent; to frighten them would be pointless since it would only interfere with their work.<sup>12</sup> But still more convincing proof of the preposterous humbug of this summary procedure was provided by Frank himself who later in the session warned that he would consider it a glaring infringement of the public interest were some judicial authority so to lose its senses as to take proceedings against any police unit for anything it did under the AB action.

"I have called this meeting",—Frank declared in connection with this warning to the judiciary,—"mainly because I want to draw the attention of Governors and police authorities to the enormous political responsibility we bear in this territory, which reaches far beyond the legal limits of our duties".<sup>13</sup>

Later Frank expressed the opinion that prisoners from the General Government, held in concentration camps in the Reich, should either be handed over to those in charge of the AB action or liquidated in the Reich.

Frank announced that he would call a meeting at the end of June to hear a report on the AB action. It can be seen that the whole business was to be carried out exceptionally rapidly if the presentation of the report was already fixed for the end of the following month.<sup>14</sup> However although Streckenbach informed Frank on 10 July that the AB action was finished, there are certain facts which indicate that it had not even been completed by then.

On 12 July Wille, a ministerial counsellor, told Frank that the methods used in the AB action and, in particular, the extreme variety of the procedures adopted in each case had caused concern among the judiciary. Frank said that the AB action could be considered over and any cases that had not yet been decided would be dealt with in the normal way. But at the same time he announced that he would hold a conference with Dr Bühler (the Secretary of State), SS Obergruppenführer Krüger and SS Brigadeführer Streckenbach on how to deal with politi-

cal offenders, arrested in the AB action, in those cases where a decision had not yet been reached.<sup>15</sup> On 23 July Wille again informed Frank there was some doubt in the General Government whether the AB action was over and once more described the concern this was causing amongst the judiciary. Frank replied that the conclusion of the AB action could be considered official news.<sup>16</sup>

Although Frank assured Wille that the action was over and that normal court procedure would be re-established, he did this only to placate public opinion; in spirit he did not deviate from the policy laid down by Hitler himself for the spilling of Polish blood in order that the biological depletion of the Poles balance the German losses during the war. The "Diary" contains clear proof of this.

At a working session of the NSDAP on 18 March, 1942 Frank said that the administration was making no concessions and shooting people by the dozens. The struggle to achieve its political aims was still going on relentlessly. He repeated the justification for doing this which he had given when discussing the AB action on 30 May, 1940. These executions were necessary, if for no other reason, because common sense said that it was pointless to spare foreign blood when German blood was being spilt. Otherwise it could lead to a decline in the German strain. That was what made it necessary to destroy any symptoms of leaders emerging in Poland with ruthless vigour.<sup>17</sup>

Frank continued to be guided by this same notion about the need for Polish blood to be sacrificed during the war. At a Government session devoted to police matters on 25 January, 1943, he said in reply to a report made by the Chief of the Security Police: "We must not be squeamish when we learn that a total of 17,000 people have been shot. The persons who were shot are also war victims". This figure was nothing compared to the sacrifices of blood being made by the German nation every day and every hour.<sup>18</sup>

To give his shooting of the Poles some formal pretext Frank used the principle of collective responsibility and the execution



of hostages based on it. As an example of this principle in action, there was the shooting of one man from every house which hung out a poster commemorating Poland's Independence Day, which he had ordered in his first months as Governor General on 10 November, 1939. The minutes of Government and Party meetings to be found in the "Diary" are evidence that the administration, with Frank's knowledge and approval, applied the principle of collective responsibility, and were in the habit of arresting and shooting hostages.

At the NSDAP meeting of 18 March, 1942, at which Frank had spoken about dozens being stood up against the wall, the Governor of Radom reported that 50 hostages were to be shot in reprisal for the shooting of an S. D.\* man.<sup>19</sup> At a Government session dealing with Security on 15 April, 1943 the Secretary of State, Dr Bühler stated that the system of taking and shooting hostages was common practice; when Dr Schöngarth, the Chief of the Security Police, tried to contradict him, Bühler replied that for the murder of a 'Landkommissar' (County Commissioner) or a 'Kreishauptmann' (County Chief) 30 hostages were shot in reprisal.<sup>20</sup> At a similar session on 31 May, General Hänicke said that there was, in effect, a state of emergency in the General Government, though it could not be officially proclaimed for political reasons. Himmler's deputy, SS Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner, who was present at the meeting agreed with Hänicke.<sup>21</sup>

The legal authority for applying in full the principle of collective responsibility and mass execution of hostages was provided by Frank's decree issued on 2 October and published on 10 October, 1943, concerning measures that would be taken against sabotage of the German work of reconstruction in the General Government.<sup>22</sup> There is an entry in the "Diary" for 2 October recording that Frank himself had doubts about signing the draft decree and only withdrew his objections after an explanation had been given by Dr Bühler.<sup>23</sup>

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\* Sonderdienst.

Section 1 of this decree made it a capital offence for non-Germans to break any regulation with the intention of undermining German reconstruction. Cases were to be tried by summary courts of the Security Police and the sentence carried out immediately. The court was to consist of two officers of a police unit and its commandant, an SS officer. The court records were to contain only the names of the judges and accused, the evidence given of the crime, the date of sentence and the date of execution.

Frank told another security meeting on 19 October that he had given the Security Police extra-ordinary powers which would eliminate any formal doubts that might remain about this procedure. Bierkamp, the Chief of the Security Police at that time, informed the meeting that as a result of the decree public executions had started of persons who could be proved to belong to the resistance movement. Bierkamp himself used the word 'terror' to describe these executions and reported that the resistance intended to answer terror with terror.<sup>24</sup> It should be added that on Frank's own authorization given on 26 June sentences passed by summary courts were carried out in the same place as the offence had been committed.<sup>25</sup>

The proceedings in one of these summary police courts simply lent an appearance of legality and was in effect no more than a formality; at a conference Frank held with Bühler and Bierkamp on 23 October, Bühler said he thought it best if Poles who were to be shot were first sentenced by a summary court. He also wanted them to stop calling these Poles 'hostages' because the shooting of hostages had always been considered deplorable and provided other countries with propaganda against the Nazi Government in Poland.<sup>26</sup> But from Bierkamp's statements at a conference on 27 October it can be seen that the persons shot were in fact hostages. He said that there were a great many persons in the hands of the police who had been arrested for various criminal offences. They had been sentenced to death but would only be executed should any Germans be murdered: the ratio would be ten Poles or Ukrainians for every German shot.<sup>27</sup>



The mass shooting of hostages aroused misgivings even in the Ministry of the Interior in Berlin; after all, repercussions could be felt abroad. On 8 February, 1944 Schumburg, the Embassy Counsellor, went to Frank on behalf of the Ministry; Frank denied that there was any shooting of hostages but his rebuttal only confirmed the opposite. He said that only those persons were shot who were proved to belong to the resistance, not to have murdered, and still less wounded, a German. The real facts had come into the open earlier in Frank's confession to an NSDAP meeting on 15 January: "I am not afraid to declare that, when a German is shot, up to a hundred Poles will be shot. These Poles are no hostages; these cases involve only those individuals whom the administration has decided are members of the resistance movement or in some other way opposed to our work in the community. The method is known to you; I have first had their names published by the Security Police and an announcement made that if anything should again happen to some German, this or that Pole would be shot."<sup>29</sup>

It can be seen from this statement that the "method" used was to shoot Poles of whom it had not only not been proved that they had taken part in the killing of some German, but also not even that they were in the resistance. At the same time the determination of what was a hostile attitude to the occupant was vague and arbitrary.

Whatever doubts might still remain whether in fact there was shooting of hostages, arrested at random without adequate grounds and often just as arbitrarily charged with belonging to the resistance, would be swept away by the statement made by Bierkamp at a conference dealing with security on 27 September, 1943 (that is before Frank's decree of 2 October). Here are the exact words he used to describe the steps taken against the resistance movement in Warsaw: "Any inhabitant of Warsaw who is not registered and cannot produce a satisfactory identity card must be shot, since anyone who is hiding in Warsaw should be assumed, without any special proof, to be a member of a terrorist group". For this reason Bierkamp intended to post the

names of a certain number of persons belonging to the national or Communist resistance and announce publicly that they would be shot the next time any attempt on German lives was made.

Frank's answer was that he considered such firm measures unavoidable at that time; he asked only that the regulations, issued under this ordinance in each district, be first given to him for his endorsement.<sup>30</sup>

Frank's attitude to the shooting of hostages is illustrated by the congratulatory telegram he sent to SS Obergruppenführer Koppe, Krüger's successor as Secretary of State for Security, after the unsuccessful attempt made on his life in July, 1944. In it he asked Koppe to draw up a plan for collective reprisals. Later, at a conference held to choose the form these reprisals should take, he expressed his support in advance for the shooting of hostages taken from suspected members of the resistance who had been sentenced by a summary court.<sup>31</sup>

As the fortunes of his Government began to wane, Frank according to the "Diary" several times adopted a critical attitude to the principle of collective responsibility. On 31 May, 1944, he told Wille, now the President of the Department of Justice, that he had serious reservations about the system of extraordinary executions and that he thought it essential to repeal the decree of 2 October, 1944 having seen its results so far.<sup>32</sup>

Unfortunately, for all Frank's criticism, the application of the principle of collective responsibility continued, with his approval.

The very first reference in the "Diary" to concentration camps shows that Frank considered them to be one of the legitimate means of repression of the Polish nation. On 7 May, 1940, Dr Fischer, the Governor of Warsaw, informed Frank that Himmler had, during his last visit to Warsaw, ordered 20,000 Poles to be sent to concentration camps; Frank's only objection was to Himmler's encroachment on his authority and his interference in the "orderly management" of the General Government. Otherwise he admitted measures of this sort to be necessary.<sup>33</sup>

Soon after this, when he was beginning the AB action against

the Polish intelligentsia, Frank considered concentration camps too mild a measure and told the session of 30 May, 1940:

"As far as concentration camps are concerned, we were clear about the fact that we did not wish to set up concentration camps, in the real sense of the word, here in the General Government. Whoever is suspected here is to be liquidated immediately...

"We cannot burden the Reich concentration camps with our affairs. The trouble we had with the Cracow professors was awful. Had we dealt with the matter here, it would have taken a different course. I should therefore like to request you urgently not to deport any more people to the concentration camps in the Reich, but to carry out the liquidation here or to impose a regular sentence. Anything else is a burden of the Reich and continually leads to difficulties. Here we have an entirely different form of treatment and this form must be maintained." <sup>34</sup>

Frank adopted an attitude, typical of him, in his own policy towards the Poles; when Wysocki, the former Polish envoy in Berlin, interceded with him on behalf of the Poles held in Oświęcim (Auschwitz) merely for being in possession of leaflets (15 December, 1941), Frank's reply was that Oświęcim did not come under his sphere of authority because it was in the Reich.<sup>35</sup> This was sheer casuistry since the fate of the internees, after all, was in the hands of those who had sent them to the camp. In this case this meant the General Government police and, since Frank doubtless had some control over their actions, he had something to say about who could be sent to a concentration camp and who could be released. Later, in February, 1944 he said as much himself when Dr Schumberg, representing the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs came to him about the matter of an amnesty for the Poles sent to Oświęcim for some trivial offences and kept there for months. Frank did not even suggest this time that Oświęcim was outside his sphere of authority; but he could see no possibility of an amnesty before 1 May of that year and even then he warned against showing any signs of weakness for the moment.<sup>36</sup>

However the moment, or to be more accurate, the Nazi military

débâcle and the clear prospect of losing the war, to which was added the alarm inspired in him by the Moscow Declaration concerning the liability of the Nazi war criminals, was sufficiently impressive for Frank himself shortly afterward to display signs of "weakness".

On 4 April, 1944 Frank sent a note to Koppe, the Secretary of State for Security, ordering the immediate transfer of the forced labour camp in Płaszów, near Cracow, to a less central area because of the dreadful impression made by its dirt and lack of facilities, which were completely at variance with the general course of his policy in the General Government.<sup>37</sup>

## THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE POLICE

THIS ACCOUNT of Frank's biological campaign against the Polish nation—the AB action and the shooting of hostages—leads logically into an analysis of his relations with the SS and police. By themselves, the undertakings that have been described suggest that the police were Frank's most trusted accomplices in his secret designs on the Polish nation and carried them out with the greatest devotion. At the session of 30 May, 1940, which dealt with the AB action, Krüger had said that the SS and police were only able to play their part in carrying out Hitler's directives because the Governor General was personally giving them the most vigorous assistance and backing them up with all the means at his disposal. Towards the end of the meeting Krüger thanked Frank for the new directives he had given the SS and police to guide them in their future work and asked him to rest assured that the police and SS would continue to carry out their duties under the leadership of the Governor General.<sup>1</sup>

It was typical of the close co-operation between the administration and the police during the AB action that it should have been the Chief of the Department of the Interior (Dr Siebert) and not the Chief of Police who ordered any soldiers, assigned to execution squads, to be first given a medical examination.

The last note in this phase of co-operation was the ceremonial farewell given in Wawel Castle to Streckenbach, who had been in charge of the AB action, on his recall to Berlin. Frank thanked him in the name of the Führer and the Reich and said that the achievements of the Security Police in those first eighteen months would go down in history. Streckenbach replied that his time in the General Government had been a period of intense but very interesting work, and that he would always think of the

time he had spent in Poland as the finest in his life. He could not have carried out his difficult undertaking without Frank's confidence and unique support.<sup>2</sup>

But the administration's collaboration with the police was not confined to the AB action. In the report Streckenbach made about the conclusion of the AB action, he informed Frank that the Security Police had reached an agreement with the Department of the Interior over the question of looking after nationals.<sup>3</sup>

To what has already been said about the subordination of the police under the Governor General in order to integrate the administration should be added Frank's first decree on 26 October, 1939 concerning the system of the General Government in which he placed the SS and police commandants under the District Chiefs, and his second decree, on 1 December, 1940, in which he made the District Governors the only representatives of the Government in the Districts like the County Chiefs in the Counties.<sup>4</sup> In the decree on security and order in the General Government, issued on 26 October, 1939, Frank put the Higher SS and Police Chief, whose immediate superior he was, in charge of maintaining security and order throughout the General Government making him personally answerable for this. Frank's only stipulation was that the Higher SS and Police Chief must obtain his consent in all fundamental matters; otherwise he was free to choose whatever measures he thought necessary to carry out his task.

In the ordinance of 31 October, 1941 which dealt with measures to be taken against acts of violence, for which in every case there could be only one penalty—death, Frank gave the Higher SS and Police Chief the right to mitigate the sentence. This decree authorized the police to try any such cases in special summary courts.<sup>6</sup>

The Government held frequent meetings devoted to security and police matters which were attended by representatives of the SS and police. The latter also took part in all the ordinary Government meetings. All this is evidence of the close co-operation between the administration and the SS and police, who in fact





The International Military Tribunal. From left to right: the Soviet, British, American and French judges





were an important part of it. The Governor General also received regular reports from the police as frequently as once a month.

The establishment in 1942 of a Secretariat of State for Security followed an agreement between Frank and Himmler, the text of which Frank had recorded in the "Diary" on 21 April, 1942. Although Frank reminded an NSDAP meeting on 18 March, 1943 that, as a devotee of the principle of an integrated administration, he had obtained Himmler's consent that the Higher SS and Police Chief come under the Governor General's authority and that the police be a part of the Government, he said that Himmler must have powers to adjust police affairs in the General Government to the interests of Reich, though only with Frank's approval.<sup>7</sup>

He himself considered the Secretary of State for Security one of the most important ministers in the Government; when SS Obergruppenführer Krüger took up this post, he called it the "backbone" of State authority.<sup>8</sup>

Another example of close collaboration between Frank and the police was his appointment of Bierkamp, the Chief of the Security Police, as a member of the Government on 9 July, 1943.<sup>9</sup>

Whatever differences there were between Frank and Krüger, who until 18 November, 1943 was in charge of the SS and police in the General Government—from 15 May, 1942 as Secretary of State for Security, they certainly did not arise from the methods of dealing with the Poles adopted by the police.

In January, 1943 the police on Himmler's orders, but without Frank's knowledge, carried out a mass round-up in the streets of Warsaw using unusually brutal methods.\* This provoked an exchange of opinions between Frank and Krüger at a Government session on 25 January, 1943. Frank referred to Hitler's decree, creating the office of Secretary of State for Security, by which Krüger was bound to obtain the Governor General's approval before executing any order of Himmler's; but at the same time he said that he had no intention of censuring Krüger and took the opportunity of thanking him and his colleagues

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\* See Chapter VI. Forced Labour in the Reich.

for their loyal work. He pointed out that should a similar case arise in the future, all that was needed to obtain his consent would be a telephone call—even in the middle of the night.<sup>10</sup>

After SS Obergruppenführer Koppe had taken over Krüger's post on 18 November, 1943, Frank thanked Koppe for his work at a Government session on 16 December, at which he had reported that 150 persons had been shot for an attack on a troop train and 50 persons for the shooting of two administration officials. At the same time Koppe recommended mass executions as an effective means of intimidation. Frank expressed great pleasure that the police in the General Government was headed by so excellent a professional. He assured Koppe that he would receive vigorous co-operation from all the authorities and wished him success in his future work.<sup>11</sup>

The disputes between Frank and Krüger were caused by Frank's dictatorial ambitions and by mutual dislike. All the same Frank undoubtedly managed to retain the whip-hand. He showed this in his dismissal of the SS and Police Chief for the Lublin District, Globocnik, in the summer of 1943 and of Krüger himself in November.<sup>12</sup>

During the talks he held with SS-Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner in Poznań on 12 February, 1944, Frank asked him to tell Bierkamp to follow his instructions regarding policy towards the Poles. In return he was asked by Kaltenbrunner to persuade Koppe not to go any further in his repression of the Poles than the security Police were proposing.<sup>13</sup>

Frank was never sparing on various official occasions in words of appreciation for the police. At a reception for SD\* Chiefs on 8 April, 1941 Frank said that the action of the German Police and SS units in the General Government after the conclusion of military operations and the winding-up of the military administration would be perpetuated as an illustrious page in the history of the German Police and the SS. He had no hesitation in saying that without the collaboration of the Police and the SS the Gener-

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\* Sonderdienst.

al Government could not have been organized in its present form and certainly, not with such vigour.<sup>14</sup>

When SS Obergruppenführer Krüger was promoted to General of the Police on 18 April, 1941, Frank said that what had been achieved by Krüger, his Police and SS, was already a part of history; once more he repeated that he could not imagine the organization of the General Government without the personal cooperation of Krüger, his Police and SS.<sup>15</sup>

## FORCED LABOUR IN THE REICH

HITLER'S dream was to turn the General Government into an enormous reservoir of labour.\*

There was, however, more to forced labour than the obvious purpose of providing the Reich with manpower. The Academy of German Law founded by Frank produced a special memorandum in January, 1940 headed "The Legal Development of German Policy towards the Poles in the Light of the Principles of Racial Policy"; this pointed out that the employment over a few years of hundreds of thousands of cheap workers in the former Reich would in the nature of things bar hundreds of thousands of people from taking part in the biological process of natural increase in their native country. ("Of course steps must be taken to ensure that these people do not participate in this same process on the territory of the former Reich"). Thus, the deportation of Poles to forced labour in the Reich had a further object: the biological conquest of the Polish nation through a deliberate restriction of its birth rate.<sup>1</sup>

In compliance with these aims, Frank on his very first day of office issued an ordinance drafting every Pole in the General Government between the age of 18 and 60 into public works.<sup>2</sup> In a second ordinance on 14 December, 1939 he authorized the District Chiefs to extend this compulsory labour to juveniles between the ages of 14 and 18.<sup>3</sup> Neither of these ordinances said anything about having to perform this compulsory labour in the Reich. It was not till the ordinance of 13 May, 1942 "concerning the satisfaction of the demand for labour needed in work of particular

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\* See Chapter III above. The Guiding Principles of Policy towards the Poles.

national and political importance", known more briefly as the compulsory service ordinance, that it was decided that the General Government acting through the 'Kreisauptmans' could compel anyone who was not a German citizen to perform their service outside the boundaries of the General Government as well.<sup>4</sup> Soon after compulsory labour was introduced. Frank put out an order that the offices in charge pay those doing compulsory labour no more than they thought fit and that they need not feel cramped by any fixed rates of pay.<sup>5</sup> Nazi lawyers explained that the Polish regulations about unemployment benefits had ceased to have any legal force, though unemployment insurance contributions were still obligatory. Payments could still be made to the unemployed by labour offices but only in the form of gifts as from a charitable institution. As Reich Minister Dr Seyss Inquart, Frank's deputy, stressed, the unemployed should not be entitled to any welfare benefits on the part of the labour office.<sup>6</sup> More to the point, Frank, in his second ordinance on social insurance in the General Government (7 March, 1940) said that all claims based on Polish insurance policies were null and void. In their place, there would be a system of benefits, effective from 1 May, to which no legal claim however could be laid.<sup>7</sup>

Göring had given Frank full powers to carry out the Four-Year Plan in the General Government; in his instructions to General Bührmann who was in charge of the department assigned to put the Plan into operation, Frank said that one of the main duties of the General Government was to provide the Reich with at least a million workers of both sexes. This figure was to include at least 750,000 farm labourers—of whom not less than half were to be women—who could guarantee the Reich's agricultural production and also make up the shortage of industrial workers in the Reich.<sup>8</sup>

The Diary contains references to Frank's connection with forced labour shipments to the Reich even earlier than the ordinance of 1942. In March, 1940 Frank had said in Berlin that if the Reich authorities asked for agricultural workers to be sent for compulsory labour he was prepared to order the police to

surround every village, remove the able-bodied men and women and deliver them to the Reich.<sup>9</sup>

On 21 April, 1940, Frank held a key conference on the shipment of workers to the Reich, particularly for farm labour, with his closest colleagues: Dr Bühler, Krüger, Dr Seyss Inquart, Frank's deputy at the time, and Dr Frauendorfer, the Chief of the Labour Department. According to the latter's report about 160,000 agricultural and about 50,000 industrial workers had already been sent to the Reich; about 500,000 in all were to be sent. In addition a fairly large number of volunteers were expected. This was not good enough for Frank. He said that the failure of all such means as proclamations could obviously be attributed to a malicious and deliberate refusal by the Poles to work for the Reich in order to do it as much damage as possible. He asked Krüger whether there was any chance of compelling Polish workers to serve in the Reich. Krüger said this only depended on putting the compulsory service ordinance into practice; and Frank said that the police must take over when the labour offices found themselves powerless.<sup>10</sup> In this way Frank personally inspired the coercive measures used by the police during the conscription of workers for the Reich.

The question of agricultural workers was again discussed two days later on 23 April, when Herbert Bäcke the Chief of the Reich Food Ministry was present. Frank said that Dr Frauendorfer's statement that coercion was the only means left of achieving their purpose had led him to decide on using coercion in shipping workers to the Reich. Circumstances would force them to confine themselves to picking the strongest and fittest, regardless of their qualifications. That was what coercion would amount to in practice. He said that he had no objection to the police arresting Poles who could be sent to the Reich to work. For the administration Poles were merely so many goods and chattels. The streets were still full of persons between the age of 14 and 60 with no occupation. No one knew how to pull in people of this sort and a press-gang was the only answer. Krüger thought the right thing would be to take them from their homes, subject



them to a medical examination and then simply ship them out. Dr Frauendorfer proposed to make it compulsory for people between 16 and 25 to register for work; and Frank suggested that if this proposal were introduced, the term "obligatory labour" be used in the regulation to describe it.<sup>11</sup>

The police applied themselves to this work with such vigour that less than a month later von Wühlisch, on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, complained to Frank about young people being seized as they came out of cinemas and being sent to farm labour in the Reich. Frank replied that force was necessary and that he expected the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to come to his defence in the event of any unpleasantness.<sup>12</sup> There was also a report on the same day of the Cracow Stadthauptmann,\* Schmid that people were being pressed into service in the streets and shipped to Germany. Again Frank replied that he considered such vigorous methods of finding workers for Germany necessary.<sup>13</sup>

At the insistence of the Reich authorities who were constantly demanding transports of large numbers of workers, a conference was held on 10 May, 1940 to discuss the recruiting of workers. Frank reminded the meeting that Göring had considered 1,000,000 workers the minimum. So far only 160,000 had been provided. Permission had been given to conscript workers, since the number of people who had voluntarily enlisted was insufficient. Because of the furore caused by their arresting people to be sent to work in the Reich, Frank admitted that it was going too far to arrest people as they came of church or the cinema though he had nothing against picking up people loafing in the streets. He considered that the best solution would be to organize police raids on the streets which would examine in detail the occupation of each passer-by.<sup>14</sup>

Frank continued to consider these 'round-ups' a practical means of recruiting workers for the Reich. At the police meeting which took place on 18 June, 1942, Frank recommended the or-

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\* Town mayor.

ganization of surprise raids all over Warsaw which would pull in persons unwilling to work; those caught would immediately be loaded into trucks and sent to the Reich; Dr Hummel, the Head of the Governor of Warsaw's Office, replied that it would be useful to change the methods of recruiting workers; they were going about it rather clumsily because they immediately resorted to brutality. At this point, Krüger pointed out that the system of voluntary enlistment had failed. Dr Frauendorfer asked him for the assistance of the police in the conscription of workers. Frank thought that more purpose could be served by voluntary enlistment.<sup>15</sup>

The recruitment of workers was carried out so vigorously that by 16 December, 1941 Dr Frauendorfer could tell a Government session that Poles formed 47 per cent of the foreign nationals working in the Reich. Labour offices in the General Government were sending 230,000 workers a month, or nearly 8,000 a day, excluding the 35,000 people sent from Galicia, and another 16,000 shipped to the coal mines in the Ruhr.<sup>16</sup> Frank gleefully informed Sauckel, Hitler's plenipotentiary for labour recruitment and organization, who visited Cracow in August 1942, that he had sent more than 800,000 workers to the Reich, promised another 140,000 before the end of the year, and still more in the following year—all because he was using the police to recruit them.<sup>17</sup>

The police, so authorized by Frank, were tackling their job arbitrarily and brutally. The Secretary of State, Dr Bühler stated at the conference on 8. 12. 1942 that the haphazard selection of manpower for the Reich was threatening the farms in the General Government, whose harvests were needed in the Reich. In some areas, the method of recruitment was to surround a school and load girls and 14-year-old boys on to trucks under police escort. Any boys who jumped out of the trucks were shot.<sup>18</sup>

This account of the position Frank adopted over using the police to round up manpower for the Reich shows how unwarranted was his angry criticism of Krüger at the Government meeting in Warsaw on 25 January, 1943 during the discussion of

the massive round-up of workers, carried out by the police without consulting Frank, at the beginning of the month. Dr Fischer, the Governor of Warsaw, said that during this 'great action' the police had not only pulled in people off the streets but also out of their homes, and from churches and cinemas, while at the same time destroying identity cards issued by the German authorities. The 'round-up' lasted a week (15-22 January) according to Krüger and had aroused enormous indignation throughout the Polish community. As can be seen from the confidential minutes of this meeting, it took place in an extremely tense atmosphere. The Nazi officials had not excluded the possibility of a rising breaking out as a consequence of this 'round-up'.

Later in the meeting, Krüger himself asked for a limit to be set on the number of workers sent to the Reich; he added that, in one village, the sight of a police officer was enough to make the peasants run off into the woods with their wives and children, since they presumed he had come to the village only to recruit workers<sup>19</sup>.

At a meeting held in February, 1943 to discuss an ordinance which was to make labour enlistment compulsory, Frank said he was prepared to ask the military authorities for a few companies to help him with the conscription of persons unwilling to work, since the police was not strong enough numerically to cope with this task.<sup>20</sup>

The result of such recruiting methods was a situation in which, according to Frank's statement on 14 June, 1943, the General Government had provided the Reich with 1,280,000 workers: this was 76% \* of the total number of workers provided by the occupied countries in the East from the Baltic to the Black Sea. And this did not include from 600,000-700,000 Polish prisoners-of-war. If these are taken into account, about 2,000,000 people were sent from the General Government to work at urgent jobs in industry and agriculture. "This will give you some idea,"

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\* The figure in the original document. For the sake of accuracy it should be 71%.

Frank said with pride, "how much the General Government has done for the Reich".<sup>21</sup>

And this vast number of workers sent to the Reich Frank owed to this use of the police for their recruitment.

Forced labour in the Reich was particularly oppressive because of the inhuman treatment given to Polish workers by the Nazis. As early as March, 1940, Dr Frauendorfer had told a conference, dealing with the shipment of farm labourers to the Reich, that one of the methods used by them to escape service was the production of a disablement certificate issued by a doctor or bailiff. Another was to run and hide in the woods. In one case, out of 800 workers registered only 69 reported for service. Frank's reply at the time was that he had no objection to the most severe and vigorous measures being taken against this sort of thing.<sup>22</sup>

During his conference with Sauckel, Hitler's plenipotentiary, on August, 1942, it was Frank himself who drew his attention to the maltreatment of Polish workers and asked him to annul at least some of the inhuman regulations imposed on the Poles in the Reich in order to facilitate the recruitment of further manpower in the General Government. Sauckel did nothing to improve the Poles' lot. At a Government meeting on 9 December, 1942 Frank again said that "the treatment in the Reich is in no way consistent with the assurances we have been giving the Poles here in the name of the Reich". He recalled the firm promise given by Sauckel that there would be an end to the infamous methods of dealing with the Poles. "We must not crush," he said, "the opportunities we still have in this country for recruiting manpower by treating the Poles in the same way as the Jews . . . Nor can I see so big a difference between the Czechs and the Poles."<sup>23</sup>

These second thoughts brought no change of conditions in the Reich. At a conference on 12 April, 1944, Gerteis, the President of the General Government Railways, thought it possible to attract 1,000 Poles by voluntary methods to work in the Reich. Frank replied that it was better to get 1,000 volunteers than to press 4,000 persons into service. This statement led Gerteis to

bring up the subject of the treatment of Poles in the Reich. This was still much worse than the treatment of all other foreign nationals. The result was that there was hardly a single Pole left ready to volunteer for work in the Reich. There was a list which contained 21 points of worse treatment for a Polish worker than for a worker from any other country. Frank announced that he would do everything to change this state of affairs.<sup>24</sup>

At a Government session on 19 April 1944 Frank reported that Himmler had, on his initiative, forbidden Poles to be given a special distinguishing mark, as had been the rule up to then, and also to be equated with Jews and gypsies.<sup>25</sup>

However none of these steps taken to improve the lot of the Polish workers in the Reich had any effect. At a conference he had with Himmler from 18–19 May, 1944, Frank again proposed that the Polish workers, instead of having a “P” on their uniform, wear their national emblem as was the custom with workers from other East European nations. Himmler agreed and promised to put this suggestion into effect. This promise, too, was never carried out. On 4 September, 1944 Dr Bühler told a Government Conference that the Poles in the Reich were still being treated like dogs; in addition despite the assurance to the contrary, 10,500 more workers had been imported.<sup>26</sup>

The reason for the continued shanghaiing of workers for the Reich, which had been initiated by Frank and vigorously supported for several years until the decline of his authority, was the catastrophic shortage of manpower in the Reich. During a conference on 19 July, 1944, Dr Stuckart, the Secretary of State in the Ministry of the Interior, who had come on a visit from Berlin, told Frank that though the number of workers to be imported into the Reich had been raised to 4,000,000, this figure was not attainable. The need was so great, however, that anyone in Eastern Europe capable of work must be sent to the Reich. The term ‘capable of work’ was to include even ten-year-old children.<sup>27</sup>



## DEPORTATIONS. RESETTLEMENT

IN "MEIN KAMPF" Hitler had laid down Nazi policy for the future as a search for "Lebensraum", the "Drang nach Osten". The theory of the superiority of the German race had led him to reject Germanization of the population of the conquered territories and to propose the 'Germanization', that is the seizure, of the land, the population of which was to be expelled.<sup>1</sup> After the occupation of Polish territory through aggression, Hitler, as Führer and Chancellor of the Reich, in an unpublished decree dealing with the consolidation of German 'folkdom' on 7 October, 1939, charged Himmler as Reichsführer SS with the task of bringing to the Greater German Reich Germans who were allegedly compelled to live abroad; they were then to be settled within the borders of the Third Reich's sphere of interest while settlements of national groups there were to be distributed in such a way that the lines of division between the two would be more clearly marked.

This decree gave Himmler authority to fetch Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche from abroad and settle them in the Reich; to remove the harmful influence of those foreign elements in the population who could be a danger to the Reich and the German national community; and to form new areas of German colonization through resettlement.

As a result of this decree the Polish nation went to their martyrdom, victims of the deportations that sprang from the Nazi political ideals of land conquest by force ('land and blood').<sup>2</sup>

The Nazi Academy of German Law, of which Frank was then President, studied the problems involved in the deportation of Poles from the Polish territories annexed by the Third Reich as a result of the Nazi ideology set down in the memorandum quoted above which was completed in January, 1940.

Under 'General Principles', this stated that:

"1) It is impossible to destroy so large a nation and one with such a tradition as the Polish nation. There is no precedent for this in the history of the last centuries. Even the reduction of a nation to a fraction of its size can only be accomplished in particularly favourable circumstances.

"2) The Polish nation, as far as numbers go, comes seventh, between France (35,500,000) and Spain (19,500,000) among the medium-sized nations of Europe (a total of 23,400,000 including about 17,000,000 in the Reich and the General Government).

"3) From the point of view of preserving their national ethos without having their own national state or in emigration, the Poles have the greatest experience—greater even than the Czechs. At this time the Poles have developed the greatest strength in comparison with other nations. Apart from this they have shown a high rate of increase over a long period. Prussian policy towards the Poles was able to keep the Polish nation at a low level, politically and culturally, but it could stop neither the increase, between the last partition of Poland and the world war, in Polish ownership of land nor that of Polish lives, in comparison with Germans living in the same area. A nation, living at subsistence level and ill-educated, but tied to their land and hoarding it, had proved stronger than a powerful well-administered state."<sup>3</sup>

From these premises, the memorandum went on to solve the individual problems of resettlement:

"The General Government, by use of expensive and, in some cases, long-term methods, essential if agricultural production is to be raised, can at best absorb 1–1,500,000 re-settlers, since it is already extremely over-populated (overpopulation in the Cracow District was 60–65 per cent). There are, at present, about 11,000,000 people living in an area of about 100,000 sq. km. —roughly 110–115 people per sq. km. (in 1925 the figures for Mecklenburg-Strelitz were 37.6, for Mecklenburg-Schwerin—51.3, for Baden—153.4, for Prussia—132). This area contains the largest percentage of rural proletariat in the whole of Europe



(Prof. Oberländer: *Die Übervölkerung Polens, Volk und Reich* Verlag). With an influx of 1,600,000 through resettlement, a proportion of 133 people per sq. km. would be reached—the 1925 situation in the Reich. This would in practice create two problems because of the overpopulation in the countryside and the lack of industry. A figure of 1,600,000 would only be enough to remove from the Reich the Jews in the liberated territories in the East (over 600,000), part of the remaining Jews—especially the younger ones—in the former Reich, in the Eastern Marches, the Sudetenland and the Protectorate, the Polish intelligentsia, politically repressed but capable of leadership, the leading representatives of economic life, including the great landowners, industrial magnates, businessmen etc., and the peasants, if they were to make room for the belts of German settlement which were to surround the areas in the East of the Reich inhabited by the native Poles.”

As a result of this, from six to seven million Poles, excluding the ‘Wasserpöls’, Silesians and Casubians, would remain for some time in the liberated East, and only a slight fraction of them could be admitted to German nationality. Deportations on a scale of several millions could not be contemplated till after victory and then only if there was a thorough re-organization of the East which would provide room for countless Poles—either in Siberia or in less distant areas, for instance with the resettlement of the Byelorussians farther East. Room could also be found by the deportation of millions of Jews (possibly to Madagascar).<sup>4</sup>

During a conference between Hitler and the Chief of Army Headquarters on 17 October, 1939, at which Frank was present, it was decided that the administration of the General Government should help purge the territories of the Reich of Jews and Poles; at the same time co-operation between it and the new areas of the Reich was to concern itself only with resettlement. After this sentence there is a note in brackets: (“compare Himmler’s task”).

On 31 October, 1939 SS-Brigadeführer Streckenbach informed

Frank that the Reichsführer SS wanted all Jews to be removed from the areas newly annexed by the Reich. By February, 1940, about a million people should have been transplanted into the Reich. Families of good racial stock (about 4,000,000) in occupied Polish territory should be transported to the Reich, individually distributed there and in this way 'de-Polonized'. The deportations were to be completed by 15 November. Frank, as reported in the "Diary", gave the task of arranging these transports to Obergruppenführer Krüger, the Higher SS and Police Chief.<sup>5</sup>

Soon after this the mass deportations started of Poles in the areas annexed by the Reich to the General Government. The "Diary" reports that at a conference of Departmental Chiefs on 8 December, 1939, Krüger described the problems arising from the deportation. He said that "since 1 December, there have been many trains arriving daily in the General Government with Poles and Jews from the territories annexed by the Reich. These transports will be coming more or less till the middle of December". Dr Walbaum informed the conference that a few days previously a transport of children, suffering from infectious diseases, had arrived without warning, from the eastern parts of Upper Silesia, in the German hospital in Cracow.<sup>6</sup>

Here are Frank's own words, spoken at a Government session on 9 December, 1942, to describe the conditions in which these deportations took place at the beginning of the occupation:

"At that time there were wild ideas about re-settling hundreds of thousands of Jews and Poles in the General Government. You remember those terrible months in which day after day goods trains, loaded with people, poured into the General Government; some wagons were filled to overflowing with corpses. That was terrible when every District Chief, every County and Town Chief, had his hands full of work from early morning to night to deal with this flood of elements which had become undesirable in the Reich and which they wanted to get rid of quickly."<sup>7</sup>

Frank attended a conference in Berlin on 12 February, 1940, presided over by Göring, which dealt with problems in the East.

Others to attend included Himmler and the District Chiefs of the territories annexed by the Reich. The conference obliged the General Government to take the Jews who had been ordered to leave the Reich and its new areas in the East. According to Forster, the Gauleiter (District Chief) of Gdańsk and West Prussia, a district set up from lands conquered and annexed by the Reich, the population of this district was 1,500,000: of this, the Germans made up 240,000, Poles originally settled there—850,000, newly arrived—300,000, and Jews and 'asocial' (sic) elements—1,800. There had been 87,000 persons deported, including 40,000 from 'Gotenhafen' (Gdynia). Apart from this they would deport numerous elements who were shirking their labour service.

Greiser, the Warta Gauleiter, reported that his district had a population of 4,500,000 which included 400,000 Germans and 400,000 Jews. They had deported 87,000 persons.

Himmler, as Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Folkdom informed them that they had had to settle 40,000 Germans in Gdynia and that room would have to be found for 70,000 Germans from the Baltic and 130,000 from Volhynia. So far no more than 300,000 persons had been deported, while the Polish population was 8,000,000. To make room for Germans from Volhynia, they had already that year deported Polish peasants from the Poznań area, West Prussia and South-West Prussia along the General Government border. Because of the problems connected with resettlement and the essential requirements of the war Himmler postponed for the time being the taking-in of 40,000 Germans from Lithuania, 80–100,000 from Bukovina and 100–130,000 from Bessarabia.

In view of these plans for further re-settlement, Frank declared at this conference with Göring that a continuation of the re-settlement methods used so far would make it utterly impossible to re-organize the administration in the General Government. Amidst all the orders being given, it should be remembered that, legally, the General Government was an autonomous area. In matters concerning it, questions of foreign policy should also be taken into account. Even the reduced plan of the Reich Com-



The Prosecution tables during the final statements of the defendants. In the foreground, the Soviet table with the author — the Polish delegate, (marked by a cross) and the Czech delegate, General Ecěr





missioner for the Consolidation of German Folkdom depended on a solution of the food problem and the time needed for its execution depended on the essential requirements of the war, as Field Marshal Göring had pointed out.<sup>8</sup>

Although Frank was well aware of the conditions under which the resettlements were taking place and at the conference with Göring attacked the inhuman methods being used, his motive in doing this was to underline for the benefit of Himmler and the Chiefs of the Districts attached to the Reich his position as ruler of "an area independent from the legal point of view". When it actually came to implementing the plans for further deportations Frank not only agreed to them but even gave them his active support. At a special conference to deal with the question of Polish and Jewish settlements in the General Government, held on 15 January, 1941, SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger gave a report on a conference that took place in the Main Reich Security Department in Berlin on 8 January, and which was presided over by SS Gruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich. They had discussed the question of rapidly deporting the Poles and Jews from the eastern parts of the Reich and replacing them with Volksdeutsche from Volhynia, Latvia, etc. The total number of people deported would come to 831,000. In addition about 200,000 thousand people would have to be resettled in the General Government in connection with the clearing of training grounds for the army. The representatives of the General Government raised no objections to these plans since in accord with the directives of the Führer and the opinion of the Governor General the resettlement of people from the Reich was to be the main task of the General Government in 1941.

At the conference of 15 January, 1941, Dr Bühler, the Secretary of State, had announced that he considered it impossible to find room for a million people within the area of the General Government since it would lead to upheavals because of the difficulties of maintaining security and food supplies; Frank's reply was that if there were any disturbances the strictest methods were to be used.<sup>9</sup> It should be added that a few days earlier (11.

1. 41) Krüger had replied in the negative to Frank's question as to whether the Reich authorities had made any arrangements for food, clothing, etc. which would be needed in the resettlement of such a huge mass of people. Frank then quoted Hitler's statement that the General Government had to take in deportees from the Reich.<sup>10</sup>

As far as the Germanization of the General Government was considered Frank considered that this could take place after the corresponding process had been completed in the territories newly annexed to the Reich. At a meeting of Department Chiefs on 12 April, 1940 Frank explained this problem in the following words:

"A policy of complete Germanisation can only begin in the General Government after Warta, Southern Prussia, Gdańsk, the South-Eastern Area and Upper Silesia have become German in the sense meant by the Führer."<sup>11</sup>

At the secret session concerning the AB action on 30 May, 1940 Frank referred to the attitude adopted by Hitler in his conversation with Frank right at the beginning of November, 1939. He had said that the Germanization of the General Government on a large scale was to follow the Germanisation of the territories annexed by the Reich. In Frank's words it would be a repetition of what had happened to this same Slav nation one thousand years earlier: this was the place to which it had been driven and where it had been contained.

Frank went on to talk of the possibilities of Germanising Polish children with fair hair and blue eyes and announced that the Nazis could definitely see in this race traces of German stock. Both he and the Führer had come to the joint conclusion that this area had to be Germanised in the way indicated though for the time being it was immaterial whether this process took place in the next fifty years or the next hundred.<sup>12</sup>

In March, 1942, Himmler visited Cracow and had several confidential talks with Frank on the question of resettlement. The first stated that Himmler had asked for the "historically German" city centre of Lublin to be handed over to German



officials and the similarly qualified market place in Zamość. He thought that German peasant families from Bessarabia should be resettled in the Zamość area. These families should be settled on the estates of the landowners to avoid upsetting the Polish peasants and so prejudicing the harvest. If they did not want to use peasants from abroad, they should work out a method of resettling the area with farmers from the German areas round Piotrków.

The second report says that Himmler unfolded his plans for resettlement in the nearest future and his projects for Germanization. He expressed the view that with the passage of time the Highlanders\*, should be Germanized since in his opinion there could be no doubt about their springing from original German stock or at the very least being a cross-breed. For this purpose Himmler recommended that a number of children with fair hair and blue eyes be placed in schools in the districts concerned. After this the parents of these children were to be given better living conditions but only in cases where they agreed to their children being taught German and improving themselves from the treasury of German thought. Later the areas occupied by these three races could be settled with some other Germans. They should bear in mind the possibility of resettling Germans from Slovakia\*\* in this area. In the first five years of the resettlement campaign after the war the first districts to be filled should be the new German ones in the east. After this it was planned to cover the Crimea and the Baltic countries with the first layer of German settlement. Additional German enclaves might be settled in the General Government from European countries. Plans called above all for a strong settlement along the San and the Bug so as to catch the foreign races in Poland in a pincers. History had shown that this form of encirclement had been the speediest method of depriving an area of its national identity.

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\* In the original: "Die Goralen, Lemken und Huzulen" – in Southern Galicia.

\*\* In the original: "Die Zipsdeutschen aus der Slowakei".

These reports do not say what attitude was adopted by Frank towards Himmler's long- and short-term plans.<sup>13</sup>

At a Government session in Cracow on 4 August, 1942, Krüger, who at the time was Secretary of State for Security, reported that Himmler in his position as Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Folkdom planned to settle Volksdeutsche from Bosnia, Bessarabia and other European countries in the Lublin and Zamość areas. Frank gave his agreement in principle and only asked that he be presented with the final plan at the end of September so that resettlement could start in November.<sup>14</sup>

At the start of the session, Frank told the meeting that he was extremely dissatisfied that Himmler during his visit to Lublin had issued orders without consulting him. Frank even maintained that the powers of Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Folkdom belonged to him within the borders of the General Government on the strength of Hitler's decree which had set up the office of Governor General. But it was only a question of his authority and of his injured ambition, since in principle he had no objections to the resettlements planned.<sup>15</sup>

However, Krüger, as Himmler's Deputy as Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Folkdom, in December, 1942 began on his orders the deportation of Polish peasants from the Zamość area and their replacement with the first 4,000 Volksdeutsche without first informing Frank. These deportations called forth active resistance on the part of the Polish peasants and widespread disturbances in the whole country. Only 50 per cent of the Polish peasants were left after the deportations. At a Government session on 25 January, 1943 Krüger gave a very general picture of the campaign just begun to settle the Zamość area with Volksdeutsche, referring to the conference on this question held in Cracow in the summer of 1942.

Though Frank asked Krüger not to give orders of such enormous political significance on his own initiative without consulting him, he was more concerned, as in the case of the huge round-ups organized by the police in Warsaw in January, 1943, discussed

at this same session, with maintaining his authority as Governor General over Krüger than with the fate of the deportees. Frank had no word of criticism or even the slightest misgivings when told by Dr Fischer, the Governor of Warsaw district, of the inhuman transports of Zamość children, torn from their parents, and of the high feeling among the peasants as a result of the deportations. Nor did Frank criticise the detention of the deportees in concentration camps so that they could be sent to forced labour in the Reich, about which Krüger told him at the same session.<sup>16</sup>

The indignation caused by these deportations of the Polish peasants from the Zamość area led Krüger to admit on 3 February, 1943 that it would be almost impossible to undertake any further resettlement. He suggested to Himmler that for the time being he postpone his plans.<sup>17</sup> Nevertheless Bühler declared at a Governor's conference on 22 February that the resettlement campaign in the Zamość area was still continuing, although it had led to serious economic losses, particularly as far as food was concerned. All the same Frank refused to stop the resettlements altogether. Referring to Hitler's wishes, he considered that it was wrong to look at the problem purely from the point of view of economic profit and loss but that it should be regarded as a necessity of the first order.<sup>18</sup> Frank did not change his views even though Dr Losacker, the President of the Main Department of the Interior, also announced on 31 May, 1943 that deportations in the Lublin District had brought fatal consequences.<sup>19</sup>

On 13 July, 1943 Dr Naumann, the President of the Main Department of Food and Agriculture informed Frank that he had received a telegram that day from Dr Claus, the Head of the Food and Agricultural Department in the Office of the Governor of the Lublin District; this said that in the southern areas of the District a vast resettlement campaign had once more started which would involve about 200,000 people. The campaign was to be concluded at the end of that same week. Frank replied that the Governor of the Lublin District had informed him that the resettlement campaign was being carried out strictly within the

limits jointly prescribed by the Governor General and Himmler. After hearing the rest of Naumann's account Frank decided to send a telegram to the Governor to check that everything was in fact following the agreement concluded between him and Himmler. Frank continued in principle to approve of the new large-scale deportations even though Naumann pointed out that Dr Claus wanted this second high-handed police action called off since the losses it had caused were taking on enormous dimensions.<sup>20</sup>

A week later at a Government session (22. 7. 1943) Frank could have had not a single misgiving left concerning these deportations, since he said: "Since large-scale evacuations had once more to be undertaken in connection with the pacification of the Lublin District, I would like to take this opportunity to stress that all these orders have no significance compared to the misery and evacuation orders arising out of a single mass bombing raid on a large Rhine town..."

So too, when General Becker informed him at the same session that the campaign against resistance bands in the Bilgoraj woods had led to more deportations, Frank said that the evacuation orders had been given after full agreement between him and Himmler.<sup>21</sup>

Chapter III: Guiding Principles of Policy Towards the Poles described how the rapidly deteriorating position of the Nazi armies on the Eastern front had influenced a change in Frank's attitude towards the Poles. His policy became more concerned with keeping the country quiet, postponing the final settling of accounts with the Polish nation till after the war. The deportations were not consistent with these guiding principles of policy. At the secret Government security session on 31 May, 1943, Krüger himself admitted that the resettlement campaign was threatening security. And Dr Fischer, the Governor of Warsaw, and Zörner, the Governor of Lublin, stated immediately after the first deportations in the Zamość area (25. 1. 43) that they were causing losses to agriculture.<sup>22</sup> These alarms induced Frank to adopt a critical attitude towards deportations, if they took place during the war.

A speech made on 2 August, 1943 in which Frank explained the targets of his new policy contained assurances that the Poles would be removed from the General Government once the war was over; he then said:

"It is impossible to try to carry out this settlement now and so provoke the country into an insurrection."<sup>23</sup>

The deportations interfered with the peace and quiet needed if the populace were to work for the Reich, and at the same time endangered security, which became increasingly difficult to maintain. Both these aspects of the problem were also dealt with by Frank in the following and last year of his regime (1944).

At a congress of Nazi agricultural experts held in Zakopane on 12 January, 1944 storms of applause greeted Frank when he said: "If one forcibly and senselessly drives hundreds and thousands of Polish peasants from their farms, then it is no wonder if they take to the forests as robbers".<sup>24</sup>

However, Frank continued to uphold the basic Nazi conception that the Poles would be deported from their native land, when the right moment came: "It is a luxury to do anything that can be done better after the victory. There is a clear answer to the question as to how this land will be colonized in due course. I am also clever enough to know that it will not be the Poles who remain here. But it is a luxury to permit any disturbances on this area at present..." (17. 2. 1944).<sup>25</sup>

"In the course of the coming decades, intensification of German colonization will certainly take place. It is as clear as daylight that the Vistula country will be as German as the Rhineland." (16. 5. 1944).<sup>26</sup>



## PERSECUTION AND EXTERMINATION OF THE JEWS

THE "DIARY" has preserved the part played by Frank in the persecution of the Jews—both in his ordinances and above all in his speeches. The source of Frank's anti-Semitism was that profession of the Nazi doctrine—Adolf Hitler's "Mein Kampf". The Nuremburg Laws and the persecution of the Jews in the Third Reich before the war were only the first stage of the campaign to which Hitler was driven by the blind hatred expressed over and over in "Mein Kampf".<sup>1</sup> Hitler's hatred of the Jews was not motivated by economics and increased rapidly as his fortunes declined—a fact for which he blamed Jewish influences all over the world. This is borne out by all his speeches on the Jewish question, for instance those of 30. I. 39 and 30. I. 1941, and that made on the day he launched his attack on the Soviet Union—22. 6. 1941.<sup>2</sup> There is not a single word in them about economic motives. He was supported by his closest colleagues—Goebbels, in particular, in a famous series of articles published in "Das Reich", the tone of which became still stronger after hopes of a rapid victory over the Soviet Union had been dashed ("Die Juden sind schuld"—16. 11. 1941). His hatred of the Jews lived with Hitler until his death and found its final expression in his will.<sup>3</sup>

Field Marshal Göring, who was authorized to carry out the Four-Year Plan, gave SS Gruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich orders on 24 July, 1939 to prepare the settlement of the Jewish problem by means of deportations or compulsory emigration—as conditions at the time permitted.<sup>4</sup> Hitler in a speech delivered in the Reichstag on 30 January, 1939, had said that a second world war would bring with it an extermination of the Jewish race in Europe. On the basis of this Heydrich on 21 September,



1939 sent urgent and secret orders concerning the Jews on occupied territories to the commandants of all the detachments of the Security Police involved in the war in the East. Quoting a conference held on the same day in Berlin he underlined once more the necessity of maintaining the strictest secrecy about these plans and their ultimate aim. He reminded them that the attainment of these ends would take some time, and that therefore the orders would be given in instalments to be executed in short stages. From this introduction Heydrich passed to the detailed plan of action. Jews living in the country were to be herded into larger towns situated on main lines of communication. Councils of elders were to be set up in these Jewish colonies who would be responsible to the German authorities. While carrying out this plan the police were to work hand in hand with the civil administration and the military authorities. A register of the Jewish population was to be kept with reports of their number sent in regularly.

Copies of these urgent instructions were sent to the Army High Command, to Göring, who had been authorized to carry out the Four-Year Plan, to the Ministries of Internal Affairs and of Food and Economy, and to the heads of the civil administration on occupied territories. This is indisputable evidence that both the Nazi military authorities and the civil authorities in Germany and the occupied territories knew of the plans directed against the Jews and helped the police to carry them out.<sup>5</sup>

The fate of the Jews had been settled by the central authorities while the whole Jewish question was made the responsibility of the SS and police; Frank must obviously have known all this. All the same in his ordinances concerning the Jews he was not only a willing instrument of the police, to whose province these questions belonged, but even tried to present his part in the persecution of the Jews as the leading role so as to create the impression that the orders against the Jews had originated with him.

Frank introduced forced labour for the Jews in the General Government leaving the issuance of the regulations to cover this to the Higher SS and Police Chief (ordinance of 26. 10. 1939).<sup>6</sup>

He made it compulsory for Jews to wear an armband with a 'Star of Sion' (23. 11. 39).<sup>7</sup> He confiscated all their movable and immovable property, making failure to declare their property or property rights both in the General Government and abroad punishable by imprisonment or fine (24. 1. 40).<sup>8</sup> His ordinance restricting the Jews' choice of place of residence (13. 9. 40) provided a legal basis for the establishment of Jewish districts or ghettos. These restrictions were to apply only to a certain group of persons.<sup>9</sup> He forbade the Jews under pain of death to leave the districts marked out for them (15. 10. 41).<sup>10</sup> He created a Jewish district in Warsaw (19. 4. 41).<sup>11</sup>

The "Diary" records both Frank's order that the Jews must wear a 'Star of David' on their arms (10. 11. 39)<sup>12</sup> and his statement (12. 9. 40) that he had decided on the sealing of the Warsaw Ghetto so as to lessen the danger of 500,000 Jews being able to move about freely.<sup>13</sup> The "Diary" also contains his unequivocal announcement (12. 4. 40) that the Jews were to be expelled from Cracow, with the exception of 10,000 craftsmen, so as to protect Nazi generals and officials from the necessity of having to share a roof with Jews and so being threatened with contamination (epidemic).<sup>14</sup>

After the completion of the military action against Poland Hitler announced in the Reichstag on 6 October, 1939 that the Nazi Government would try to settle the Jewish problem in Europe.<sup>15</sup> After the successful campaign in France, Frank declared on 12 July, 1940 that the peace would be shortly followed by an expulsion of the Jews from Germany, Czechoslovakia and the General Government to one of the African or American colonies—perhaps Madagascar—which the French Government would hand over for this purpose. He said that he was going to ask Hitler to place an embargo, in connection with these plans, on further deportations of Jews from Germany to the General Government.<sup>16</sup> On 25 July, 1940 Frank once more forecast with roguish humour the expulsion of the Jews beyond the seas.<sup>17</sup>

As can be seen from the "Diary" the martyrdom of the Polish Jews began very early, though cases were sporadic to start with.

On 2 December, 1939 Frank told his colleagues that there was no need for communiqués about the shooting of Jews to be issued in order to frighten them (from breaking Nazi regulations).<sup>18</sup> From the moment he took office Frank was not only on the side of this unjust and inhuman method of dealing with the Jews but also of the whole Nazi programme of Jewish persecution wherever the Nazis were in power. This is why he emphasized his gratification that the Polish Jews had fallen into Nazi hands: "Look at the Jews. First we caught up with them in Vienna, then in Prague and now in Warsaw. We have caught them in Copenhagen and Oslo and even in Amsterdam and Brussels; tomorrow we may get our hands on them in other cities of the world" (20. 5. 1940).<sup>19</sup>

In July, 1940 Göring told Heydrich to get everything ready for the final settlement of the Jewish question in the German sphere of influence in Europe and referred to his ordinance of 24 January, 1939. Should this preparatory work encroach on the province of some other of the central authorities, it was to be drafted into participation in these preparations.<sup>20</sup> In January, 1942 a conference was held in Berlin at Heydrich's office to deal with this question which was attended by Dr Bühler representing Frank. This conference had been announced by Frank himself at a Government session in Cracow on 16 December, 1941 when he spoke to his colleagues about the great problems involved in the choice of method of complete extermination of the Jews. This was the most terrible statement ever to have come from the mouth of a Nazi statesman. Both the conference and all the other details of the preparatory work were veiled in the strictest secrecy in accordance with Heydrich's decree of 21 September, 1941 on which they were based.

"We must destroy the Jews," said Frank, "wherever we come across them . . . this just happens not to come within the framework of legal procedure. One cannot apply the views which have been current to date to such gigantic and unique events. Anyhow we must find a path which leads to the goal and I am thinking about it."<sup>21</sup>

In his speech of 30 May 1940 dealing with the AB action Frank, had considered the extermination only of the leading sections of the Polish intelligentsia; at this session he was deciding the extermination of millions.

The inflammatory nature of Frank's many speeches on the Jewish question must be emphasized, particularly this grim statement about the final annihilation of the Jews. This was a propaganda of hatred emanating from the highest position in the General Government and often directed to the lowest ranks of the Nazi hierarchy—the police and gendarmerie who were to be the executors of the law. For this reason the worse the example given at the top, the greater Frank's responsibility. For example, addressing the men of a guards battalion in Cracow on 19. 12. 1940, he said that obviously all lice and all Jews could not be wiped out in the course of a single year, but that this could be achieved eventually if his listeners would help him.<sup>22</sup> The following day (20. 12. 1940), he said almost the same thing to men of the regular police.<sup>23</sup> At the session of 16 December, 1941, he also emphasised the necessity for taking the severest steps against any Jews who left the ghettos and asked that the death sentence, mandatory in such cases, be carried out with all haste.<sup>24</sup>

At a Government session on 18 June, 1942, attended by Frank, there was a discussion about the deportation of the Jews shut up in the ghettos. Bühler asked SS Obergruppenführer Krüger as Secretary of State for Security whether a rapid reduction of the population of the ghettos was in sight. Krüger replied that he had been assured of the cooperation of Gerteis, the president of the railways in the General Government, who had promised to provide a sufficient number of wagons.<sup>25</sup>

A separate chapter in the story of the part played by Frank in the persecution of the Jews must be given to his destruction of them by hunger. At the first definitive conference held in the General Government, on 23 April, 1940, to deal with the question of feeding the population, a conference attended by Under-Secretary of State Backe, the deputy of the Reich Food Minister, Frank had stated that it was of not the slightest concern to him

if the Jews had anything to eat since the problem did not interest him in the least.<sup>26</sup>

On 15 October, 1941, Frank expressed the opinion that there was no need to supply the Jews with food.<sup>27</sup> Announcing the extermination of the Jews on 16 December, 1941, he gave as one of the reasons for this step the trouble involved in feeding these 3½ million "exceptionally dangerous gluttons".<sup>28</sup> When the malnutrition of the Polish population of the General Government began in 1942 to have the appearances of a famine, Frank said, while discussing the food problem on 24 August: "In passing, may I say that we are sentencing 1,200,000 Jews to death by hunger. It is obvious that if the Jews do not die from hunger the execution of the anti-Jewish orders will have to be speeded up."<sup>29</sup>

After the almost complete annihilation of the Polish Jews and the Jews deported to the General Government for that purpose which had taken place in 1943 as a result of the "Reinhard Action", Frank did not fail to express his satisfaction: "To anyone who asks what can become of the NSDAP we can answer: the NSDAP will certainly outlive the Jews. Here we started off with 3,500,000 Jews of whom only a few labour companies are left. All the others have—let us say—emigrated." (2. 8. 1943).<sup>30</sup>

Speaking in Berlin on 25 January, 1944 Frank said that there were perhaps only 100,000 Jews left in the General Government.<sup>31</sup> Finally—at a NSDAP meeting on 4 March, 1944 he admitted that there might be those who would feel pity for the fate of the Jews. "What a terrible thing has been done to the Jews," they might say. But he considered the extermination of the Jews as a service rendered by National Socialism: "Nobody else would have been able to deal with it." Not a single human consideration suggested itself to Frank. "The Jews are a race that must be wiped out; whenever we catch one he will be liquidated".<sup>32</sup>

After the total destruction of the Warsaw ghetto in the spring of 1943, Krüger admitted at a Government session on 31 May that the extermination of the Jews had been one of the most



difficult and unpleasant operations undertaken by the police: nevertheless it had to be carried out since such were the Führer's orders.

He went on to say:

"We had to remove the Jews from armaments factories and war production, with the exception of the most important branches of war production. The Jews who remain live in large camps and leave them only for work . . .

"In the factories there remain those Jews who are the best physical specimens, called 'Macchabees', who are model workers. Apart from them Jewesses are also employed. It has been seen that they are much stronger than the males. These observations were also made during the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto. This was a very difficult operation. Police losses came to 15 dead and 88 wounded. There too Jewesses fought with the men of the SS and the police to the death, never abandoning their weapons."<sup>33</sup>

Although in a conversation with Hitler in his headquarters on 6 February, 1944 Frank had said that the "removal of the Jews from the General Government had been an enormous burden in the country's general situation", he had immediately added: "At the moment all that is left is manpower that is absolutely indispensable, employed in work that it would be impossible to carry out without them."<sup>34</sup>

After the extermination of the Jews, the administration of the General Government tried to use the funds obtained from the sale of the movable property that had belonged to the Jews to prop up the currency of the General Government which was threatened with depreciation. An appropriate agreement was made possible with the support of SS Oberguppenführer Koppe, the Secretary of State for Security during Frank's conference with Hitler in Poznań on 22 February, 1944. The General Government administration was to be given part of the proceeds of the Reinhard action which was being supervised by the SS and Police Chief in Lublin, Odyl Globocnik.<sup>35</sup>



## Chapter IX

### ECONOMIC DEVASTATION

THE GUIDING principles of Nazi policy in Poland, described in Chapter III, also determined the economic policy of the Governor General: a policy of plunder and economic devastation of the country. This was supported by the instructions given in October, 1939 by Göring who had been authorized to carry out the Four-Year Plan. According to these, all raw materials, machinery, etc, which could help Nazi war production, were to be removed from the General Government. All enterprises, except those essential to keeping the population alive, were to be transferred to Germany, unless it was considered better, for practical reasons, to exploit them on the spot.<sup>1</sup>

Recalling after three years of rule this early mania for destruction, Frank described it in these words (9. 12. 42):

“Hand in hand with the tendency to regard the General Government as a dung-heap on which all the rubbish of the Reich could be dumped, went the tendency towards complete economic devastation of us. It was said that it would be a great advantage if this area ceased to have an economy of its own — so let’s remove from this country all the important machinery, let’s dismantle all the important factories, let’s destroy, if it is at all possible, all the important lines of communication and electricity networks. They even mooted a plan to remove all telephone and telegraph cables, to remove all railway equipment, such as railway lines, to the Reich, leaving only some one-track railway lines, which would satisfy basic needs. It was further said that there was no purpose in admitting within this area any form of organized life. The whole General Government was simply to be treated as a concentration camp. The only people who would be allowed any freedom of movement would be the guards.”<sup>2</sup>

On 2 December, 1939, Frank announced:

"As a matter of principle, it is to be added, on the subject of the administration of the General Government: this area is, in its entirety, booty of the German Reich. It thus cannot be permitted that this territory should be exploited in its individual parts, but the area must be subjected to economic utilization as a whole and it should benefit the German people with its entire economic assets."<sup>3</sup>

On 19 January, 1940, he explained the change in the attitude of the Nazi leaders to the role of the General Government.

"On 15 September, 1939, I received instructions to take over the administration of the occupied Eastern territories, accompanied by a special order to exploit this sphere ruthlessly as a war territory and a land of booty, to turn it, so to speak, into a heap of ruins from the point of view of economic, social, cultural and political structure. This attitude has changed completely under the influence of my work of persuasion over the last few months. Today the territory of the General Government is viewed as a valuable constituent part of German living space. The policy of ruthless destruction of this area has been replaced by a policy of treating it considerately to the extent in which it can, in its present situation, prove of benefit to the Reich. An important consequence of this new line is the introduction to this area of the Four-Year Plan through which this area has been made part of all-German targets."<sup>4</sup>

On being appointed Göring's plenipotentiary for the execution of the Four-Year Plan in the General Government, Frank set up a separate department to deal with these matters, which would be directly responsible to him. In the directive sent to the head of this department on 25 January, 1940, Frank told him to manage the economy of the General Government in such a way as to achieve in the shortest possible time the maximum that could be extracted from the economic resources of the General Government for the immediate bolstering of German defence. Thus the directive precluded the conducting of any long-range economic policy.



The dock and the counsel of the defendants



The details of Frank's directive were an intensification of agricultural production and the maximum exploitation of timber, but they repudiated all the principles of a planned economy. The forests were to provide the Reich with a million cu. m. of cut timber, 1.2 million cords of pit-props, and 0.2 million cords of plywood. The directive also sought an intensification of the production of industrial raw materials such as iron ore, etc., an increase in the output of oil, which would be sent to the Reich, a rise in the efficiency of industrial establishments in the execution of orders given them by the army. In the supply of food to the population, priority was to be given to those employed in war production, while the rest were to be kept on iron rations. Without exception, all factories were to be destroyed which were not essential to the civilian population, which required raw materials needed by the armaments industry and which could not make use of some substitute material, as for instance wooden shoes for the population.<sup>5</sup>

The results of this directive given by him concerning the policy of enhancing the war potential of the Reich were presented by Frank at a conference on 2 March, 1940.

"Today the General Government, from the point of view of the economy, is a desert. The Four-Year Plan has, as far as has been possible, wrung everything from it there was in way of raw materials. Even that was to the good, since the requirements of the Reich as far as raw materials are concerned, are enormous. We have done everything we could in this department. If necessary we shall take all steps to shape the standard of living of the Polish people in such a way that it only just supports life and shows a declining graph compared with the situation in Germany. If we take a look at the life of the Polish nation, we can say that is, in fact, the case. On the whole the food situation in many of the larger sections of the country is catastrophic . . ."<sup>6</sup>

Frank confiscated the movable and immovable property in the General Government of the former Polish State (ordinance of 15. 11. 39)<sup>6</sup> and transferred it to the hands of the General Government. According to Frank's interpretation, this had not

been a legal inheritance of the Polish State but a prescriptive acquisition to which the rights of third persons, coming into force before 20 November, 1939 had expired (ordinance of 24. 9. 1940).<sup>8</sup> Frank also demanded the right to confiscate private property in the General Government "only to carry out the tasks involved in the public utility", with the exception of articles of personal use, provided they did not go beyond the limits of a modest standard of living. Compensation could be given but it would not be legally mandatory (ordinance of 24. 1. 40).<sup>9</sup>

Having in mind the most ruthless exploitation of the resources of the General Government for the Nazi war economy, Frank combined this plan with an effort to lower the standard of living of the Poles — "a subject people" — to a minimum.

"We are not interested", he explained to his colleagues on 6 November, 1940, "in the growth of this country. This is perhaps the hardest word we have to say. We are not interested in the Poles getting richer or more secure, or in their becoming more active in dealing with their property . . . This area is called upon to provide a reservoir of man-power on a large scale. We have here solely a gigantic labour camp where everything which stands for power and individuality is in German hands."<sup>10</sup>

These words are the key to his attitude towards the living needs of the Poles in the General Government. On 19 January, 1940, he defined his attitude to the Poles in these words:

"My relationship with the Poles is like the relationship between ants and greenflies. If I treat the Poles reasonably — tickle them, so to speak, in a friendly way — I do this in the expectation that the work they do will benefit me. This is not a political problem but a purely tactical and technical one . . . In cases, where, in spite of all these measures, performance does not increase, or where the slightest act gives occasion to intervene, I shall not hesitate to take even the most drastic measures . . ."<sup>11</sup>

On these premises Frank based the official food ration for the Poles in the General Government. At a special session on 23 April, 1940 to deal with food questions, Frank expounded the principles of his policy.



"The Jews," he said, "do not interest me in the least. Whether they have anything to eat or not is a question I have pushed right into the background.

"A second category is made up of those Poles who cannot be exploited. These Poles we will feed by allotting them whatever there is to spare and which we have at our disposal. In any case I am leaving the Poles to look after themselves and I tell them: 'It is not our fault that a war has broken out'. The Poles only interest me up to the point where I see a reservoir of manpower in them but not in the sense of a binding, official guarantee that they will be given such and such — we are not talking about a ration for the Poles but only of the possibilities of feeding them."

The only guarantees that Frank gave were to the army, Nazi officials, Germans from the Reich, and Volksdeutsche, and even these were not for a full provision of food but only for a supply of certain categories, above all particular amounts of bread, meat, sugar etc.

At this same meeting, Frank stated that the Poles were not to be provided with any more leather footwear. In connection with this he ordered a factory to be opened for the production of wooden soles.<sup>12</sup>

In connection with the preparations in September, 1940 for the attack on the Soviet Union the General Government was to take on the additional burden of helping to supply the enormous Nazi army — at the cost of feeding its own population which would be left to its own resources.

On 9 April, 1941, Dr Paersch, the Director of the Issuing Bank, describing the situation of the Poles, told Frank that things had changed for the worse. He drew this conclusion not so much from the overall condition of the economy but from the food situation among the Poles which was far below subsistence level. The population's ration cards provided them only with a fraction of the calories needed to keep their organism alive. The official ration of bread, for instance, had been reduced and, in addition, some food articles were completely absent from the cards. Thus

many people had been driven to provide themselves with the food they needed on the black market.<sup>13</sup>

The consequences of the shocking food situation among the Poles were not long in coming. On 9 September, 1941 the Senior Health Counsellor Dr Walbaum gave his opinion on the health of the Polish population. Investigations carried out by his section had revealed that the majority of Poles were consuming only about 600 calories, while the normal needs of a man came to 2,200. The Polish population was so debilitated that it was an easy prey to a typhus epidemic. At the time the number of Poles sick came to 40 per cent. In the last week alone, official figures had given 1,000 cases of illness.<sup>14</sup>

In spite of this critical situation the provision of food for the Polish population in the General Government did not improve. On 15 October, 1941, Frank decided to leave the Jews completely to their own devices as far as food was concerned and also said that "it will probably also be impossible to give the Poles anything more than an increase of the bread ration to 1,400 grams (a week). In any case more consideration will have to be given than so far to the organization of communal meals (from a common pot)".<sup>15</sup>

The next year brought a further considerable deterioration in supplies. On 24 August a special Government session was held on the subject of a new plan for requisitions and food supplies in the General Government. Frank described in his opening remarks the problems of the economic situation of the Reich: "... Before famine strikes the German nation, it is necessary to starve the occupied territories and the people in them. At this moment we must be activated by a firm resolution to help the great German nation and our Fatherland.

"This has led to an ultimate demand being made on the General Government: the General Government has promised to send to the Fatherland an extra 500,000 tons of bread grain, above what we already supply by way of food to relieve the Fatherland and to units of the army, SS and police stationed

here. In relation to all the duties undertaken by us last year, this means a six-fold increase in them for the General Government.

"The consequences will be borne by the foreign nationals alone. They must be extorted from them cold-bloodedly and without pity since the part to be played by the General Government today is more essential. The eastern occupied territories — the Ukraine, Ostland, etc. — are not yet able to contribute in any noticeable way to the relief of our Fatherland . . ."

After Frank's opening address, Naumann, the President of the Main Food and Agricultural Department, described the changes introduced into the plan for requisitioning and food supplies. The grain quota had been raised from 960,000 to 1,200,000 tons. On the other side, economies had been introduced in food supplies. Rations for the Jews had been completely cancelled with the exception of those for 300,000 artisans employed by the Nazi administration. Naumann announced a reduction in the bread-ration for non-Germans, beginning on 1 March, from 4.2 to 2.8 kg a month. Between 1 March and 30 July, 1943 the bread-ration for ordinary non-German consumers was completely withdrawn.

The potato quota was raised by 25 per cent, that is, to 1,500,000 tons; the non-German urban population was to be given 100 kg per head but only after a suitable amount had been set aside for the production of alcohol to be distributed as bonuses for work done, and for other "important requirements" unspecified by Naumann.

The meat quota was also increased 25 per cent to ensure the completion of new services for the Reich. The fulfilment of this quota was to be made easier by the latest registration of cattle which had been almost 100 per cent carried out. Naumann predicted that an extensive slaughter of cattle would make it possible for non-Germans to receive a ration of 400 grams of meat per head per month. But he warned that it might not be possible to provide even this 400 grams since the needs of the Reich and the army had to come first.

Naumann further stated that no requests for an increase in the

deficient food rations given to workers in the armaments industry and their families could be considered, even if made by the armaments inspectorate. Similarly salt would be distributed in towns as a ration, and in the country only as a bonus for work done.

Finally Naumann announced that the following economic year (1942/3) would be the hardest as far as food was concerned. After Naumann's presentation of the detailed plan for requisitioning and food supplies, Frank stated that he considered any discussion of the plan superfluous and pointless since it might create the false impression that there was some other way out of the situation. The most difficult task would fall to the police in their fight against the black market and attempts to violate regulations. To this end he was willing to give the police extraordinary powers to overcome their problems.

On the other hand Germans, the army and others units stationed in the General Government were not to feel any of the effects of the new plan.

To dispel any misgivings which Naumann's report must have aroused even among the Nazis, Frank was uncompromising from the outset:

"With all the difficulties which you find here in the form of diseases of the workers or the collapse of their organizations, etc., you must always keep in mind that it is still much better if a Pole collapses than if a German succumbs."<sup>16</sup>

In order to ensure at all costs and with every possible means the extortion from the country of these enormous quotas of agricultural products, accompanied by a reduction, or even abolition, of the official rations of the Poles, Frank introduced a state of emergency from 1 August until 30 November in order to guarantee the collection of requisitions on time. An ordinance of 11 July, 1942 made it a capital offence for anyone wilfully to fail to discharge his compulsory supply of agricultural products or, apart from this, by some criminal activity under the administration regulations, to remove a sizeable quantity of agricultural products. Such cases were tried by summary police court and

the sentence could be carried out immediately.<sup>17</sup> A similar state of emergency was also introduced the following year by Frank, extending the death penalty to failure to carry out compulsory supplies of cattle or their slaughter without authorization and to obstruction of the collection of quotas.<sup>18</sup>

Dr Fischer, the Governor of Warsaw, at a session on 7 December, 1942, raised the question of the changes planned in the food rations of the Polish population. He said: "If the new food plan is to be carried out, this would mean that in the city of Warsaw and its immediate surroundings alone, 500,000 people would get no more food. However successful the campaign for collecting the crops was, we should not make light of the fear that from February of next year, even the peasants in the Warsaw District, are going to be plunged into great hardship."<sup>19</sup>

Although Frank was well aware of the situation of the Poles in the General Government, he made every effort, primarily out of obedience to the premises of his policy, to make the services rendered by the General Government to the Reich as great as possible. In this case, the personal pride Frank took in the success of the administration entrusted to him was not without its significance.

At a NSDAP meeting in Cracow on 14 December, 1942, he said:

"I shall endeavour to get out of the reservoir of this territory everything that can still be got out of it." He went on to enumerate the services rendered by the General Government to the Reich.

"When you consider that I was able to deliver 600,000 tons of bread grain to the Reich, to which another 180,000 tons for the Armed Forces here must be added; also an abundance of other commodities such as seeds, fats and vegetables, amounting to many thousands of tons, as well as the delivery of 300 million eggs to the Reich, etc., you can estimate what importance the territory possesses for the Reich. In order to make clear to you the significance of the delivery of 600,000 tons of bread grain from the General Government, you are referred to the fact that with



this one contribution alone the General Government is covering two-thirds of the increase in the bread-ration in Greater Germany for the current rationing period. We can claim this as a vast achievement with all justice . . ."

Frank, however, was well aware at the same time of the fatal consequences in the General Government that the supplies to the Reich, increasing out of all proportions, were bringing:

"Now this delivery to the Reich has one great drawback, which is that the deliveries imposed on us exceed the area's needs for real food, so that we are facing the following problem: can we, as from February, completely exclude over 2 million members of the non-German population of this area from the general food supplies or not? . . .

"The provision of food for the population obviously looks catastrophic. We have at present conditions of complete famine; anyone who is not directly or indirectly connected with German work processes is in a catastrophic position as far as food is concerned."<sup>20</sup>

Even Krüger, the Secretary of State for Security, admitted that the economic situation of the Poles had been made critical by the ruthless exploitation of the General Government. As evidence there are his remarks at a Government session on 25 January, 1943:

"We know definitely that the output of the foreign nationals is decreasing from day to day. It is not sufficient to improve their wages and norms somewhat. The ability to work comes ultimately from the stomach; they can only work if they are given something to eat. After all we in the General Government are not living under normal conditions where our currency is concerned. For the 33 zlotys which a foreign national perhaps earns in the General Government today, he can no longer in practice buy himself anything. The money is spent for the most part on rent, light, coal, gas, etc., in fact on all the essentials which a man needs for himself and his family."<sup>21</sup>

The General Government took up the question of feeding



the foreign nationals at a separate session on 14 April, 1943. Dr Bühler, the Secretary of State in the Government was the first to confirm the critical situation of the population and the Polish workers in particular.

"I can state already at this stage that the Polish worker in the General Government is being looked after worse than the foreign workers in Germany, than the worker from the East in the Reich provinces, than the Polish and also the Russian prisoner-of-war, to say nothing of the consumers' scale of rationing granted to the Czech population in the Protectorate, and to the Polish population in the incorporated Eastern areas. In spite of this the same output is demanded from the Polish population as from that in other regions."<sup>22</sup>

Naumann, the President of the Main Department of Food and Agriculture, later said that the depredation of the General Government was drawing on its very substance.

"Last year the livestock in the General Government was truly cut down, to the tune of over 20 per cent. Cattle which were really- needed for the production of milk and butter, were slaughtered last year in order to be able to keep up, to some extent, deliveries to the Reich and the Armed Forces, and the supply of meat. If the aim is to get hold of 120,000 tons of meat, the remaining livestock will have to be cut down to the tune of 40 per cent. This will mean that at the end of the financial year of 1944, only 600,000 head of cattle will be left in the General Government . . ."

Answering Frank, Naumann stated that as far as grain was concerned, 383,000 tons had been procured in 1940, 685,000 tons in 1941, 1,200,000 in 1942, which in itself went to show that requisitions had increased from year to year, and were approaching nearer and nearer to the limit of what was possible. They now intended to get hold of 200,000 tons more again thus reaching the utmost limit. The Polish peasant's hunger could be intensified still further only to the point where he still remained strong enough to till his field and to perform the other work demanded of him as well, for example the haulage of wood for the forestry

administration. The rise in prices on the black market was a clear indication that in practice they had almost reached the limit of what it was possible to requisition.<sup>23</sup>

The difficult situation of the Polish population would not by itself have been enough to induce Frank and Krüger, as Secretary of State for Security, to consider some method of improving the economic conditions of the Poles, the Nazi administration had a strong enough police force at its command to root out the black market and crush any possible traces of revolt among a people driven to desperation. On 15 April, 1943, the day after the food conference, a security session was held. Krüger announced that, as far as security was concerned in the General Government, "the considerable deterioration in the food situation of the foreign nationals is still of great significance. Many Poles are increasingly forming into gangs". With naive short-sightedness, Krüger stated that "a political pacification of the population is definitely feasible if, above all, the feeding of the families of that part of the population who are in German service can be assured. The Polish worker cannot today satisfy his hunger with the food allotted to him; his output is steadily decreasing, and he is forced to stop work two or three days a week to procure himself some food by illegal means."<sup>24</sup>

It was fear about maintaining security in the General Government that finally induced Frank to change the rations of the Polish population. This was clearly confirmed on 26 May, 1943 when he quoted a statement, made by Dr Schöngarth, the Chief of the Security Police, at a Government session on 20 April, 1943, that unless present methods of dealing with the Poles were modified he could not under any circumstances answer for the maintenance of security in the General Government. Frank decided to introduce new rations at the beginning of the next food period (1 September, 1943). "I have chosen the last possible date as I see it," he said, "on which these changes could be introduced. We had always considered that the war would end sooner and that we could hold out till then. But seeing that the end of the war has become a much more distant prospect,

we must make an effort to remove this main source of disturbance in the country.”<sup>25</sup>

Losacker, the President of the Main Department of the Interior, announced at a security session on 31 May, 1943:

“The General Government has for a long time been clear on the point that the scale of food rations allowed to foreign nationals can under no circumstances be continued without the population being left to resort to self-help or being driven to insurrection. That is why it is very important that beginning from September a sufficient food ration be allotted. The difficulties of the food situation, which naturally have a bad effect on the mood of the population, the enormous rise in prices, the partly overdone and narrow-minded policy over salaries and wages have led to parts of the Polish population being driven to despair.”<sup>26</sup>

President Naumann drew up a plan for a new scale of food rations for the Polish population in the General Government (20. 4. 45). On its introduction, food rations for the Poles in the General Government were to be, on the whole, equivalent to those in the Warta District.\* Naumann pointed out that the point was not to increase the rations, but only to take living needs into account for the first time.<sup>27</sup>

Frank himself was also of the opinion that this was not a raising of the scale but only a recognition for the first time of what constituted a minimum subsistence level. Had the introduction of these minimum standards not taken place, the security situation in the General Government would have deteriorated to the point where the work of administering it for the Reich would have been out of the question and the Reich would have had to give up hope of all deliveries (10. 7. 43).<sup>28</sup>

Although Frank considered the malnutrition of the Poles a source of trouble for the Nazi administration in the country, he continued nevertheless to wring an inordinate amount of goods for the Reich out of the country. On 14 June, 1943, he announced with pride that the General Government occupied

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\* Warthe Gau.

a unique position in the Reich as far as services were concerned. It had supplied the Reich in the previous year with 760,000 tons of bread grain—that is 80 per cent of the quantity needed to raise the bread ration in the whole of the Reich for a single year. Deliveries from the General Government came to 68 per cent of the total from all the occupied territories in the East.

"If you think about it," he said, "you will see the enormous significance of this territory (the General Government) to the Greater German food area."<sup>29</sup>

From the report made by Naumann to Frank on 10 July, 1943 concerning the conference devoted to the food situation in almost all the countries of Europe, it is clear that the General Government in addition to this 760,000 tons of bread grain supplied, in place of a further 90,000 tons, a greater amount of sugar, meat, etc. According to Naumann for the first time the efforts made by the General Government on behalf of the Reich had been recognised in full by the central authorities.<sup>30</sup>

In a review of the Government's four years of activity presented on 26 November, 1943, Dr Bühler suggested that, among the services rendered to the Reich by the General Government, pride of place should be given to their deliveries of food and agricultural crops. He gave the following list of deliveries:

In 1940/41:	121,000	tons of potatoes
	4,500	" " sugar
	7,510	" " cattle
	800	" " fats
In 1941/2:	53,000	" " grain
	134,000	" " potatoes
	4,465	" " sugar
	21,498	" " cattle
	900	" " fats
In 1942/3:	630,000	" " grain
	520,000	" " potatoes
	28,666	" " sugar
	55,000	" " cattle
	7,500	" " fats

In 1943/4:	450,000	„ „	grain
(planned)	526,000	„ „	potatoes
	20,000	„ „	sugar
	40,000	„ „	cattle
	7,000	„ „	fats.

Dr Bühler emphasised that it was quite impossible to estimate the value of these services, if one considered that the General Government had the feeding of its own population to worry about.<sup>31</sup>

According to Naumann (10. 5. 44), in 1940 370,000 tons of grain had been requisitioned, in 1941 — 700,000 tons, in 1942 — 1,200,000 tons, in 1943 — 1,500,000 tons. The quotas of meat, fats, and potatoes had shown a similar increase. Disregarding the situation on the front and in the Lublin District, the authorities in the Reich had once more raised the quotas for 1944.<sup>32</sup>

All this however did nothing to improve the food situation of the Poles in the General Government. Frank stated at a security session on 8 May, 1944 that the Polish nation was suffering from unprecedented hardship as far as food was concerned, and this would entail a serious loss of the administration's authority in the country. Frank attacked the optimism and self-deception of Naumann in this respect. "The food situation of the foreign nationals in the General Government has deteriorated calamitously. Conditions are very serious. For hundreds of thousands of Polish families it is almost impossible to get enough food. It would, in any case, be a mistake," said Frank, "to appraise the food situation in the General Government on the basis of figures supplied by the rationing authorities, which tend to give only one side of the picture."<sup>33</sup>

## DESTRUCTION OF CULTURE

THE INSTRUCTIONS given by Hitler charged the General Government not only with the economic devastation of the country but also with a reduction of its cultural level to the lowest possible standard.

Even before he had taken up office in Wawel Castle in Cracow, Frank had marked out, in Łódź on 31 October, 1939, the basic line of his cultural policy towards the Poles in an interview with Goebbels, the Reich Minister of Propaganda.

"Only such possibilities of education may be placed at the disposal of the Poles as would show them the hopelessness of their national destiny. For this reason only bad films or ones laying stress on the greatness and power of the Germans, could therefore be considered. It will be essential to provide the Poles with certain items of news by means of powerful loudspeakers."

Reich Minister Goebbels, it is recorded in the "Diary", agreed in principle with Frank's argument against the organisation of theatres, cinemas or cabarets for the Poles. Permanent loudspeakers were to be installed in the larger towns and shopping-centres which would, at advertised hours, broadcast information about the situation in general, and orders concerning the Poles.

"The whole Polish system of information must be dismantled. The Poles are not to be allowed wireless sets; they are to be left with only those newspapers which provide news and nothing else—there is to be no press which might express any opinions. In principle, they are to have no theatres, cinemas or cabarets, so as not to dangle before their eyes what they have lost. If the need should arise in the larger towns such as Warsaw, to get the Poles off the streets with the help of film shows, a separate decision will have to be taken in each case."



As far as films were concerned Goebbels was very pleased to hear that the seizure of Polish cinemas had already been ordered. "The Poles are to be completely deprived of opportunities of listening to the radio. The suggestion made by Otto, the Mayor of Warsaw, that we take over the Warsaw Orchestra is completely unacceptable. In general, we must resolutely root out the hiding-places of Polish nationalism. All national aspirations, wherever they show themselves, must be immediately suppressed."

"The Governor General stated", the "Diary" records further, "that the university colleges were already closed. The seminaries, re-opened by the Wehrmacht, will be closed on principle, as they only foment hatred towards the Germans".<sup>1</sup>

As if to complete this programme, Frank told his colleagues on 25 February, 1940 that "a raising of the educational level of the Polish people is in no way in our interests. The question of university attendance will depend on further developments in Poland. Even if some of you may be of a different opinion, I, at any rate, think that the Poles must make the sacrifice".<sup>2</sup>

At an education conference on 18 June, 1940 Frank allowed the Poles, with respect to completion of their primary education, to start only vocational schools of the same standard as an ordinary German technical school. In this same field, he permitted them training in the artistic skills, particularly music, painting, etc. The Polish Academy of Science would remain closed. Any form of centrally-directed scientific activity was still forbidden.<sup>3</sup>

On 12 September, 1940 Frank confirmed this line of policy:

"The Poles must realize the limits of their possibilities for development. In answer to my explicit question, the Führer again decided that the restrictions we agreed upon must continue. No Pole shall occupy a higher rank than foreman, no Pole shall be able to have the chance to acquire a higher education at State institutions. I must request you to maintain this strict line. On several grounds it is necessary for me to direct this serious exhortation to you with full emphasis."<sup>4</sup>

Frank put these principles of Nazi cultural policy in the General Government into effect with his ordinances. All publications

were to be dependent on the permission of the authorities (26. 10. 39).<sup>5</sup> Permission from the authorities would have to be obtained for every kind of publishing undertaking (31. 10. 39).<sup>6</sup> Finally a ban was placed on any kind of publication of books, journals, diaries and music (24. 10. 40).<sup>7</sup> Polish bookshops were also forbidden to sell any books on world affairs or politics (24. 10. 40).<sup>8</sup> All forms of musical, artistic, theatrical, film, literary and press activity were put under the supervision of the Governor General's Office (8. 3. 40).<sup>9</sup> Later, applications had to be made to, and permission received from, the authorities for them (18. 8. 40).<sup>10</sup> It was made compulsory to hand over all film cameras and films, and compensation depended on the arbitrary decision of the authorities (18. 10. 40).<sup>11</sup> A trustee was appointed for the liquidation of the administrative records of the former university colleges in the General Government (29. 10. 40).<sup>12</sup> Only Germans could be employed in the Department of Education (16. 3. 40).<sup>13</sup>

Permission had to be obtained from the District Governors to run, found or wind up private schools (31. 10. 39 and 12. 4. 40).<sup>14</sup> Permission had to be given by the County Education Counsellor for private tuition outside school (23. 4. 40).<sup>15</sup> Finally vocational training was introduced with compulsory attendance at these schools for two to three years after completion of primary education (29. 4. 41).<sup>16</sup>

Together with this complete suppression of Polish teaching Frank established in the ancient home of the Jagiellonian Library in Cracow the Institute of German Work in the East as the final death-blow to Polish science and culture—to be replaced in the General Government by German science and culture as the Nazis conceived it.<sup>17</sup>

Frank decided to hand over to the Institute the Jagiellonian Library (Library of the University of Cracow) as the property of the Polish State. The Institute was to take over the Library as a trustee, and later it was to be administered as a good German municipal library of the same class as, for instance, the library in Weimar. The staff was to consist of a director and a few librarians, who would be German, and several Polish assistants.

The Library's catalogues were to be examined and articles of value and of assistance to the Institute's work were to be reserved for it. The remainder were to be administered by a Polish staff under German supervision. The name of the Library was to be 'The Library of the Institute of German Work in the East'. Hitler was to decide what was to be done with the oldest documents, which were of great value. They could be treated perhaps as spoils of war and later handed over to the great libraries in Berlin, Munich or Vienna.<sup>18</sup>

The Institute followed the path, marked out by Frank, of plunder of Poland's cultural heritage. Dr Coblitz, the Director, informed Frank on 14 September, 1940, that the Institute had taken over several Polish libraries. It also had at its disposal all the libraries of the seminaries attached to the University. The Institute had already taken possession of thirteen of them.<sup>19</sup>

Typical of Nazi cultural policy and Frank's standpoint was the conference held in Lwów on 19 March, 1942 to deal with plans for the establishment of University institutes there. The conference was attended by Watzke, President of the Main Department of Education and Schooling, and SS Obergruppenführer Krüger, then Chief of Police in the General Government. Describing the preliminary work, Watzke referred to an unspecified directive given by Frank. This said that under no circumstances were the institutes to provide a higher education. The administration, language of instruction and text books were to be German in order that strict supervision could be kept over the tuition. Individual departments in the Government could have a far-reaching influence on the curriculum and in this way schooling would only embrace those subjects which were in the German interest.

"The Governor General", the "Diary" records, "once again presented his point of view in detail. There were great political dangers latent in these proposals. The existence in that area of a large educated group of non-Germans would always present the most serious threat to German ambitions of sovereignty. On the other hand, it had proved absolutely essential to develop

cadres to satisfy the most basic needs of the General Government in the interests of the German Reich. In such a situation the German administration had to risk consolidating the forces of resistance among the population through the training of cadres. While avoiding everything which might in the least look like higher education, it was necessary, for the sake of experiment, to undertake, without any fuss, training in four categories in which cadres were a burning problem to German work in the General Government—agriculturists, doctors, veterinarians, and chemists. As for names, they were to be called 'training courses' instead of 'institutes'. These establishments were to be under constant strict supervision from the Germans. The German teaching staff should strictly observe in their tuition the frame of reference marked out by the German administrative body."<sup>20</sup>

From this it can be seen that when the administration was faced, particularly in the District of Galicia, with a shortage of qualified personnel, Frank, while starting the courses necessary, tried not only to avoid anything in the nature of higher education but even the use of the suggestive term 'Institute'.

Frank fell short of the truth when he emphasized at a press conference in Berlin on 7 February, 1944, that in actual fact there were five institutes of 'university standard' in the General Government.<sup>21</sup>

Of his attitude to Polish scholarship and Polish scholars sufficient evidence is provided by the views expressed in his famous speech of 30 May, 1940 (dealing with the AB action) on the question of the senior members of the University of Cracow sent in November, 1939 to concentration camps in the Reich. Frank expressed his pain that they had not been left in the General Government, where they could have been dealt with without all that "terrible trouble" caused by their deportation to the Reich.<sup>22</sup>

Any concessions that Frank might have made in favour of Poles in the field of culture were purely well-calculated tactical manoeuvres, and never sprang from any conviction that they were just. At the Party meeting on 18 March, 1942, his cruel

words about "dozens being stood up against the wall" were directly followed by the following justification for his opening of a substitute for the Philharmonic and his retention of the school system:

"If we permit ourselves the luxury of letting the Poles have a sort of Philharmonic which we show to foreign correspondents, this means nothing. The people produce music the way we want them to, and when we have no more use for them we shall dissolve this institute. In any case we should look at all this sensibly and calmly. We maintain agricultural schools and technical schools, we have medical practitioners trained, but they cannot obtain any academic position or title."<sup>23</sup>

The general guiding principles of Nazi cultural policy, as laid down at Frank's conference with Goebbels on 31 October, 1939, naturally precluded any idea of a Polish press or of the publication of Polish journals; and this was confirmed by Frank's ordinance, cited above, concerning publishing matters. As a result the only papers to appear in Polish were Nazi. On 14 April, 1942 a conference was held to discuss press matters which was summed up by Frank as follows:

"We are all perfectly aware that we have to provide these millions of Poles with a press, and one which, at any rate, goes beyond the limits of news and nothing more. The reason for this is not the Poles, but only and especially, our own interests. We have to create at least the appearance that the General Government is a sort of trustee area on the Greater German territory. We cannot finish off the struggle and solve the problem of Poland by putting 16 million bullets in the backs of 16 million Poles. So long as the Poles are alive, they must work for us and we must enlist them in this process...

"On the subject of Polish press policy, it is to be stated as a matter of principle that the Poles have to have the impression that they are not being treated as pigs in the press but as Europeans and humanbeings. This is also to hold good for Government work quite in general. We are already so much concerned with the Poles that we must say: although they have a very bad



time, the Poles live better in the General Government than the Italians in Italy or the Greeks in Greece, the Serbs in Serbia, etc....”<sup>24</sup>

It was not till the turn of the tide at Stalingrad, when defeat was staring the Third Reich in the face that Frank began, for tactical reasons, to introduce certain and, in any case, insignificant changes into his cultural policy towards the Poles as well. In Cracow he opened a Chopin ‘Museum’ (27. 10. 43) in the new building of the Jagiellonian Library, now given the German name only of Staatsbibliothek (State Library).<sup>25</sup> Describing this in a lecture given to representatives of the press in Berlin on 25 January, 1944 he used almost the same jeering and frivolous tone as when explaining why he had allowed the Poles to start a substitute for the Philharmonic: “Poles are by temperament very romantic. My action in opening a Chopin museum and making such a great cultural gesture to the Polish nation meant more to the Poles than if I had done them some material service. I opened a Chopin museum, I ordered Poles also to be invited to show them the Chopin relics that we were able to collect in France, Italy and Spain. I gathered them all together and opened a great Chopin museum in Cracow—an undertaking that cost me only a little money but which found a response in the gallant and somewhat romantic temperament of the Polish nation and had a wonderful effect in the sphere of cultural propaganda.”<sup>26</sup> Frank followed this by opening a theatre in Cracow with presentations in Polish, calling it ‘The Cracow Popular Theatre’. This theatre was also the scene of various Nazi functions. Under the German name on the theatre’s placards appeared its equivalent in Polish: ‘Teatr Ludowy miasta Krakowa’. The decision to open this theatre was taken at a special conference on 3 March, 1944 and it was Frank himself who suggested having its name appear in Polish as well as German.<sup>27</sup> On 16 March, 1944, Ohlenbusch, the President of the Main Department of Propaganda, informed Frank of the theatre’s opening night giving it its German name of ‘Polnisches Volkstheater Krakau’. The production and décor was moderate, the acting crude in the extreme. Frank



expressed his wish that supervision of the theatre be exercised as tactfully as possible and suggested that the attention of the Polish manager of the theatre might be drawn to his full responsibility for any incidents that occurred during a performance.<sup>28</sup>

It was characteristic of the Nazi policy, followed by Frank in his campaign against Polish culture, that in the Polish version of the Theatre's name, the word 'Polish' was left out, just as with the Main Welfare Council, which in German was called the Main Polish Board.<sup>29</sup>

Nevertheless these tactical gambits on the part of Frank in the field of culture made no impression on the Polish community. On 17 October, 1944, Frank received Styrer, the Director of the Polish language section of the Nazi Radio in the General Government. Asked by Frank what was the prevailing mood among the Poles, he replied that "the Poles on principle say exactly the opposite to what they hear from the Germans. The Pole takes everything that comes from the Germans as something directed against him. After all, the Poles, over the whole course of their history, have had to put up a constant struggle either against the Austrians or the Prussians or the Tsarist Russians; they have rebelled against whoever was ruling them".<sup>30</sup>

## Chapter XI

# LOOTING OF ART TREASURES, DESTRUCTION OF THE ROYAL CASTLE IN WARSAW AND OF THE CITY

FOLLOWING Hitler's instructions about reducing Polish culture to its lowest possible level, the Nazi administration in the General Government applied itself to the art treasures collected in the country over the centuries. Both books and works of art were either looted or destroyed on a scale unprecedented in the history of Poland. Very early on there are historic entries in the "Diary" concerning this, which are typical of Frank's actions.

*"Łódź, Thursday, October 26, 1939*

*Łódź, Friday, October 27, 1939*

The Governor General accompanied by the Reichsführer SS Himmler visited Warsaw . . . " <sup>1</sup>

*"Berlin, Saturday, November 4, 1939*

The Governor General had a thorough conference with the Führer from 13.20 to 15.15. The Führer discussed the general situation with the Governor General, acquainted him with his plans, and approved the work of the Governor General in Poland, especially the destruction of the Royal Castle in Warsaw and the decision not to rebuild that city, the transfer of art treasures . . . " <sup>2</sup>

Thus before he had even take up his post as Governor General on Wawel Hill in Cracow, Frank visited Warsaw in the company of Himmler; during this first visit to the capital, he decided, as the representative of the Nazi Reich and probably with the moral support of the Reichsführer SS and Police, to destroy completely the Royal Castle and not to rebuild the city of Warsaw. This was confirmed by a letter written by Hess on 20 November, 1939, in which he drew the attention of the central authorities,

who were planning to rebuild certain industrial works in Warsaw, to the fact that Frank had decided not to rebuild the city and that the Führer had endorsed this decision.<sup>3</sup> According to the "Diary" this had happened at the conference in Berlin on 4 November, 1939. There are also entries in the "Diary" which record Hitler's approval of Frank's transfer of art treasures from Warsaw to Cracow which Frank had chosen as his capital — a decision also approved by Hitler. Thus Frank's own "Diary" places beyond doubt the active role played by him in the destruction of the Royal Castle. It also shows that the decision not to rebuild the city and to strip the capital of its art treasures was his. But the terse entries of the "Diary" are pregnant with the tragedy of the personal and shameful part played by Frank in the monstrous demolition of the Royal Castle and the looting of art treasures as early as October, 1939, during the Governor's first exploratory visit to the capital. There is further evidence of this in a document written into the record of the International Military Tribunal: this was the testimony of Dr Stanisław Lorentz and Dr Władysław Tomkiewicz.

Dr Stanisław Lorentz, director of the National Museum in Warsaw, stated that at the time of the capitulation and the entry of German units into Warsaw, the Royal Castle with the exception of a little damage done during the siege, was on the whole in a satisfactory state. The municipal administration of the city had immediately taken measures to preserve the building and already in the first days of October, they had begun to rebuild the temporary roof over the wing containing the magnificent reception apartments.

In October, 1939, Hans Frank, the Governor General, arrived in Warsaw. He declared to representatives of the municipal administration that the Royal Castle should be pulled down and opposed himself to any restoration or preservation of the building only slightly damaged during military operations.

With his own hand, Frank tore off the silver eagles from the royal canopy and put them into his pockets. By this act, he gave the signal for the beginning of the general plunder of the Castle, which

lasted for several weeks. Pictures, upholsteries, wainscotting were torn off the walls and stolen. At the same time, the German sappers made holes in the Castle walls for the purpose of laying mines. The soldiers did not keep secret the object of these preparations; the Castle was doomed to destruction by explosion. The disclosures made by the soldiers were confirmed by the arrival of architects and German building contractors under the personal direction of architect Heidelberg, director of the Architecture Department of Warsaw District. These people with the help of hundreds of Jews brought daily to the spot, began pulling down the building. With electric drills they made two rows of holes, with an interval of 75 cms between them, and at a height of 1,5 metres from the ground. In two months several thousands of these holes had been bored in the outer and the interior walls of the Castle, which at the end looked a mere heap of ruins. The principal tools used were picks and axes... The ruins of the Castle remained in this state for nearly five years and were still in the same state after the Warsaw uprising.

Regarding the "transfer of art treasures" Dr Lorentz stated: "During the siege of Warsaw in 1939, the Royal Castle, as a national historic monument, was not used by the Polish defenders as a stronghold, or as a depot for military equipment or ammunition. But this fact did not prevent the invaders from shelling this monument of Polish culture, as though it were a military target, and thus the Castle had to share the fate of many other 'military' targets of the city such as churches, schools, hospitals. On 17 September 1939, incendiary bombs were literally showered on the Castle. On that day, the roofs of two towers were burnt down and when the roof of a Castle wing, overlooking the river Vistula, which contained the magnificent reception apartments, caught fire, the fine Bacciarelli ceiling, dating from 1780, was destroyed. And then the National Museum staff began to carry out salvage operations, under continuous fire which endangered their lives, trying to save the most precious objects, and to transport them from the Castle to the cellars of the Museum. Already in November 1939, almost the entire treasure was taken by gangs

of Nazi bandits under the leadership of German scientists, such as Dagobert Frey, professor of the History of Art at the University of Wroclaw (Breslau), Dr Barthl, director of the museum at Wroclaw and a Viennese art historian, Dr Joseph Mühlmann, brother of Dr Kajetan Mühlmann, the state secretary, who had been appointed the special Commissioner for the inventory and the safeguarding of treasures of art in the General Government. His activity consisted in confiscating the most valuable collections and destroying monuments of Polish culture."

Dr Wladyslaw Tomkiewicz, the deputy of Dr Lorentz stated: "According to the testimonies of Dr Joseph Mühlmann, prof. of Art in Vienna as well as of Prof. Dagobert Frey who had been in the building of the National Museum in 1939, I assert that these were exactly the persons to whom the Governor General (Frank) gave orders to take actions in order to 'save' the works of art in General Government. As a result of these actions the whole interior part of the Royal Castle was so destroyed that nothing remained but the walls which stood till the uprising in 1944".<sup>4</sup>

The evidence of these Polish art experts was supported by the statement of SS Oberführer Dr Kajetan Mühlmann, the Under-Secretary of State. Göring, as Chairman of the Reich Defence Council, had named him as the Governor General's special commissioner for the safeguarding of art treasures in the General Government. He filled this post from October, 1939 to September, 1943. Dr Mühlman testified that the official policy of Frank was to confiscate all outstanding works of art in the possession of Polish public institutions, in private collections or belonging to the Church.

"I confirm," he said, "that these works of art were in fact confiscated and that it is obvious to me that in the event of a German victory, they would not have been left in Poland but added to German art collections".<sup>5</sup>

The truth of Dr Mühlmann's testimony was borne out by a report made by Dr Hans Posse, the Director of the Art Gallery in Dresden sent to Cracow and Warsaw to examine the quality

and the number of the confiscated works of art. He said that on 6 October, 1939, the "safeguarding" of the more valuable Polish art treasures under the direction of Dr Mühlmann, Göring's appointee, was already in full swing. Dr Mühlmann had co-opted for this purpose suitable experts in Berlin, Vienna and Wrocław. Their primary task was to "safeguard" the art and cultural treasures of Warsaw, particularly in the Royal Castle, the greater part of whose furnishings and furniture could be salvaged. Almost every day trains were coming to Cracow loaded with "safeguarded" works of art taken from public, private and Church collections. They were being stored in the new building of the Jagiellonian Library where they could be examined and catalogued. All this was to be completed by February (1940). Posse postponed plans for dividing the confiscated works of art until they had all been put in store. For the time being he thought it best if the interior contents (dadoes, tapestries, doors, flooring, pictures, mirrors, candlesticks, furniture, porcelain etc.) were taken from the treasures salvaged from the Royal Castle to furnish the Zwinger Pavillions in Dresden.<sup>6</sup>

In his testimony Dr Lorentz described the vandalistic methods used in "safeguarding" these works of art and particularly in the destruction of the Royal Castle.

The fact deserves special emphasis that this whole action of "safeguarding" Poland's art wealth began before Frank had even been appointed to the post of Governor General (12. 10. 39). Once Governor General he gave it the endorsement of his own personal participation by ordering the transfer of art treasures to Cracow. In this he gained the supreme approval of the Führer (4. 11. 39), but it was not till 16 December that a formal basis was provided for this laying waste of Poland's art heritage. This came with Frank's ordinance of the same day concerning the confiscation of works of art in the General Government. To meet the general interest all publicly owned works of art were confiscated which had not already come under the ordinance of 15 November, 1939, which confiscated the property of the former Polish state. Private art collections could also be con-



sidered as public property depending on the opinion of Dr Mühlmann who could take them under his "trusteeship", and all the works of art belonging to the Church apart from objects of everyday use in the performance of rites and services. All such property had to be declared. Any infringement of the regulations under this ordinance was liable to a sentence of imprisonment to be passed by a special court.<sup>7</sup>

Dr Mühlmann was to be responsible for the detailed regulations needed to put the ordinance into effect. These did not appear until 15 January, 1940, and made 15 February the last date on which property of artistic, cultural and historic (that is dating from before 1850) importance could be declared. The declarations were to cover paintings, sculpture, articles of artistic manufacture (furniture, porcelain, cut-glass, gilt-work, carpets, lace, etc.), drawings, engravings, woodcuts, rare manuscripts, music manuscripts, autographs, illuminated manuscripts, miniatures, prints, weapons, coins, medals, etc. Thus all the art treasures belonging to the nation were to be confiscated.<sup>8</sup>

In his report Dr Posse, director of the Dresden Art Gallery says that "safeguarding" which was to be completed by February, 1940, would make it possible to form some idea of the amount and condition of the art treasures belonging to the Polish nation. Outstanding works of art were to be photographed. The Governor General would present the Führer with albums of the photographs. Dr Posse wrote that he had already completed his examination of public, private and Church collections.

Dr Posse proposed even before he had completed his examination that the three most valuable pictures in the Czartoryski Museum — Raphael's Portrait of a Youth, Leonardo da Vinci's Cecilia Galierani or Lady with Ermine, and Rembrandt's Landscape — which at that time were in the Kaiser Friedrich-Museum in Berlin — be reserved for the future Art Museum in Linz.<sup>9</sup>

The contents of this report place beyond all doubt the Nazis' intention of taking all Polish works of art to the Reich to enrich their own collections and of completely denuding Poland of her best works of both fine and applied art.

As described in Dr Posse's report, the campaign undertaken to "safeguard" the works of art in the General Government stripped the whole country not only of its most priceless, but also of almost all its better art and cultural treasures. One of the victims was Wit Stwosz '(Veit Stoss) Altar in the Church of Our Lady in Cracow.<sup>10</sup> On 17 June, 1940, Dr Kajetan Mühlmann informed Frank that the "safeguarding" of art treasures was to all intents and purposes over and that he would give him a final report as soon as possible. Frank said that he would send the report together with photographs to the Führer. Dr Mühlmann was to hand the report to Hitler in Frank's name.<sup>11</sup>

This report in fact covered only those works — numbering over 500 — which were considered the most valuable. The printed catalogue had a supplement of photographs of the "safeguarded" works of art. The selection had been carefully made by obliging Nazi art historians who had taken from public museums and private and Church collections pictures by well-known German, Dutch, Italian, French and Spanish masters, together with the best Polish paintings of the Middle Ages, the most valuable ancient illuminated manuscripts, engravings, wood cuts etc., sculptures, artistic handicrafts, porcelain, carpets, weapons and coins.<sup>12</sup>

The preface to the catalogue says that Dr Mühlmann had in six months collected almost everything there was in the way of works of art in Poland, with the exception of the Wawel tapestries, which were in France, and so could be "safeguarded" also. In addition the catalogue says that several Nazi art historians and museum specialists had been drafted into the campaign and gives their names on the title page of the preface. They had on the basis of their pre-war knowledge of Polish museums and collections robbed them systematically of anything that was of value. Further on, the preface says that a scientific analysis of the works 'safeguarded' had shown how strongly the German creative spirit had penetrated the East. Even Dutch and Flemish works were, in the opinion of these Nazi writers, only an expression of the German character and culture.<sup>13</sup>

In a speech made to mark the third anniversary of the General Government (26. 10. 42) Frank announced that about 90 per cent of all works of art in the General Government had been "safeguarded". They had now become the property of the General Government.<sup>14</sup>

Frank himself had an original Rembrandt in his office on Wawel. He talked about it himself in his famous interview with Kleiss, the correspondent of the 'Völkischer Beobachter' (6. 12. 40). The "Diary" says that he pointed smilingly to an original Rembrandt hanging over his desk, and said: "We have here a handsome frame; the value of this picture must reach hundreds of thousands if you can measure the value of a work of art of this kind."<sup>15</sup>

When in summer 1944 the Soviet armies were advancing westwards within the borders of the District of Galicia, the works of art collected on Wawel were transported in August to Silesia to the Palace of Count Richthofen in Sichów (Seichau) where a Viennese, Kneisel, undertook the conservation of these, 'safeguarded' works. In a letter of 24 October, he told Palezieux, an architect on the Governor General's staff, that he had managed with some difficulty to transfer the most important cases from the summer-house to the palace where they had been stored in the kitchen and a neighbouring room. The cases containing collections of coins had been damaged and their contents retrieved from the floor. In a report, dated 1 January, 1945, Kneisel said that in the huge collection of prints which had also been brought to Sichów, he had discovered serious damage caused by their storage in the damp cellars of the Jagiellonian Library. He also unwittingly confirmed that Frank did not intend to return the "safeguarded" art treasures to Poland. Kneisel's report also refers to two paintings by Matejko: "Rejtan" and "Batory at Psków", which had come to Sichów by accident among the works of the first selection from Wawel. They had been brought by Kneisel from Świdnica (Schweidnitz). According to Kneisel's report Palezieux attached no importance to works of Polish origin; this prompted Kneisel to suggest that the Matejko paint-

ings be returned "as a fine gesture" to the Poles, who looked on the works of Matejko as something sacred; Professor Kopera had assured him that they meant more to him than Leonardo da Vinci.<sup>16</sup>

After his flight from Cracow on 17 January, 1945, Frank stopped in Sichów with his whole staff. Dr Meidinger, the Chief of the Governor General's Chancery, recommended that the 'safeguarded' Polish collections be shipped to the town of Morawa (Muhrau) near Jaworów (Jauer) and this was done soon afterwards. The Diary records that on 23 January Dr Walter Schüler, an official in the Governor General's Chancery, handed over, in Frank's name, the collections of the former Polish state, stored in Morawa Castle, to the Burgomaster Robert Schnitzler in the presence of Kneisel. The collections were to be "safeguarded" in the Reich for the purposes of conservation.<sup>17</sup>

According to Palezieux, Frank's adjutant, SS-Hauptsturmbannführer Helmuth Pfaffenroth went to Neuhaus in Bavaria, where Frank had set up the remnants of his Chancery after his flight from Cracow, with a transport of the most valuable pictures from the "safeguarded" Polish collections, including da Vinci's 'Lady with Ermine' and Rembrandt's 'Landscape'; Raphael's 'Young Man' was not among them.<sup>18</sup>

The American officers who arrested Frank on 4 May, 1945 found in his Neuhaus residence several works of art and valuable treasures, brought from Cracow, among them the da Vinci and Rembrandt from the Czartoryski Museum in Cracow, the Codex of Baltazar Behem from the Jagiellonian Library, the chasuble of Kmita from Wawel Cathedral, and a gold chalice from the Church of Our Lady in Cracow.<sup>19</sup>

The "safeguarding" of Polish art treasures was looting pure and simple, regardless of whether they were state or private property. When the Nazis came to works whose authors they considered to be Germans they thought of this looting as some sort of recovery of monuments of German culture in the East, which would bear testimony later to the German right to the lands on which they had stood. Among these relics was the magnificent

Behem Codex from Cracow, a priceless and unique example of lay iconography of the late middle ages. This Codex was published in 1941 with the assistance of Frank and in the foreword Friedrich Winkler, the director of an engravers in Berlin, wrote in the very second sentence that the contents of the Codex confirm that Cracow was German. A groundless and ridiculous statement, and, it should be added, completely erroneous as far as the 'ideology' of nationalist cultural expansion is concerned. After all what does it matter that Baltazar Behem, a local writer from Cracow, was of German origin, that the Codex is written in German, that the social background of the codex is German, since Behem, as many others like him, was a good citizen of the town and country in which he lived and in which he made his living, since his descendants became completely Polonized. The Behem Codex in the Jagiellonian Library should rather be a cause for German pride that the light of their culture had in days gone by shone so far outside their own boundaries and helped to create such lasting monuments.<sup>20</sup>

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In the very first entry in the Diary (4. 11. 39) Frank's aversion to the Polish capital emerges in his resolution not to rebuild this focal point of Polish culture and the national spirit. Frank just like Hitler was to take several opportunities in the years that followed to express his antagonism and aversion to Warsaw. At a Government session on 12 July, 1940, Frank informed his colleagues of Hitler's decision concerning the fate of the town. The reconstruction of Warsaw as the capital of Poland was completely out of the question. In connection with the development of the situation in general the Führer wanted Warsaw to be reduced to the level of a provincial town.<sup>21</sup> At the police session on 18 June, 1942, Frank ordered large-scale round-ups of people, who had refused to work, to be organized in Warsaw since he regarded it as the main centre of crime.<sup>22</sup>

Frank revealed his attitude to Warsaw more fully at an economic conference in Warsaw on 19 March, 1943, when he an-



nounced that the problem of the fate of the city did not interest him in the least. Schlösser, the Director of the Department of Economy in the Warsaw District, had talked of its industrial significance: "The principle" Frank said "to be followed is that Warsaw should never become any sort of capital and that it should not play any leading part in the struggle against the Germans. There is always present the great danger that Warsaw might become the centre of the area, at any rate in the sense of a great political force. This also has always been the Führer's opinion. According to him the ideal picture of Warsaw would be that of one great factory, one great station and one great port. If once more hundreds of thousands of Poles are able to find work and bread, and a certain stabilization takes place as far as living conditions are concerned, we would then have to pay for this with a certain amount of political anxiety. People who are hungry are forced to use up a lot of their energy in trying to satisfy their hunger. But if that hunger is satisfied then energy is released once again for other matters. At any rate it must be obvious that the so-called Polish leadership should not be allowed the slightest opportunity of declaring Warsaw the capital. If, then, we talk about Warsaw as the economic capital of the General Government, this is music for all Polish ears, but sounds a grim note in German ears which have heard of these Polish political aspirations. There is nothing easier than building up a centralised movement from economic foundations. A city like Warsaw with its huge masses of workers provides Communism with a fruitful field for its propaganda. . ." <sup>23</sup>

When his regime was already in decline, Frank spoke once again about Warsaw, when he reported on talks he had had with Hitler in his Headquarters on 6 February, 1944. Hitler had asked him about Warsaw and said that, beyond doubt, it had caused him the greatest concern in the General Government. Frank admitted that Warsaw was, in fact, the sorest point in the country. Hitler recognised the choice of Cracow as the capital to have been absolutely correct and emphasized that Warsaw must be destroyed as soon as the opportunity presented itself.<sup>24</sup>



The Warsaw Uprising in August, 1944, provided them with the opportunity they had been looking for. On 3 August, 1944 Frank telephoned General Guderian and asked him to send help to the Nazi detachments in Warsaw. Guderian assured Frank that everything humanly possible would be done to "help" Warsaw. Once they had regained control of the city they would pass sentence on it with absolute severity. On the evening of the same day Frank informed Dr Bühler by telephone of Hitler's decision to use every means available to suppress the uprising.<sup>25</sup> On 5 August Frank was telephoned by Dr Fischer, the Governor of Warsaw, and heard his report with satisfaction. He was told among other things that the city was already feeling the effects of attacks by dive-bombers. Frank expressed his recognition of Dr Fischer's exemplary cooperation with the Nazi military commander General Stahel. That evening Frank sent Dr Lammers, the Minister of the Reich Chancery, a telegram which included the following information:

"The City of Warsaw is in flames for the most part. The burning of the houses is also the surest method of getting the insurgents out of their bolt-holes. . . After this insurrection and its crushing Warsaw will be completely destroyed as it deserves."<sup>26</sup>

There could hardly be clearer evidence that Frank as Governor-General endorsed in full the destruction of the capital of Poland. But a telegram has been found which was sent to Frank by Dr Fischer the Governor of Warsaw on 11 October, 1944, and which informed him that SS-Obergruppenführer (the Waffen SS General) von dem Bach-Zalewski had been given orders for the pacification of Warsaw, that is the levelling of the city to the ground. Before this happened all raw materials, textiles and furniture were to be removed from the city and this was primarily to be the job of the civil authorities. Dr Fischer stressed that he had informed Frank of all this because this new order given by the Führer to destroy Warsaw was of important consequence to the new policy adopted towards Poland.<sup>27</sup>

Dr Fischer's telegram put the final tragic seal on the part played

by Frank and the Nazi administration in the barbaric destruction of the capital of Poland.

Warsaw was in fact almost totally razed to the ground. Dr Tomkiewicz has said in the testimony already quoted that the destruction came to 90 per cent. Frank made no protest and even agreed to take part in the form of looting the movable property of the devastated city.

Frank must also have played his part in the final demolition of the denuded walls of the Royal Castle, about which Dr Lorentz and Dr Tomkiewicz also speak in their testimony.<sup>28</sup>

Dr Lorentz: "At the beginning of December, 1944, two months after the capitulation of Warsaw, German military units placed charges with dynamite in the holes made in 1939 and blew up the Castle . . ."

Dr Tomkiewicz: "The Germans blew up the walls of the Royal Castle in December, 1944, when they were burning and destroying on a large scale the public buildings and private dwelling places that were still untouched. I saw the Castle with my own eyes in November, 1944, when the uprising had been put down. I can state that the Castle was almost in the same condition as it had been in 1940. When the Soviet units entered the city on 17th January, 1945, the Castle was nothing but a heap of ruins."

It was the Nazis conscious intention to destroy Warsaw and they laid low 90 per cent of it — a crime in which Frank played his part. But there has been no better expression of appreciation for the capital of Poland than Frank's own words spoken in his speech to Luftwaffe officers on 14 December, 1943: "In this country there is one source from which everything harmful flows: this is Warsaw. If we did not have Warsaw in the General Government we would not have four-fifths of the difficulties with which we have to contend. Warsaw is and will be a hotbed of agitation and a point which is the source of all disturbance in this country."<sup>29</sup>

## Chapter XII

# THE ATTITUDE OF FRANK AND THE NAZI ADMINISTRATION TOWARDS THE UKRAINIANS IN THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT

THE RACIAL policy of Frank aimed at underlining any possible idiosyncrasies in the various ethnic groups of the General Government. "In our dealings with every national group in the General Government, we should take into account their ethnic individuality", was Frank's recommendation to his subordinates (3. 5. 40).<sup>1</sup> In a famous interview given to a reporter by the name of Kleiss, on 6 February, 1940, Frank said that the highlanders\* were certainly of Germanic stock.<sup>2</sup>

However it was not long before Frank realised that the supposedly individual nationality of the highlanders was merely a delusion of Nazi propaganda. At a session on 12 April, 1940, Frank said that "the specific character of the highland nation is mainly decorative".<sup>3</sup>

In his attitude to the Ukrainians in the General Government Frank tried to take advantage of the circumstance that Polish Governments between the wars had failed to regularise the situation of the Ukrainians living in territory that was part of the Polish State at the time. They were without doubt victims of racial oppression, quite apart from their material hardships. On the other hand, Frank decided to apply the principle accepted by the former Austro-Hungarian Empire in their administration of areas inhabited by racially-mixed groups: divide et impera. He stated this distinctly at the session of 12 April, 1940.<sup>4</sup>

He decided that the Ukrainians were to keep their Church, their culture, their language and their autonomy, but that they

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\* "Goralen" – in the original.

must prove their loyalty to Hitler and the Reich. Any aim of establishing a Greater Ukraine had to be totally rejected. The gallant Ukrainians might perhaps at a later date be drafted into the State or local police as watchdogs over the Poles (3. 5. 40).<sup>5</sup> Because of this confinement of the Ukrainians to so narrow a sphere of activity, Frank declared that he would naturally not stand for the establishment of an all-embracing organization of the Ukrainian national community, though something in the nature of a self-help and welfare organization could be formed for the majority of Ukrainians. This could be made possible by the creation of some kind of communal co-existence with the Ukrainians of a non-binding nature (12. 4. 40).<sup>6</sup> Toleration of any kind of organized popular front or popular representation could never be considered (4. 3. 40).<sup>7</sup>

Frank warned his subordinates that the Ukrainians considered the General Government only as an instrument of uniting all the Ukrainian territories; the Nazis should not allow themselves to be used for this purpose. He told his colleagues to avoid passing references to the Greater Ukraine in their official speeches and warned them about flying the Ukrainian flag too frequently and treating the Ukrainians as representatives with their own national territory. Frank considered the Ukrainians to be subjects of the Greater German Reich and not representatives of the Greater Ukraine on German territory (12. 9. 40).<sup>8</sup>

After Hitler had launched his war of aggression on the Soviet Union, Frank held a conference in Berlin on 13 October, 1941 with Rosenberg, the Reich Minister for Eastern Affairs, to clear up the political aims of Nazi policy towards the Ukraine. Rosenberg attacked the army, whose actions after the occupation of Lwów had caused the proclamation of an Ukrainian Government in Lwów. This mistake was rectified by the arrest of the persons responsible.

To Frank's question about the fate of the Ukrainian University in Lwów Rosenberg replied that its continued existence was of no interest to him. The Ukrainians could always be told that the opening of a university in Lwów was not possible until

a similar higher education institution started in Kiev. He considered the transfer of Ukrainian university professors from Lwów to Kiev as completely unnecessary and asked Frank to take steps to prevent any Ukrainians from emigrating there.

Rosenberg explained that he had vetoed the plan to set up a Ukrainian state as a buffer against Russian influences. The people of the occupied territories were no longer in a condition to perform the tasks assigned them; the German administration would have to take on the difficulties of training them. Rosenberg thought that there was no longer any point to this.<sup>9</sup>

The arrest of Ukrainian nationalists in Galicia, who had fixed their political ambitions to the illusory promises of the Nazis showed clearly that the latter's only aim was to subdue the Ukrainian territory in the same way as Poland.

At a Government session on 16 December, 1941, Frank said that "the Ukrainians in 'our' District of Galicia should not above all form the impression that we might recognize within the borders of the Greater German Reich some sort of Ukrainian statehood". In any case Frank saw the settlement of the Ukrainian problem in the same terms as that of Poland: they would "put themselves at our disposal for all time as manpower". Thus they would be given an opportunity to develop in proportion to the needs of a working nation, which should be integrated into the organization of the Greater German Reich. In addition the Ukrainians could be used as a foil to the Poles. But apart from all this it should be emphasized that the District of Galicia, in particular, was an integral part of the Greater German Reich and not some community of the Greater Ukraine, of any kind whatsoever—even spiritual. Attempts to make Lwów or institutions there replacements, in the course of time, for Kiev must be completely frustrated in advance. All departments must co-operate with the army to scotch any stirrings in this direction. Frank also asked his colleagues gradually to restrict the flying of Ukrainian flags to a minimum. A final elimination of Ukrainian organizations, which were not indispensable, should be made.



"Above all, one idea should predominate: the Territory of the General Government would become the next integral part of Europe; it would be unqualifiedly Germanized immediately after the re-Germanization of the Eastern territories of the Reich."

Frank gave his audience a glimpse into the future of the Nazi era. "We will build huge 'autobahns', like the ones that already cut across our country. Along them will rise great German settlements. At specially chosen strategic points military camps will be set up and in a wide zone around them German life will develop. If we then have the opportunity of driving eastwards the foreign nations, which we no longer have any use for, it will not be so difficult increasingly to settle German elements and remove the foreign elements."

Frank then said that the Führer had authorized him to start preparing the ground for all this. "Some day a land of the Goths will rise farther to the East and the General Government will become a land of the Vandals."<sup>10</sup>

The supplement to this argument seemed to come in Frank's statement on 11 March, 1942, that the racial problem in the General Government should be considered from the point of view of the territory being eventually assigned for re-settlement by Germans. This meant that it was of no importance how long it took to clear the whole country on the Vistula, together with Galicia, for German settlement. This of course could only be done by the expulsion of the foreign nationals—Poles and Ukrainians—from these territories. Everything, which aimed at this goal, was right: anything which clashed with it was a mistake. "If there was peace today", Frank explained, "the situation would be much easier from the racial viewpoint than it is now since we could then carry on a racial policy as we liked..." Because of this Frank considered that there was a self-evident need for making "our ultimate political decision".

"Things would go badly for us in the General Government", he said, "if political collaboration between the Poles and Ukrainians became a reality and we upset the 'political seesaw' we have been maintaining between the Poles and the Ukrainians."<sup>11</sup>



There is evidence that the Nazis took this lesson expounded by Frank to heart. At a security conference in the Lublin District on 29 May, 1943, SS Obergruppenführer Mühle, the Chief of Security Police, reported that the security police had purposely joined in the Ukrainians' racial struggle with the Poles.<sup>12</sup>

The true aims of Nazi policy towards the Ukrainians were exemplified by the statement of Dr Wächter, the Governor in Lwów, on 16 December, 1944, that the Nazi political line, as far as the Ukrainians were concerned, had become extremely tangled. The Nazi radio in Königsberg ended its propaganda broadcasts in the Ukrainian language with the slogan: Long Live the Free Ukraine! Were some Ukrainian to raise such a cry publicly in Lwów he would be arrested. Wächter found this confusion in the official German line nothing less than intolerable.<sup>13</sup>

Although the Nazis pretended to be the friends of the Ukrainians and to place them above the Poles, the actual situation was quite different. During a conference with Frank at his headquarters on 6 February, 1944, Hitler recalled that in Austria the 'Ruthenians', though despised as a nation, had been readily used politically as an anti-Polish element. Frank, however, pointed out that he did not consider the level of the Ukrainian intelligentsia very high, as far as their professional qualifications went. "It is", he said, "a difficult problem for us to keep the Poles, whose education comes much closer to European requirements at a low level, while at the same time training a cadre of leaders in Poland." Hitler agreed and said that the Poles were certainly a very able nation.

During this conference, Frank boasted that his doubledealing policy towards the Ukrainians had made it possible for him to organize a volunteer SS-Division in Galicia of simpleminded dupes. He emphasized that the Ukrainian was working in what he called peace and quiet.<sup>14</sup> How far Frank was from the truth and how different was the actual state of affairs in the Ukrainian territory under Nazi rule can be seen from the memorandum sent Frank in February, 1943, by Dr Włodzimierz Kubiowicz, who had become a tool of the deceptions of Nazi policy. "Inhuman

treatment", said the memorandum, "brutal conscription of forced labour, groundless arrests, and mass executions are by no means rare occurrences".

"The Ukrainians had to realize", wrote Dr Kubiowicz, "that the Germans made no distinctions between the nations in the East and treated their friends and enemies alike. The Nazi administration had applied the principle of collective responsibility to the Ukrainians no less than to the Poles".

The documents enclosed with the memorandum, in particular a list of names of those who had been executed, showed that the Nazi were shooting even five- and three-year-old children along with their mothers, as well as seventy-year-old people. Polish peasants were being shot side by side with Ukrainian peasants.<sup>15</sup>

## Chapter XIII

### RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION

ENTRIES in the "Diary" show that the Polish clergy from the very first days of Nazi rule were the victims of intensive persecution. On 2 December, 1939, Frank mentioned an archbishop and bishop being sentenced to death for allegedly hiding arms.<sup>1</sup> On 12 April, 1940, Frank spoke of parish priests being arrested in the Lublin District on charges of inciting the population in their sermons.<sup>2</sup> Frank himself produced the directives which led to the repressions against the clergy.

Informing his colleagues on 25 February, 1940, of the closing of Wawel Cathedral, Frank told them to pay close attention to the activities of the clergy, particularly their sermons, and to intervene immediately should there be the slightest suspicion that the churches were being misused for other purposes.

"If the Security Police notice that the clergy are deviating politically in any way, there is no place for mercy in such a case."<sup>3</sup>

Frank, in his first months of office, had already considered the problem of religion in Poland and described it in these words:

"The Church is maintaining a remarkable aloofness. But this is only a method which has recurred constantly in Polish history. The Church, as long as there were still other centres of operation available, has always kept itself in reserve as the final nucleus of Polish nationalism. To Polish minds the Church is the central rallying-point, silently shedding a constant ray of light and in this way acting as a sort of inextinguishable beacon. Whenever all was darkness in Poland, there was still Our Lady of Częstochowa and the Church. You must never forget this. For this reason the Church in Poland has no need to be active. Catholicism in this country is not just a religion; it is a necessity of life." (2. 3. 40).<sup>4</sup>

This appraisal explains why the list of Polish priests who died in Dachau alone contains 846 names.<sup>5</sup>

Frank constantly drew attention to the activities of the clergy; he was never sparing with threats in his speeches, as can be seen from the following passage which appeared in a speech made on 19 December, 1940:

"I observe in increasing measure that the Church is beginning to become unpleasant. While until now this mighty ideological bloc in Poland has, strangely enough, remained — so to speak — loyal, the Church is beginning here and there — apparently as a result of the stiffening of certain political situations on this continent — to become an embarrassment. I would like to stress straightaway that I shall not stop at anything here and even have bishops arrested immediately if the slightest thing occurs. I request you in this connection to take the severest steps to ensure that officials in uniform are strictly forbidden to visit Polish churches during a service."<sup>6</sup>

During the lecture he gave Frank on 2 October, 1939, in Berlin on how to deal with the Poles, Hitler also raised the question of religion. He realized its significance in Poland and so told Frank to make use of the Church in keeping the Poles "quiet, stupid and backward."<sup>7</sup>

On 14 December, 1943, Frank spoke to officers of the Luftwaffe:

"The Polish clergy and the Polish schools are my chief enemies precisely because I have to put up with them for reasons of general policy. I am aware that the Polish priests and teachers are systematically keeping this country in a state of unrest."<sup>8</sup>

On 11 February, 1944, Frank spoke in similar vein to Party officials:

"We cannot carry out any Church or school policy. I am intelligent enough to realize that these curates are our mortal enemies."<sup>9</sup>

After Cardinal August Hlond, the Primate of Poland, had left the country in 1939, Prince Adam Sapieha, Archbishop of Cracow was regarded as the official representative of the Church

in Poland. The "Diary" records that in 1942 (21. 11. 42) Archbishop Sapieha sent a memorandum to Frank about the arbitrary arrests being made by the Security Police. In accordance with Hitler's express orders, as he stressed, Frank decided to see the Archbishop in person. However he postponed the audience because of secret information given him by SS-Oberführer Schöngarth about the activities of Sapieha and his confidant, canon Odyl Gerhard.

It was not till 1944 that Archbishop Sapieha managed to see the Governor General. On 6 May, 1944, Frank told Dr Craushaar, President of the Main Department of the Interior, to see the Archbishop first. He was to inform the latter that Frank out of consideration for Catholic feelings had persuaded Reichsführer SS Himmler to release the Primate of Poland, Cardinal Hlond on condition that he did not return to the General Government.

Frank then discussed with Dr Craushaar and Wilden, the Chairman of the District Court, the question of new postulants for the seminaries. He had already conferred with Himmler on this matter. New postulants could be admitted provided they were not active in the resistance movement. The Security Police had been sent a list of the new parish priests but SS Oberführer Bierkamp had not yet reported whether he had any objections to the persons named.<sup>11</sup>

The "Diary" then records the course of Frank's first interview with the Archbishop of Cracow on 5 April, 1944. Frank's suggestion that the Church put out a statement condemning the resistance movement and adopt an attitude favourable to the Nazis in their conflict with the Soviet Union was turned down by Sapieha on the grounds that he was no politician. He saw the situation only as a man and a bishop. As such, he had heard about cases of human suffering and that was why he had sent his memorandum to the Governor General. When Dr Craushaar, who was present at the interview and Frank insisted that they had been often told that the Church was the real centre of the Polish underground resistance, the Archbishop denied being the head of any kind of resistance movement and declared that in the

course of the last five years the Nazis had not proved themselves friends of the Polish nation.

Archbishop Sapieha went on to describe the living conditions of the Poles in the General Government:

"The life of the entire population is rather unprotected. It has happened that it has been left to lower administration offices to decide whether to shoot Poles or not . . . The deportation of workers to the Reich has been carried out in a bad manner . . . In the Reich the Poles have been expelled from the churches and this creates a bad impression in this country".

"Archbishop Prince Sapieha," notes the "Diary", "then refers to the arrest and shooting of Polish priests. He states that many of them were quite innocent. Twenty priests had already met their death in Auschwitz and a further twenty were still in goal."<sup>12</sup>

The matters discussed in the interview between Archbishop Sapieha and Frank were used in his trial as evidence that the leading representative of the Church Hierarchy in Poland had informed Frank of the crimes committed by the Nazi administration in the General Government.

As for religion itself, Frank on the whole talked about it with extraordinary cynicism:

"If, as is claimed, Catholicism is really a dishonour for a nation, then all the more Catholicism must I wish for the Polish race . . . If Catholicism is a poison, then one can only wish this poison on the Poles. The same applies to other things as well." (14. 4. 1942).<sup>13</sup>

Frank also accused the Church, without any justification, of conspiring with the Jews and masons against Hitler's plans. Here was an echo of one of the Führer's catchphrases: "That the enemies we had in Germany have organized themselves internationally and have international support, we recognize from the fact that the carrying out of the Führer's programme in the world-historical sense leads to the same enemy front which we saw as victors over us in 1918: the Jews, the Jesuits and the Masons. These enemies of ours are today present again in the world drama." (17. 2. 44).<sup>14</sup>



## Chapter XIV

### THE ATTITUDE OF POLISH SOCIETY

AT THE SECRET session of 30 May, 1940, devoted to the AB action, Frank explained to his closest colleagues in the SS and police that Hitler had decided to keep the General Government under the permanent sovereignty of the Reich; one of the reasons for this was that the Nazis wrongly considered that the Polish nation proper, simple peasants and workers, would in fact be willing to work for the Third Reich, if they were kept under tight control (by the Nazis). These considerations must also have played their part in Frank's decision to exclude the peasants and workers from the scope of the AB action. "However intensive our anti-Polish tendencies are," he pointed out, "we must always bear in mind the preservation of the Polish peasant's and worker's ability to work. We must clearly realize that we could not maintain the area of General Government, were we to launch the destructive crusade against the Polish peasant and worker that some extremists envisage. It can only be a question of removing the leading sections; the working people must do good work under our responsible authority and command. That is why it would be useful if this nation of peasants and workers regarded the police as their protectors. Please help me, by supporting this policy of divide and rule. It would do no harm for the police more often on their own initiative to come ostentatiously to the aid of a Polish worker against a great Polish capitalist. In general the feeling must spread among Polish peasants and workers: we are under the protection of the Reich and its executive bodies and we have nothing to worry about as long as we do our work. This general procedure is the more important, the more intensive the steps we take against the real representatives of authority and the leading persons in Poland."<sup>1</sup>

Frank mistakenly supposed that the political leader section of Polish society was recruited exclusively from the intelligentsia and the owner class while the worker and peasant masses were without political initiative.

This policy of playing one side off against the other and of supposedly 'looking after' the Polish worker and peasant, while dealing harshly with the intelligentsia, led in actual fact to a brutal treatment of the whole of Polish society, the eradication of its cultural life and its economic devastation. The chief sufferers were the rural population, who were the targets of bloody pacification campaigns and deportations. Those living in the country, no less than those in the towns, were victims of the raids and street round-ups for forced labour in the Reich, without distinction as to sex, status or occupation. As a result both the intelligentsia and the workers and peasants formed a resistance to the Nazi Government. This can be clearly seen from the words of SS Oberführer Dr Schöngarth, the Chief of the Security Police, at a Government session on 20 May, 1941:

"It would be a fatal mistake to think that it is only former officers, office-workers or persons with some sort of education who are the men behind the resistance. The truth is that all these naturally form the leadership of the movement. But the majority of those who carry out the operations consists exclusively of peasants and workers... We should not include in the resistance only those people who are members of organizations. The Security Police includes in the resistance movement, in its broader sense, all Poles. There is not a single Pole who would now come forward and really work for the Government."<sup>2</sup>

Frank himself had to admit the complete defeat of his policy of provocation. In a secret memorandum sent to Hitler on 19 June, 1943, he wrote:

"What has been impossible throughout the history of the Polish nation, what was impossible even in the early years of German rule — that is the formation of a national community, dedicated to a single purpose and internally integrated from top to bottom — this is now threatening to become, slowly but

surely, a reality purely as a result of German methods. The German leadership cannot disregard this process of integration of the individual sections of the Polish population because the Poles' powers of resistance will grow as a result of it."<sup>3</sup>

There is a connection between the hostile attitude taken by the intelligentsia, peasants and workers to the Nazi Government and the Nazi appraisal of the Polish national character. On 2 March, 1940, Standartenführer Meisinger, describing the organization of the resistance movement, said that "one of the most dangerous factors in our struggle to defeat the resistance movement is the fanatical faith of the Pole in the resurrection of Poland."<sup>4</sup> Frank, too, warned his colleagues that they "should not suppose that a Pole who smiles or is deferential is any less dangerous than one who is a member of the resistance movement." (23. 9. 41).<sup>5</sup>

The best picture of the resistance movement was given by SS Obergruppenführer Koppe, the Secretary of State for Security, on 16 December, 1943: "The resistance organizations and the partisans aim at the restoration of Poland."<sup>6</sup>

The Polish nation produced not one Quisling.

The attitude of broad sections of Polish society was so hostile to the Nazi invaders, that they also failed in their attempt in 1944 to form an 'Antibolshevik League'.

Nor were Frank and his subordinates successful in their attempt to persuade the members of the Main Welfare Council, called in German the 'Main Polish Board' (Polnischer Hauptausschuss) publicly and openly to adopt a pro-Nazi position in their charitable work.<sup>7</sup>

Frank's opinion about Polish schools, expressed together with that about the Polish clergy on 14 December 1943, has already been quoted. On 11 February, 1944, talking about priests and teachers, about the impossibility of carrying on a church or school policy and about his conviction that the clergy was hostile to the occupant, Frank added that "the teachers do nothing but support the resistance movement".<sup>8</sup>

The contents of the "Diary" of Hans Frank are a valuable testi-

monial to the fact that, as seen by the enemy, the whole of Polish society — workers and peasants, intelligentsia and clergy — with a few exceptions, closed their ranks implacably against the occupant and were willing to make the supreme sacrifice for love of their country.

## FRANK'S OWN CONFESSION. SUMMARY

IN A LECTURE delivered at the Nazi Administrative Academy in Cracow on 23 October, 1943, Frank himself said that "to lead means to bear responsibility — nothing more". On 2 March, 1940 he told a meeting of the Reich Defence Committee:

"I am responsible for what has happened since 11. 10. 39, no matter what happened, how it happened or by whom it was done. I bear the responsibility and I am not passing it on to anybody. And because of this I also want to stress that this responsibility can be borne. If there were here and there events which were — let us say — regrettable from the point of view of humanity in general, we must accept the responsibility all the more".<sup>1</sup>

Frank himself probably best described the illegality of the Nazi administration in Poland at a secret session on 31 May, 1943.

"The General Government has been established by the Führer in 1939 as a kind of special administration. The General Government is what you might call a latent state of emergency. This follows from the fact, for example, that we have still maintained summary police courts, which, as executive organs, may carry out their sentences immediately. We have carried this emergency state so far that we have imposed sacrifices in the native population utterly different from those in other territories..."<sup>2</sup>

The results of this illegality and permanent state of emergency were again best described by another Nazi leader in the executive machine — SS Brigadeführer Dr Schöngarth, the Chief of the Security Police; at a Government session on 20 April, 1943 — Hitler's birthday — he said:

"No people has ever before had to suffer such oppression as that being suffered by the Polish people."<sup>3</sup>

Here are confessions, extraordinary for their tragic eloquence, made by the Nazis themselves about what they did in Poland. These words were spoken by Dr Schöngarth before the ordinance of 2. 10. 43 was issued which was to become the basis for public mass executions in the street, particularly in Warsaw.

Frank was aware of his responsibility for the administration's crimes. At a secret session in Warsaw on 25 January, 1943, he concluded his summing-up of the discussion in these words:

"We must not be squeamish when we learn that a total of 17,000 people have been shot . . . We must remember that we, who are gathered here, figure on Mr Roosevelt's list of war criminals. I have the honour of being Number One. We have, so to speak, become accomplices in the world historical sense. Just because of this, we must hold together and be in agreement with one another and it would be ridiculous if we were to let ourselves get involved in any squabbles over methods."<sup>4</sup>

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While in gaol in Nuremberg, during his long trial before the International Military Tribunal, Frank wrote down his thoughts on the defeat of the Third Reich, ruled and destroyed by Hitler. On the basis of his own recollections, he drew up a personal balance-sheet with the Führer. He wanted to bequeath to his children, particularly his sons, apart from his personal memoirs, a lesson for the future to be learnt from his own fate and from his complicity in the Nazi exploits of destruction, which in his memoirs he fully accepted.

In these reflections Hitler was so much the dominating figure, putting everything in the shade of his personality, that Frank's own memoirs are in character and title a study of Hitler: "Adolf Hitler — Ein Essay". In it he tried to collect all that he had learnt about the life, personality and career of Hitler in his long years of collaboration with him.<sup>5</sup>



With the same passion, with which he had once idolized Hitler, he now turned against him in his memoirs:

"In the face of the dreadful deeds of which he (Hitler) was the author and of all those things which his subordinates did in his name or on his orders or with his clear consent and approval or on his direct or indirect initiative, one very simple conclusion leaps to mind: that he was one of the most evil, most monstrous villains in the history of mankind. The results of his work are so tragically terrible in the number of deaths, in the extent of suffering and destruction of every kind that it seems almost impossible even to try to find a similar example in the history of the world. His name is surrounded by the stench of millions of corpses, of destruction, famine, catastrophe, subversion, butchery. He was the greatest human engine of destruction that mankind has ever suffered up to the present day . . .<sup>6</sup>

"How much suffering would have been spared us and the world had Hitler died that New Year's Eve of 1938 . . .<sup>7</sup>

"Hitler was a fiend sent by Satan . . .<sup>8</sup>

"Hitler was the main defendant at Nuremberg. His deeds are monstrous."<sup>9</sup>

Once Frank had found the war noble and worthwhile; now in his prison memoirs he condemned it.

"When today in Nuremberg I think of all my countrymen who died in the last war — almost 4,000,000 killed alone on various fronts — then Hitler's guilt is no less than satanic. All the senseless killing of every war has never equalled this in cost to civilized man. How many futures were blighted by the crimes in Auschwitz! A monstrous fate just to think about."<sup>10</sup>

In these memoirs, Frank had no reservations about Hitler's responsibility in starting the world war.

"As far as Poland is concerned, the Anglo-Polish guarantee agreement had been drawn up in March; it was an answer to the great speech made by the Führer in the Reichstag in which he put forward his demands on Poland. No objections, formal or factual, could be raised against this speech. These demands, as Hitler saw them, were in themselves moderate, and envisaged

the conditions for a settlement of the problem — a plebiscite, according to the statute of the League of Nations, on the territory of a corridor of limited area — which could be acceptable, if there was any willingness for negotiation. But Poland's position was clear from the legal point of view. The corridor was part of her sovereign territory, while Gdańsk was an 'independent Free City' under the supervision of the League of Nations. How then could Germany make a demand of this kind? For any thinking and normal-thinking person, this would provide grounds for second thoughts, but not Hitler who did not think within the restrictions of history and certainly not of the law. In addition, Hitler had recognised and guaranteed the frontier between Poland and Germany in the Polish-German agreement of 1934 which said that in the event of any disputes steps should be taken in a spirit of amity. Why did he not honour his commitments? The legal basis for what he did was indeed flimsy . . .

"He sent an invitation via London to the Polish plenipotentiary for negotiations in these matters to come within 24 hours, and Warsaw was even willing to negotiate. What, then, was the point of a war? . . . He received urgent and sincere appeals for peace which prophetically foretold the disaster awaiting him and which came true in so terrible a form . . . And truly a man might ask, seriously and indignantly: why, Hitler, did you start this mad war which plunged your Reich, your people and so many persons into the abyss? . . ." <sup>11</sup>

Frank recalled that in 1938 Hitler assured Grabowski, the Polish Minister of Justice then visiting Berlin, in his (Frank's) presence that his policy would continue to be based on the 1934 Polish-German agreement and that he was prepared, there and then, to guarantee the Polish frontier for 25 years and not the original 10. <sup>12</sup>

So, although Frank's Nazi nationalism was too strong for him to renounce the spirit of imperialism and still prevented him from regarding Hitler's demands as anything but 'in themselves moderate', as a lawyer he no longer had any reservations about Hitler's guilt in launching an aggressive war against Poland.

Frank also writes in his memoirs with supreme disgust and condemnation of the alleged immediate 'casus belli', the organization, on Hitler's orders, of an attack on the German broadcasting station in Gleiwitz (Gliwice) by convicts, dressed in Polish uniforms. Frank recalls the fiendish perversion of the truth in Hitler's address to the Reichstag on 1 September, 1939, in which he gave this alleged 'attack' as the direct cause for the launching of hostilities against Poland.<sup>13</sup>

"This war," writes Frank, "was, from the outset, the most unpopular in the history of Germany. On 1 September, 1939, one event broke the strongest tie between Hitler and the German nation . . . Adolf Hitler," he says portentously, "stand up and hear the indictment of the German nation. You duped your people. The German nation did not, at any price, want another war . . . No, there is not the slightest justification for Hitler for starting this war."<sup>14</sup>

These criticisms of the war made by Frank have been included to highlight his earlier frequent and enthusiastic approval of the war of aggression, acquisition, and plunder. This had been the cause of the numberless outrages which so wracked Frank's conscience in prison.

Frank admitted that he too must bear the responsibility as one of those who had helped Hitler to power in Germany. "If history lays the guilt for the war on Hitler, this guilt is shared by all those who helped to put him in a position where he could put in motion the whole machinery of the Reich without having to consult anybody. I am one of them because I too was active in helping him to power and to strengthen his position. And that is why I include myself in the group of those who share his guilt despite my fight for the law."<sup>15</sup>

Frank correctly saw his guilt in the active support he had given Hitler to rule Germany by terror and outside the law, and to start a new world war, although the Nuremberg Tribunal did not charge him with this. By this admission of complicity through his active support of Hitler, Frank unwittingly, but accurately, made nonsense of all his claims to have championed the law.

Frank admitted that he fully approved Hitler's ideology, though he criticised his methods. In this connection, Frank expatiated on his supposed campaign at congresses of Nazi lawyers before the war for legality in the Third Reich, brushing aside the fact that Hitler's path to power was one progression of crime and violence. Frank also considerably overestimated the significance of these congresses, which, after all always ended in votes of confidence in the Führer, and in addition might have given people unacquainted with the real situation the false impression that the Nazis were concerned with legality.<sup>16</sup>

Frank branded Himmler and Bormann as the advocates of terror and violence, and the evil spirits of the Führer. He called them "archvillains".<sup>17</sup>

These prison reflections bear out the theory we put forward that this supposed campaign for legality in the Reich was an attempt to realize Frank's own ambitious plans to emerge at the summit of political life in the Reich the moment it became obvious that Hitler was threatened by inevitable disaster.

Here is what Frank wrote in his memoirs:

"Mussolini's fall in the summer meant a further decline in the authority and importance of Hitler. It is quite impossible to describe his reactions to this event. It must have filled him with a grave presentiment of his own fate.

"This happened when I had fallen into Hitler's complete and even unconcealed disfavour. After all, I had, in the summer of 1942, openly parted with Hitler, in the eyes of the whole of the nation, when I had registered the firmest protest against the regime of Hitler, Himmler and Bormann in four major speeches at the Universities of Vienna, Berlin, Munich and Heidelberg. These speeches were enthusiastically applauded by audiences, several thousand strong. This action required courage but it was, in reality, no more than a fulfilment of my duty as a guardian of law. So I took my leave of Hitler and forecast the end of him and the Reich, since no state in Germany's situation can survive without the law . . ." <sup>18</sup>

The memoirs also confirmed our suspicions that Hitler guessed

Frank's purpose. Describing his last conversation with Hitler in his Headquarters on 6 February, 1944, Frank says that Hitler recalled his (Frank's) activities in 1942 and justified his own reactions to them in this way: "Don't you feel that I had to treat you as I did, when, almost without warning, you publicly attacked me in wartime with charges of rule by terror?"<sup>19</sup>

Frank describes with his usual exaggeration the price which Hitler made him pay for his university speeches in 1942. His 'campaign' was to have led to his demotion to a rank-and-file party member. Frank managed to overlook with extraordinary ease his retention of the post of Reich Minister and Governor General right up to the end of the Third Reich.<sup>20</sup>

Although Frank declared that as a leading National Socialist he shared in Hitler's guilt, and condemned his own conduct, speeches and work,<sup>21</sup> he contradicts himself a few pages later when he criticises the methods used in making the "Excerpts" from his "Diary", which had been the basis of his indictment and sentence.

"Some quotations, a few pages in all, have been chosen from my war "Diary", covering 43\* volumes; they have been extracted piecemeal from the whole and a terrible indictment constructed from them, while passing over the rest of the contents, which are a hundredtimes wider in scope than the selected quotations and completely stultify them . . .

"No attention has been paid either to the fact that, when I addressed the SS and police, I was talking to my mortal enemies . . .

"There has been no attempt to discover in this indictment whether there was any real connection of cause and effect between the quotations used against me and what actually happened. I maintain and declare that I never committed a single murder in my life and that all these killings took place as a consequence of orders given by Hitler and Himmler directly to their Krügers and Globocniks . . ."<sup>22</sup>

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\* Mistakenly for 38.



The best answer to these charges will be to recapitulate what has already been established in earlier chapters.

The post of Governor General guaranteed Frank full powers in the General Government in accordance with the Führer's decree of 12. 10. 39. Both the Higher SS and Police Chief and the Secretary of State for Security were his subordinates. Frank was also the head of the territorial organization of the NSDAP set up by him in the General Government. Frank was an enthusiastic supporter of the aggression against Poland and regarded as its aim the ultimate annihilation of the Polish State. (II)

Frank had no reservations about Hitler's grim directives concerning the thorough cultural and economic devastation of the country. Frank repeated with relish Hitler's slogan that at all costs they were to finish with the Poles once and for all and break their backbone for all time. Frank forecast the creation of a 'District of the Vandals' in the General Government. It was not till the defeat at Stalingrad that Frank came to his senses and was prompted to change his views on the attitude to be taken with the Poles, but his motive in replacing the former brutality was the disingenuous one of keeping, to use his own phrase, "the people quiet and working". Only when the Soviet armies had entered Polish territory, did Frank begin to talk about 'co-operation' with the Poles in Europe. He was without doubt influenced in this by the declaration of the Allied Powers concerning the liability of the Nazi war criminals and by fear of punishment (III).

If Frank claims in his memoirs that he never committed a single murder and throws the whole blame on Himmler and his subordinates then his memory has failed him. It is enough to recall the terrible AB action and the plans to murder several thousand persons in cold blood which Frank himself inspired, expounded, publicised and entrusted to members of the SS and police. It is enough to recall the derision with which Frank then spoke about the professors of the University of Cracow and his regrets at the trouble that had been caused by not murdering them straight-away in Cracow. If Frank complains that there is no relation



between the statements in the "Diary", quoted by the prosecution and the actual facts, it is in the AB action that this relation appears in its most dreadful form: on Frank's orders the SS and police murdered thousands of people. The AB action also shows up as a monstrous falsehood Frank's claim that he was a completely solitary figure without any influence on the course of events; on the contrary it displays him as the champion of crimes committed in cold blood and with premeditation. Another lie is Frank's claim that he saved thousands of lives; the AB action shows him as the inspiration behind their murder.

There is also a close relation between Frank's words and the actual facts in the matter of the execution of hostages, since Frank himself issued the ordinance on 2 October, 1943, dealing with counter-measures to be taken against attempts to sabotage the German work of reconstruction in the General Government; he himself expounded and publicised the principle of collective responsibility based on this ordinance, which found its practical expression in mass executions (IV).

Frank claims in his memoirs that as early as January, 1940 his relations with the SS and the police had been made so difficult that he submitted his resignation and, when summoned by Hitler to Berlin, complained about the SS and police. There is not a single reference to this in the "Diary", though there is an entry recording that at a session on 19 January, 1940, Frank gave a report on his conference with the Führer earlier that month and said that Hitler, after hearing his two-hour description of the situation in the General Government and its line of development, had given him the enormous satisfaction of having nothing but praise for the work of Frank's administration in the General Government.<sup>23</sup>

There was, therefore, no question of trouble between Frank and the SS and police in January, 1940, nor of threatened resignations because of it; in fact in May of the same year Frank was already charging them, as his most trusted colleagues, with the execution of the AB action (V).

Frank lent the full support of his authority to the deportation

of people from the General Government to forced labour in the Reich and once more used the police to raise the contingents sent (VI). Frank also supported the deportation of the Poles as part of the policy of Germanization in the General Government (VII). It was not till April, 1944, that Frank took up a critical attitude towards concentration camps, though as late as February of that year he was still talking about the need for stern measures in connection with the sending of Poles to Oświęcim (IV).

It should be added that both forced labour in the Reich and deportation were to be instruments, scientifically elaborated by Frank's own Academy of German Law, in the biological campaign against the Polish nation, the purpose of which was to destroy the Polish race and prepare the area for German settlement (VI—VII).

Frank gave the full authority of his high position to the vicious campaign of persecution of the Jews and supported it in numerous speeches with an excitement and ardour typical of him. In his speech of 16. 12. 41 he clearly forecast the ultimate extermination of the Jews and singled out his second-in-command, Dr Bühler, at a special conference which was to decide finally the means to be used.

Frank must answer not only for such measures against the Jewish population as forcing them to wear armbands, shutting them up in ghettos, imposing the death penalty on attempts to leave ghettos, etc., but also for his vicious outbursts against the Jews which his subordinates and the ordinary Nazis greeted enthusiastically and interpreted in their own way (VIII). Frank's memory again failed him when he says in his prison memoirs that after the hearings before the International Military Tribunal no one could charge him with playing any part in the mass murder of Jews.<sup>24</sup> However a few pages later he himself admits his complicity in the persecution of the Jews. "I too was an anti-Semite; I too made speeches. That is why I too, in a looser "intellectual" sense, bear a heavy guilt. And I have accepted it unqualifiedly."<sup>25</sup>

"Collective mass murder directed against a whole nation is the most terrible of crimes; Hitler is guilty of this — against the Jews."<sup>26</sup>

Frank conducted a ruthless policy of complete exploitation of the Polish economy to benefit the Third Reich at the expense of the Polish nation; this policy led to a food ration that was tragically small and to a health situation that was catastrophic. There is a close relation between the statements made by Frank, which were the basis for the merciless decisions taken concerning the raising of quotas and the reduction of rations, and the transports of food to the Reich and the famine of the local population (IX).

Frank made a systematic effort not only to undermine Polish culture but also, by closing all universities and secondary schools, to leave Poland only with technical vocational secondary schools, to paralyse all scientific, artistic and publishing activity, to transform the Polish nation into an helpless collection of robots (X).

Frank plundered the Polish art treasures in public and private collections on the principle that a mass of robots should have no need for any aesthetic or artistic satisfactions (XI).

Frank with classic Nazi self-deception supported the idea of a separate Ukrainian nation in the General Government and tried to use it as a foil to the Polish nation; in the presence of his colleagues he worked out plans for the complete Germanization of the General Government, which also involved the deportation of the Ukrainians further eastwards to make room in this area for a land of the "Vandals and Goths" (XII).

Frank claims in his prison memoirs that he submitted his resignation fourteen times but that each time Hitler persuaded him to stay on in his post — even in 1942, when he was removed from all his offices in the Reich and the NSDAP.<sup>27</sup> However in the "Diary" there are only two references to Frank submitting his resignation and each time for the same reason: this reason, it has to be emphasized once more as strongly as possible, had nothing to do with Frank's administration of the General Government but was purely an internal affair of the

Third Reich, the background to which was the personal rivalry between Frank and his 'beloved' Führer (I).

Frank claims in his memoirs that he sent about two thousand telegrams, letters and memorandums to Hitler concerning the situation of the Polish population. There is no mention of them in the "Diary".

Frank was well aware of his responsibility for the bloody regime in the General Government, and accepted it with his usual conceit; he even heard with satisfaction the news that he was at the head of the list of the war criminals in Poland.

This review of Frank's activities seems to provide a full answer to his complaints against the way in which the extracts from his "Diary" were made and a "terrible" — to use his own word — accusation based on them. This is the picture of Frank's rule painted in the "Diary", and in the "Excerpts" chosen to illustrate the different sides of the Nazi administration in the General Government and the martyrdom imposed on the Polish nation by his regime.

There is not much that could be taken from the "Diary" in Frank's defence apart from his unsubstantiated promises about a change of policy, provoked by the fear of being held responsible instilled in him by the defeat at Stalingrad. Or perhaps there is his raising of the food ration at a moment when the physical depletion of the Polish community threatened, as Nazi officials themselves saw, the complete breakdown of the labour force as a result of hunger, and a revolt which it would be difficult to suppress because of the shortage of police.

Frank, therefore, in prison forgot, or preferred to forget, what he had written in the "Diary". Though he made several complaints in his memoirs against the indictment, in the end he himself admitted his guilt and responsibility:

"But apart from everything, it is not my intention to bargain or make a deal with the victors concerning my guilt. Anyway, I feel guilty as a member of Hitler's whole enterprise. And for this reason I feel it my duty to my conscience, which has so much to answer for, to God, to humanity and to myself, to accept my

guilt for everything that happened in Poland, because as a man involved in Hitler's whole work I have committed many sins in word and deed. In any case God knows everything, everything.

"That is why, my children, I cannot in these notes either give my picture of my experiences in the General Government. For every sin which I might have committed against the Poles, the Jews and Ukrainians, I lower my head and beseech Our Lady of Częstochowa, whose sacrosanctity I took under my particular and persistent protection through all those terrible years, to intercede on my behalf with the Eternal Father in Heaven."<sup>28</sup>

It is difficult to say which is the more striking in this record: the self-deception or the moral breakdown of a man who not so long before had been a representative of the 'master-race'.

Frank recalls his farewell to Wawel Castle taken the day before his flight from Cracow on 16 January, 1945.

"Then, standing in front of the sarcophagus of the old king, it was clear to me that the day of judgement was dawning for Hitler and his people, among whom I was one. I bid a lasting farewell to the Polish nation and the Polish land. May God be with you and grant you happiness!"<sup>29</sup>

"It was a great injury we planned for the Poles when we decided to deprive them of this magnificent castle (Wawel) and their ancient land. Silently I begged the walls for forgiveness."<sup>30</sup>

"The Führer was unjust towards the Poles and I too have sinned grievously against myself and this nation."<sup>31</sup>

Towards the end of his prison reflections, Frank wrote: "On 4 March, 1945, I gave myself up to the Americans. Of my own will I give them my Diary of the war. I do not want to hide any sin: let what is known to God be also known to mankind."<sup>32</sup>

At the end of his prison reflections and recollections, Frank wrote a request that his 'last words' before the Nuremberg Tribunal be added to them as a supplement. These 'last words' contain some uncompromising and unjustified remarks directed against the Polish nation. It can be seen from them that Frank had no intention of correctly assessing the mass of Nazi crimes in Poland.<sup>33</sup>

The above has been a summary of the picture provided by the "Diary" of Frank's grim and bloody regime.

But to give the essence of his intentions in as short a form as possible let me recall the words I spoke as the Polish representative at a reception given by the Soviet delegation to the International Military Tribunal on 2 September, 1946 — after the conclusion of the court proceedings but before the passing of sentence.

"From November, 1945, until today my chief duty in the Polish delegation has been to read Frank's "Diary". This has given me an idea of what would have happened to the Polish nation in the event of a Nazi victory: they would have been the victims of complete destruction to the glory of the Nazi Weltreich. There is no more convincing or more expressive argument in favour of the necessity of co-operation between the Slav nations than that provided by a reading of Frank's "Diary." This necessity has been confirmed by Frank's last words in the dock. Expressions of this co-operation have included the fact that the Polish, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav delegates were invited by the Soviet delegation to sit at the Soviet Prosecutor's table. I drink to the successful co-operation between the Slav nations in the cause of world peace."



THE CRIMES OF FRANK  
AND THE NAZI ADMINISTRATION  
IN THE LIGHT  
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

THE PRECEDING chapters have dealt with the part played by Frank in the various spheres of the Nazi administration as it emerges in his "Diary". In this chapter the light thrown on this criminal activity by international law will be considered.

The basic principle of international law, as it stands today, binding an occupant with regard to the country occupied, is that occupation during a war is not equivalent to permanent rule over a country occupied by force of arms. The occupant has no right to annex the occupied territory during the war nor to create in it a new state organization since he is not sovereign over the occupied territory.<sup>1</sup>

The international commission, set up to establish the principles of the wartime responsibilities of states, which met in Paris in 1919, made it a crime to usurp sovereignty during military occupation. Belligerent occupation—that is 'occupatio bellica'—does not lead to permanent sovereignty over the territory occupied — that is subjugation through conquest and annexation — as was maintained by some German writers and Nazi ones in particular. Liszt considered that war ended with the defeat of the enemy, whether a peace treaty was concluded or not; Meurer recognized subjugation to exist when the whole state area of the enemy was occupied and considered that the continuation of the war by the allies of the defeated state made no difference. A similar opinion came from Freytag-Loringhofen who held that the Polish state had been liquidated in the second world war by the very fact of military defeat.<sup>3</sup>

The conquest of the whole enemy territory can only be the precursor of the final downfall of the conquered state and it is only recognition by allied states that can give conquest permanent consequences in law in an international sense.<sup>4</sup> Thus neither Poland nor Yugoslavia ceased to exist although their territory was conquered by the Nazi armies during the second world war, irrespective of whether these nations had Governments in exile at the time or not.<sup>5</sup>

The incorporation of part of the occupied Polish territory into the Reich, as in the case of France and Belgium, was certainly illegal from the point of view of the law of nations.<sup>6</sup>

The International Military Tribunal also rejected in its verdict the Nazi principle of subjugation of countries conquered by the Third Reich in the war. It even considered purposeless the question whether the principle of subjugation could be applied in the case of aggressive war and found it beyond dispute that none of the Nazi-occupied countries had finally laid down arms, so that it was impossible to apply to any of these countries the principle of subjugation.<sup>7</sup>

Even if military action by an enemy destroyed the state organisation, the nation itself still remained and did not cease to exist as a political, moral and legal entity. One Polish writer has concluded from these premises that the Polish state did not cease to exist even during the partitions because the nation endured and the state is simply the expression of the will of the nation.<sup>8</sup> A similar idea was expressed in Stalin's famous order-of-the-day of 23 February, 1942: "It would be ridiculous to equate Hitler's gang with the German state. The experience of history teaches that Hitlers come and go but the German state, the German nation endures."<sup>9</sup> Kelsen maintained that the German state had ceased to exist as a result of its conquest and the transference of sovereignty to the states occupying Germany. A. A. Anisimov rightly found Kelsen's view mistaken. Although the Third Reich had surrendered unconditionally, it was only the practical administrative authority that had passed to the allied states; sovereignty remained vested in the German nation.

It should be emphasized that the position adopted by the International Military Tribunal on the question of subjugation brought about an essential change in the views held by German writers (in West Germany). August von Knieriem in "Nürnberg — Rechtliche und menschliche Probleme", which is the definitive work on this subject in German literature, writes: "A conquered state continues to be at war if it has a Government in exile, if its people have not abandoned resistance and if this state provides the ranks of its allies with any military resources it has at its command (army and navy). If to these three pre-conditions is added another one, that the armies of its allies continue to fight with the purpose of liberating a conquered state and with a realistic hope of success, we consider that the annexation of the territory of the conquered state should be regarded as conflicting with international law.

"In one case, which was dealt with at Nuremberg, that is in the case of Poland, all these pre-conditions were fulfilled. This means that in our opinion the annexation of large parts of Poland by Germany violated international law."<sup>10</sup>

Frank's statements, as recorded in the "Diary", show that in accordance with Hitler's policy, he callously overrode this prime principle of international law, that military occupation does not entail permanent sovereignty over the occupied territory. Frank considered that the General Government would become a Nazi colony. The change in title from "General Government of the Occupied Polish Territories" to "General Government" was explained by Frank on the basis of Hitler's decision that the General Government was to become an integral part of the German Reich for all time. Frank's later statements supported this attitude. The General Government was to remain forever German through the realization of the guiding principle of Nazi policy of expansion of 'Lebensraum' by force. Frank regarded discussion concerning the reconstruction of the Polish state as madness.<sup>11</sup> It is true that at first there had been talk of handing over the General Government to the Polish nation as a sort of 'rump' state; but as early as November, 1939, Hitler

<sup>11</sup> Hans Frank's

told Frank that he would not give up the General Government.<sup>12</sup> If, then, Frank later publicly stated that the General Government was to be an "area of domicile for the Poles" (*Heimstätte der Polen*), even so limited a recognition of the Polish nation's right to exist should be regarded purely as propaganda calculated for its effect abroad.<sup>13</sup>

What Frank had to say about the fate of the Polish nation and particularly the Poles within the frontiers of the General Government was so terrible that it is absolutely impossible to measure it against any standards of international law. It is impossible to think in terms of law when Frank spoke of finishing with the Poles once and for all or of breaking the backbone of the Polish people or said that Poland would never rise again. Nevertheless an attempt will be made in as far as it is possible to look at the various aspects of Frank's criminal activity in the light of international law.

At the moment when the Nazis launched their aggressive war against Poland the rules of international law concerning occupation were contained in the regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land, annexed to the IV Hague Convention of 1907.

In order to see the legal nature of the Hague Regulations in their proper light, it is worth recalling that there were serious reservations to them on the part of the smaller nations who feared that the Regulations concerning land warfare might in future wars become an instrument in the hands of the great powers for justifying their authority in occupied territories. This was the prevailing mood at the Brussels conference in 1874, and the Hague conferences in 1899 and 1907; the first draft of the Regulations was passed in 1899 together with a declaration that the Regulations were only to be regarded as a limitation of the powers of an occupant.<sup>14</sup> The Regulations defined what an occupant was forbidden to do, rather than what he was allowed to do. This spirit of restricting as far as possible the arbitrary powers of an occupant ran throughout the contents of the convention and was underlined in the Preamble:

"According to the views of the high contracting parties, these provisions, the wording of which has been inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war, so far as military requirements permit, are intended to serve as a general rule of conduct for the belligerents in their mutual relations and in their relations with the inhabitants.

"It has not, however, been found possible at present to concert regulations covering all the circumstances which arise in practice, on the other hand, the high contracting parties clearly do not intend that unforeseen cases should, in the absence of a written undertaking, be left to the arbitrary judgement of military commanders.

"Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the high contracting parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principle of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilised peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of the public conscience."

The other essential characteristic of the Hague Regulations is that they are binding in every war, just or unjust. As far as positive law is concerned, that is the standards of land warfare and of the behaviour of the occupant towards the population of the occupied country, it makes no difference whether the war is aggressive or in defence of violated rights. In either case the occupant is bound to observe the rules of the Hague Regulations.<sup>15</sup>

The aim of the great powers during the Hague conference was to preserve the fullest measure of freedom of movement in the event of war. This can be seen in the qualification that appears in the Preamble to the Convention, quoted above: "so far as military requirements permit".<sup>16</sup>

The final adjustment of the conflicting trends which appeared during the conference was expressed in the progressive and liberal spirit of the final words of the Preamble to the Convention: both mankind and nations at war were entrusted with the preservation



of the principles of the law of nations which spring from the customs established between civilized nations, from the ideals of humanity and the demands of public conscience. Thus the ultimate criterion in cases of doubt was to be civilization, humanity and public conscience.

These Regulations were passed before the first world war. If we consider the enormous advances made in military technique, during the first and particularly the second world war, and the waging by the Third Reich of total war in its most brutal form, the conditions which existed in 1899 and 1907 would seem to belong to another age.

The rules of land warfare were drawn up at a time when armies moved on foot, by horse or by rail. The automobile was still in its embryonic stage. The use of the airplane as an instrument of war was no more than a dream. The atom bomb did not exist even in the imagination. The concentration of industry in powerful organizations extending beyond the boundaries of a single nation had hardly begun. Blockade was the most important economic instrument of war. Total war did not become a reality until 1939.

This was how the American Military Tribunal, passing sentence on Flick, described the period of the Hague Convention of 1907.<sup>17</sup>

The rules of the Hague Convention were a step forwards compared with the international law of the day. Nevertheless the codification of the principles accepted by the Regulations meant that they were considered binding from then on. There can be no doubt that in 1939 all civilized nations had recognized the principles contained in the Hague Regulations as a code of law and practice in wartime. This is how the International Military Tribunal considered the force of the Hague Regulations binding during the second world war.<sup>18</sup>

The Soviet Union also recognized the 1907 Convention as binding during the last war. This was clearly shown in notes sent by Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, on 25 November, 1941, and 27 April, 1942, in which he announced that the Soviet



Union would continue to observe the Regulations of the Hague Convention although the Nazis had violated every clause in it.<sup>19</sup> The Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R., General Rudenko, also referred to the Hague Convention in his opening address to the International Military Tribunal during the trial of the main Nazi war criminals.<sup>20</sup> Soviet scholars, although critical of the proceedings of the Hague conferences in 1899 and 1907, recognized the Hague Regulations considering the times when they were drawn up, as a sufficiently extensive and systematic codification of the rules of land warfare.<sup>21</sup>

Prof. Ehrlich (Cracow) is mistaken in his claim that there was no war as a result of the assault of the Nazi Reich on Poland in 1939 but only "a series of illegal acts", since the Reich had renounced war in the Kellog Pact and, further, had bound herself under the 1934 agreement with Poland not to resort to force in the settlement of disputes.<sup>22</sup> As has been correctly emphasized by Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, war is always war, under international law, even if it has been declared illegally.<sup>23</sup> Prof. Ehrlich is also wrong in concluding that in the case of an aggressive war the occupant is not properly bound by the Hague Regulations.<sup>24</sup> In every war, the laws of war are binding, states Oppenheim-Lauterpacht.<sup>25</sup>

The essential point about administration by an occupant under the Hague Regulations is its exclusively military nature. This expressly follows from Article 1 in which a state is bound to issue the appropriate orders to its land forces, and from Section III headed "On military authority over the territory of the hostile state" and from Articles 51, 52 and 53, which speak of the methods to be used in the collection of contributions, requisitions, etc. only to meet the needs of the occupying army and to be made only by it or its organs. It is also impossible to find any measure of similarity between the administration of an occupant and a civil administration.<sup>26</sup>

From this it can be seen that an occupant should confine himself to actions which are indispensable. In no case has he the right to annex the occupied country or to dispose of it. He does

not have the right to change or destroy its state organization, to amend or repeal its constitution, its administrative or judicial division.<sup>27</sup>

Thus Frank was repudiating the Hague Regulations when he told foreign reporters in Berlin in March, 1940 that his Government was the only legal Government in the world of the Polish nation.<sup>28</sup> The Hague Regulations were violated by the actual establishment of the General Government and its 'Government', and by the introduction of a new administrative division into 'Districts'. In this Frank infringed Article 43, which says that the transference of authority from the legal government to the occupant is only 'de facto'. It is the duty of the occupant to restore order and normal life in the country occupied and to observe the laws binding in it except in cases where absolute considerations make it impossible. By these were meant considerations of a military nature and ones connected with military operations and the requirements of the army.<sup>29</sup>

The principle applied by Frank was the very reverse: he considered himself and his 'Government' the only source of law in the General Government. With a total disregard for the Polish laws then in force, he issued decrees and other ordinances, the only object of which was the realisation of the political and economic ends of the occupant. This followed from the fundamental attitude of the Nazis that as a result of conquest the Reich had acquired full powers over the territory and population of the conquered country. In accordance with this standpoint, Section 4 of Hitler's decree of 12 October, 1939, concerning the administration of the occupied Polish territories, stated that the laws then in force in Poland were only binding where they did not clash with the transference of government to the German Reich. Dr Albert Weh, Director of the Legislative Office in the General Government, produced a collection of regulations issued in the country in which, quoting Hitler's speech of 6 October, 1939, he wrote in explanation of this decree that the occupation of Poland was not a wartime occupation as defined by 'occupatio bellica' but simply an occupation of the Polish territory for all

time and the end of the Republic of Poland — in accordance with the principles of the law of nations because of Poland's total military defeat.<sup>30</sup>

The most important resolution in the Hague Regulations concerning occupied countries is the rule that family honour and rights, the lives of persons and private property must be respected (Article 46). Frank broke this consciously and deliberately, with the full calculation of political premeditation. His violation was of such dimensions that there is only one term that can be used to describe it: genocide. This is the only word that fits Frank's intentions to spill Polish blood in the AB action of 1940, or his announcement in 1942 that people were being shot in their dozens, since sheer common sense indicated that there was no point in respecting the lives of foreigners when the best German blood was being spilled. Genocide, too, is the only word that can convey the full meaning of the extermination of Jews in Poland of which Frank himself was an enthusiastic advocate.<sup>31</sup>

There is no point in discussing the Hague Regulations and their bearing on the individual stages in the persecution of the Jews, which began with the obligation to wear the Star of David on their arms, the creation of the ghettos, etc.; all these criminal ordinances, which were not only contrary to the Hague Regulations but also contemptuous of any human standards of behaviour since ancient times, were to put the seal on the final settlement of the Jewish problem — complete extermination, or the mass-murder of the Jewish population in Poland: genocide.

This annihilation of the Jews in Poland provided the main basis for drawing up a charge of genocide in the indictment against the chief Nazi war criminals at the International Military Tribunal.<sup>32</sup> The policy of genocide followed by the Nazis also led to a resolution being passed by the United Nations in December 1948 concerning the prevention and punishment of this atrocity.<sup>33</sup>

At the time of the Hague Regulations a general rule that the life of the private citizen should be respected seemed natural

and sufficient. What happened under the Nazi occupation led to the conclusion of a special convention in Geneva on 12 August, 1949, for the protection of civilian persons in time of war in which particular emphasis was laid on the humane treatment of persons not directly engaged in the hostilities, and their being subject to no discrimination as to race, colour, religion or faith or for any other reasons of such a nature (Article 3, (1)).<sup>34</sup>

The extermination of the Jews in Poland was the most atrocious of the crimes committed by the Nazis during the second world war; this is an opinion that was shared by Frank himself as can be seen from his statements during the court proceedings at Nuremberg, dealing with the part played by him.<sup>35</sup>

There remains Frank's advocacy of the principle of collective responsibility and his shooting of hostages in connection with his policy of waging a biological war against the Polish nation.

The taking and execution of hostages was re-introduced in modern times by the Prussians during the Franco-Prussian war of 1870.<sup>36</sup> Marx, writing in London in 1870, spoke of the universal indignation aroused by the Prussian methods of conducting the war, their system of requisitions, the burning of villages, the shooting of partisans, the taking of hostages, etc., — a return to the excesses of the Thirty Years War.<sup>37</sup> During the first and second conferences at The Hague in 1899 and 1907, no mention was made of hostages when the Regulations were being codified although all the practices of war as they were known at the time found their way into the Regulations as part of the law of nations. Memories of the cruel actions of the Prussians in the 1870 war were too fresh and so it was considered too painful even to mention them.<sup>38</sup>

But the Hague Regulations of 1907 have something to say about the taking of hostages in so far as this is a means of collective punishment used by an occupant against the population of an occupied country. Article 50 states: "No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted on the population on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible". Neither the words

themselves of Article 50 nor any logical interpretation of them can be made to show that the taking of hostages is permissible — still less the shooting of them. It is hard to see how the convention would mention a milder form of punishment and omit the extreme penalty, if it could be applied on the basis of this resolution in the Convention.

The view that Article 50 forbids the shooting of hostages seems to be even more reasonable if we take it together with Article 46, which says that the life of the individual, and the dignity and rights of the family must be respected. It is difficult to reconcile a respect for human life with the shooting of hostages liable for the offences of others only because they were held responsible *en masse* without any proof of their guilt.<sup>39</sup>

It is impossible to prove that in a particular case, where the military interests of the occupant have been infringed, the whole population of a given area is liable for the actions of an individual, and to show that the whole population were active accomplices of the offender by preventing his detection; and this precludes the admissibility of taking hostages on the basis of Article 50. The punishment of innocent persons is a glaring offence against human feelings and conscience. This form of legal murder is all the more shocking in that it is preceded by no legal hearing.

So it is that Soviet scholars have rightly accepted that an occupant may impose special monetary penalties on persons guilty of violating the law but not on a whole population who cannot be held liable for the actions of an individual.<sup>40</sup>

Prof. Ehrlich refers to Article 30, which guarantees even spies a legal trial, to support his claim that the application of collective punishment is completely inadmissible because it would mean liability without proof.<sup>41</sup>

Like the Soviet scholars, prof. Ehrlich considers a subsidiary clause in Article 50 — concerning the absence of collective responsibility on the part of the population — purely as an argument in support of the main clause which precludes collective punishment in general.



From similar premises Laun argues that apart from fines the only penalties admissible under Article 50 are certain restrictions of freedom, such as curfews, etc., since otherwise the fundamental purpose of the Convention — that is the restriction of arbitrary measures — would be frustrated. Because court proceedings are by-passed when collective punishment is imposed under Article 50, Laun considers the determining factor in deciding collective responsibility, to be the public conscience under whose protection the preamble to the Convention has placed the population.<sup>42</sup>

For instance if a group of people in some village committed a serious assault on a soldier and the military commander ordered, as a collective punishment in reprisal, the shooting of the villagers or the destruction or burning of the village, which would involve a loss of human life, this in Laun's view would be collective murder. These same principles are equally applicable to larger areas and over longer periods of time — not just to an isolated instance in a single village.

Laun considers that an occupant has to choose between searching for the individual offender or persons strongly suspected of being involved or of imposing a collective penalty but one limited in its extent. The basis for determining the complicity of the population in this case should in the absence of a court hearing be a liberal judgement restrained by the highest dictates of public conscience.<sup>43</sup>

There are writers who maintain that Article 50 of the Hague Regulations does not expressly forbid an occupant from taking repressive measures against the population nor does it ban the taking of hostages in particular. Liszt claimed that the taking of hostages was not a violation of international law since the Hague Regulations make no mention of hostages and does not forbid the taking of hostages. Liszt bases his argument on Article 23 which does not list the taking of hostages among the actions forbidden to parties at war. However though certain writers have considered that the Hague Regulations do not ban the taking of hostages, they all at any rate emphasise that it is



forbidden to kill them. Liszt too points out that the spirit of the age requires that hostages be treated decently. Here Liszt quotes an instruction issued by the American Army in 1864 which said that hostages must be treated in the same way as prisoners of war.<sup>47</sup>

Hostages can be taken for purposes of prevention or repression, that is either before or after an act which a party at war or an occupation authority wants to avoid or to punish. The difference between these two types of hostages is crucial. To take hostages before some action is committed against the interest of the occupant and to broadcast this fact to the general public is a warning to the population of an imminent danger which it can in the opinion of the occupant avoid. To take hostages after an action and shoot them is collective murder which the population could not avoid because it did not even know about it.<sup>48</sup>

Both Oppenheim and Liszt recognise the taking of hostages as a preventive measure. Liszt contrasted hostages taken to guarantee the payment of imposed contributions etc., with hostages taken as a measure to prevent some danger threatening the occupant, when these hostages were in the same position as the occupant — that is threatened by the same danger. ("Gefahrgeiselschaft", "d'otages d'accompagnement", "hostages — prophylactic reprisals").<sup>49</sup>

During the first world war the Kaiser's Germany, steeped as it was in the spirit of militarism, continued the practice of taking hostages and shooting them in accordance with the principle, beloved of the Prussians, of "Kriegsraison vor Kriegsmanier".<sup>50</sup> Liszt maintains that the allies also took hostages but omits to mention that they did not shoot them.<sup>51</sup>

Studies in international law before the last war underline the necessity for an express ban on the taking of repressive measures against the population for offences committed by an individual for which the population cannot be held collectively liable. The butchery committed in Belgium and France during the first world war by the Kaiser's armies was always explained by the necessity for repressive measures. For the same reasons the need

was emphasised for an express ban on the killing of hostages in the course of repressions against the population for offences not committed by it.<sup>52</sup>

In these works the idea of individual responsibility emerges more and more clearly; this is one of the cornerstones of modern civilisation and is based on the concept of the dignity of the individual.<sup>53</sup> As early as the 17th century Lessius, a scholar from Louvain, had said that there was never any justification for killing innocent persons, while Vitoria, the forerunner of Grotius, maintained that hostages who were innocent must not be killed; otherwise it would be the equivalent of murdering women and children.<sup>54</sup>

If the German methods of repression and shooting of hostages during the first world war met with universal condemnation, the barbaric methods used by the Nazis in the second were a hundred times more vicious than the atrocities of the Kaiser's armies. The Nazis shot hostages in such numbers that the Charter of the International Military Tribunal made the shooting of hostages a separate crime within its competency, and the Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war introduced a ban on collective penalties (Article 33) and on the taking of hostages (Article 34). The Convention also gave clear expression to a principle which had been fought for by whole generations: no person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed (Article 33).

Frank began to apply the principle of collective responsibility in the very first months of his taking up office in Cracow. On 10 November, 1939, he told the Governor of Cracow to order the execution of one man in every house which hung out a poster to mark Poland's National Day (November 11). There was no question of giving the population prior warning. These then were to be hostages taken after the fact—an act of ruthless repression. With Frank's full knowledge the police were in the habit of taking hostages after the fact and executing them.<sup>55</sup> The large-scale slaughter of hostages began with Frank's ordinance of 2. 10. 43, concerning the prevention of sabotage of the German

work of reconstruction in the General Government. Chapter IV dealt in detail with the conduct of the Nazi police on the basis of this ordinance. There was a series of repressive acts, a chain of mass murders which violated every concept of justice. Frank could find no way of justifying them even to the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin which was disturbed by the strong feelings that these mass street executions had aroused abroad. Frank himself must have been aware that he was flagrantly violating the international law on war.<sup>56</sup> The summary police courts set up by Frank's ordinance of 2. 10. 43 in which the accused had no chance of defence and the 'court' could only pass a death sentence were also a complete travesty of justice. According to Frank's explanation the only possible crime of which the persons sentenced to death in these courts could be guilty was membership of the resistance movement and this was very cursorily proved on the basis of alleged evidence. There was never any question of there being some connection between the persons executed and some assault committed on the Nazis.<sup>57</sup>

With a burst of sincerity Frank provided the best description of the barbarity of the street executions authorised by his decree; on 15 January, 1944, he said: "I did not hesitate to say that for every German shot up to a hundred Poles would be shot."<sup>58</sup>

Here was the same system of terror as Frank had endorsed as early as 1940 in an interview with the correspondent of the NSDAP newspaper 'Völkischer Beobachter': he compared the Nazi regime in Prague with the Nazi regime in Poland: "If I wanted to have a poster put up for every seven Poles who were shot, the forests of Poland would not suffice for producing the paper for such posters."<sup>59</sup>

Unavailingly the Secretary of State, Dr. Bühler, advised that the term "hostages" at least should not be used in notices of mass execution for fear of the impression it would create abroad, unavailingly Frank explained to representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that hostages were no longer being shot.

The collective executions of hostages were more than just

a violation of the Hague Regulations; they broke every principle of the moral coexistence of nations.

The deportation of people from the General Government to forced labour in the Reich (VI), practised on a huge scale by Frank's regime was also a glaring infringement of the Hague Regulations, which allowed the population of an occupied territory to be employed only for the needs of the army of occupation (Article 52) and then within the area of the occupied country.<sup>61</sup>

Everything contained in Section III of the Hague Regulations dealing with military authority over the occupied territory of the hostile state shows that the regulations in this chapter have as their object only the satisfaction of the occupant's wartime needs: he cannot do anything which falls outside the needs of war production, the administration, and the army in the country occupied, and which aims at the realization of the political plans of the occupant for after the war. In accordance with Article 43 Section III the occupant is obliged to take all the measures dependent on him to restore and ensure public order and safety.

This obligation to maintain public order was atrociously disregarded and the principle that the occupant can only make such demands as satisfy his own and the army's needs repudiated in the whole campaign of deportation from the General Government that took place under Frank's regime and the object of which was the realization of the extensive Nazi plans for Germanization (VII). These deportations were also a transparent contravention of Article 46 of the Hague Regulations which enjoined a respect for the rights of the individual, of the family and the life and property of the private citizen.

After genocide or the slaughter of whole racial, ethnical and denominational groups, after the concentration camps which were kept in conditions that gave them the universal name of death camps, forced labour in the Reich and deportations were the most iniquitous of the Nazi crimes committed during the last war.<sup>62</sup>

Because of the actions of the Nazi occupation administrations in various countries of Europe the Geneva Convention of 1949

included a rule that the occupying power may compel the population of an occupied country only to work in the borders of the occupied territory where the persons whose services have been requisitioned are domiciled and only to meet the needs of the army or for the public utility services of the population of the occupied territory (Article 51). The Convention also forbade compulsory transfers of the population except for evacuation to serve important military needs and also banned deportation to the area of the occupying power regardless of the reason (Article 49).

In the light of the Hague Regulations, and Article 46 in particular, it was a war crime to send people to concentration camps—a method practised on an enormous scale in the General Government, including its collective application to people deported from certain localities which could later be resettled by Germans brought from outside the General Government (VII).<sup>63</sup>

The economic devastation of the General Government by means of excessive quotas of food supplies shipped to the Reich and the starvation of the Poles in the General Government through insufficient food rations was also a brutal infringement of the Hague Regulations which in Article 52 had permitted requisitions and services only where they were needed by the occupying army. And these requisitions had to be related to the resources of the country.

Influenced by the actions of the Nazi occupants, the Geneva Convention imposed on the occupant a duty to keep the population of the occupied territory supplied with food and medicines and in particular to look after the health and hygiene of the occupied territory.

According to the Hague Regulations, the occupant should consider himself only as administrator and usufructuary of the property of the state located in the occupied area (Article 55). In violation of this Article, Frank followed the Nazi principle of conquest, which he himself venerated,<sup>64</sup> and immediately confiscated the property of the Polish state in the General Government disregarding the limitations strictly set out in Article 53 of the Regulations.<sup>65</sup>



Frank's confiscation of all Polish historic art treasures—state, Church, public and private—was also an infringement of the Hague Regulations. Here Article 56 was broken which makes it an offence to appropriate, destroy or defile works of art, and in addition equates the property of institutions devoted to the fine arts and science, even if they belong to the state, with the property of private citizens which is exempted from confiscation under Article 46.<sup>66</sup> The plunder of works of art in the General Government, the looting of the Royal Castle in Warsaw, and other public and private collections under the pretext of preserving these works of art (XI), was also a glaring contravention of Article 47 which states that pillage is formally forbidden.

The vandalist destruction of the Royal Castle on Frank's orders and with Hitler's approval after the cessation of military operations in 1939 and in 1944 (after the Warsaw uprising) was not only an infringement of the Regulations but an offence punishable under the Regulations by a military tribunal.<sup>67</sup>

As regards international law and the Hague Regulations in particular the whole Nazi policy of reducing the cultural condition of the Polish nation to its lowest possible level, the plundering of the Jagiellonian Library, the establishment of the Institute of German Work in the East, the closing of the universities and school—all this was completely illegal under international law and the Hague Regulations in particular.<sup>68</sup>

Frank's whole career as Governor General was a repudiation of the fundamental principle of the Hague Regulations—that the occupant must respect laws in force in the country.

There is not a single article of the Hague Regulations which was not infringed in the course of Frank's criminal activity as Governor General. Lewin has correctly observed that the conduct of the Nazi aggressors in the occupied countries was a flagrant violation of the contents of the Hague Regulations.<sup>69</sup> In his note of 6 January, 1942, the Foreign Minister of USSR rightly emphasised that the Nazi regime of plunder and bloody terror towards a peaceful population did not consist of the excesses of individual army units but was planned and particularised



in advance.<sup>70</sup> S. B. Krylov has written that the actions of the Nazi oppressors in the Soviet Union and other freedom-loving occupied countries were distinguished by unprecedented atrocity.<sup>71</sup>

The International Military Tribunal also pointed out in its written judgement the infringements of the various resolutions of the Hague Regulations committed by the Nazis in the occupied territories.<sup>72</sup>

The Tribunal also confirmed that the breaking of Articles 46, 50, 52 and 56 of the Hague Regulations constituted war crimes under International law. The actions mentioned in these articles were also judged war crimes coming within the province of the Tribunal.<sup>73</sup>

Lauterpacht has also correctly said that the Nazis were guilty of unique violation of all the laws of military occupation, particularly in Eastern Europe. They suspended the local laws on a wide scale. They handed private and public property over to the mercies of the systematic policy of exploitation in the service of the Reich and its war effort. Millions of people were deported to forced labour in the Reich. The populace was subjected to a policy of terror, the object of which was to suppress any resistance to the occupant. In connection with this and with Article 46 of the Hague Regulations the International Military Tribunal decided that the Nazis had governed the occupied territories in violation of the law on war, while the court proceedings provided evidence that the Nazis had followed a system of government by violence and brutal terror. In Eastern Europe they had put into practice a policy of reducing the numbers of the intelligentsia and their political opponents. Concentration camps had been set up in and outside Germany for persons from the occupied territories. Those detained in these camps were subjected to systematic brutality. The concentration camps were the main instrument used in the slaughter of 6,000,000 Jews from the occupied countries (mainly in gas chambers), and this was the result of the implementation of Nazi racist policy.<sup>74</sup>

If the Germans during the first world war, writes Van Nispen

tot Sevenaer, trampled on the rules of the Hague Regulations, in the second world war the Nazis pushed their contempt for the principle of the law of nations to unprecedented proportions. Is this not tantamount to saying that the Nazi occupation authorities disqualified themselves from the right of using those sanctions provided for in the law of nations and that as a result the Nazis must be held liable for all the human suffering and injustices perpetrated on the populations of the occupied territories through the use of repressions, the rights of war and collective punishments? <sup>75</sup>

“The Nazi occupation”, writes Van Nispen tot Sevenaer, “was as unjust as the war itself which was its cause. This war brought misery to Europe and a great part of the whole world”. <sup>76</sup>

## NOTES AND REFERENCES



## NOTES AND REFERENCES

THIS WORK is based wholly on documents brought to light during the trial of the major Nazi war criminals before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg.

After sentence had been passed on 1 October, 1946, the Secretariat of the Tribunal undertook on behalf of the Allied Supervisory Council in Germany the publication of the official court records and of the documents submitted during the court proceedings and admitted by the Tribunal among the evidence. The publication was in English, German and French and covered 42 volumes in each language. The title of the English version is: "Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal", Nuremberg, I—XLII (Nuremberg 1947/9). Volume I, 'Official Documents', embraces the make-up of the Tribunal, the names of defending counsel, the Agreement between the Four Powers of 8 August, 1945, which set up the Tribunal, the Charter of the Tribunal, the preliminary resolutions on procedure prior to the trial, the indictment and sentence. Volumes II—XXII contain the record of the proceedings. Volume XXIII is a chronological and subject index. Volume XXIV includes an index of documents and names together with errata. Volumes XXV—XLII consist of documents laid before the Tribunal by the prosecution and the defence. The French and German editions follow a similar pattern. The French title is: "Procès des criminels de guerre devant le Tribunal International Nuremberg" and the German "Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof Nürnberg". The publication was in a limited edition and not intended for sale. All three versions give Nazi documents in the original German. When referring to it, I have used the English edition. The abbreviation IMT (International Military Tribunal) is followed by the number of the volume in Roman numerals and the reference of the document and its serial number in Arabic numerals. Where there is a very extensive document, I have, to help the reader, followed the document reference with the page number in the particular volume of the collection. When quoting testimony given in German, I have used, for the sake of accuracy, the German edition. The abbreviation IMG (Internationaler Militärgerichtshof) and the number of the volume in Roman numerals is followed by the page-number in Arabic numerals.

The prosecution did not present the Tribunal with any Nazi documents where they attested to circumstances already sufficiently proved by other documents or where there was no time because of the haste with which the

court proceedings had to be conducted. And the official publication of the Secretariat often contains only those parts of the various documents quoted at the trial.

There is also a collection of documents published on the authority of Robert Jackson, the United States Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality—not an official edition since it was not sanctioned by the Secretariat of the Tribunal; this contains several documents which were either not presented to the Tribunal at all or were not included by it among the evidence, since it had already been presented with documents testifying to the same circumstance, together with the complete text of documents of which the official edition contains only those parts cited during the proceedings. This American collection as a rule contains only those documents used by the American and British prosecutors in support of that part of the indictment which devolved upon them (Count One—The Common Plan or Conspiracy, Count Two—Crimes against Peace—Aggression). The collection is entitled 'Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression' (Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality Washington 1946/8). There are eight volumes and two supplements, A and B. Volume B contains defence documents and the separate 'Opinion and Judgement', which contains the verdict of the Tribunal and the dissenting opinion of the Soviet member I.T. Nikitchenko. In this collection the Nazi documents are given in English translation. In quotations from it, I have used the abbreviation NCA followed by the number of the volume in Roman numerals and the page-number in Arabic numerals.

If a document was not presented originally in German to the Tribunal, the official collection gives it in the language in which it was presented, that is in the language of one of the chief delegations, whose prosecutor produced the document. The American collection also gives such documents in English.

Each document, after being examined, was given a special reference and serial number in the Prosecutor's Office. The Tribunal when admitting these documents, also gave them a reference (USA, GB, FR, SSSR) and a serial number. The documents presented by the Soviet delegation, which came from its own archives, in all cases had only the SSSR reference plus a serial number.

Vol. XXIX of the official collection contains a selection of fragments (PS—2233) from Frank's "Diary", which covers the extracts made by me and presented by the American delegation (PS—2233) and the Soviet delegation (SSSR—223). It also contains other passages from the "Diary" which Frank and his defence approved for printing. All these extracts appear in Vol. XXIX as PS—2233.

When quoting passages from the "Diary", I have given the volume reference, the name and date of the session or meeting, and the page-number of the minutes. In quoting from the Governor General's Diary I have given the Volume reference, the date of the entry, and the page-number.



## INTRODUCTION

<sup>1</sup> In the preface, endorsed by Robert Jackson, to the American edition of the trial documents, it was stated that a complete and satisfactory preparation for the trial could have been possible only if its date had been set for 1948 at the earliest (Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I p. XIII)

<sup>2</sup> Shortly after this was written, the Central Research Commission into Nazi Crimes in Poland ordered the six file-covers of the "Diary" for 1944 to be bound strictly following the pattern of the volumes already bound. The files of the Governor General's Diary, were entitled 'Tagebuch' and that containing minutes of Government sessions, etc. 'Regierungssitzungen, 1944 Febr.—Juli'. For technical reasons, the extensive file covering the period from 1 March to 31 May, 1944, was divided into two volumes—from 1 March to 31 March and from 1 April to 31 May. To the last volume of the 'Tagebuch' for 1944 was added the notebook with entries from 16 January to 3 April, 1945. In addition a detailed German index for 1944 was prepared on the lines of those for the preceding years. It also covered the minutes of Government sessions.

The maintenance of the "Diary" in 1945 after Frank's flight from Poland is typical of the man. It shows the great importance he attached not only to the 'Diary' itself, but also to his position as Governor General even after the post had ceased in effect to exist.

On 16 January, 1945, Frank, "deeply moved" according to the "Diary" left his chancery, which he had set up on Wawel. On 18 January he arrived in Sichów (Seichau) in Silesia with his whole staff at the Richthofen palace.

On 19 January, he visited Wrocław, where the Secretary of State, Dr Boepple, Dr Bühler's deputy had already installed himself and his staff. On 21 January, Frank, assisted by three subordinates, burnt a major part of the official files, brought from Cracow. On the 25th he left Sichów and on the 26th reached Bad Aibling in Bavaria which he left on 13 February for Neuhaus: there on his request, No. 12 Josefstalerstrasse—the 'Café Bergfrieden'—was assigned as the Governor General's chancery. Frank also made it his home. And it is with the 'Bergfrieden' that the last entry in the "Diary" is concerned: "3 April. 4.45 P.M. The Governor General arrives at the "Bergfrieden" and spends the night".

There, too, on 4 May, Frank was arrested by an American officer, Lt. Walter Stein, who at the same time took the "Diary".

<sup>3</sup> IMG, XII, 27.

<sup>4</sup> SSSR—223.

<sup>5</sup> The library of the American Chief of Counsel's office in Nuremberg. The

"Diary" had been placed here in the same two boxes in which Frank had transported it from Cracow.

<sup>6</sup> IMG, XII, 98; (PS-3850), the original in the archives of the American Chief of Counsel's Office.

<sup>7</sup> Tagebuch 1942/III, pp 980-981.

<sup>8</sup> IMT, XXIX, PS-2233 (703).

<sup>9</sup> SSSR-223.

<sup>10</sup> A university professor in the USA, who escaped from the Reich before the war because of Jewish persecution.

## CHAPTER I

<sup>1</sup> IMT, XXXI, PS-2979; NCA, B, 1256; Edgar von Schmidt - Pauli: *Die Männer um Hitler* (Berlin, Verlag für Kulturpolitik 1933) p. 160 ff., Gerd Rühle, *Das dritte Reich, Die Kampfjahre 1918-33* (Berlin, Hummelverlag 1933) pp. 159, 167.

<sup>2</sup> Gerd Rühle: *Das dritte Reich I* (1933), pp. 103, 348-349.

<sup>3</sup> Op. cit. pp. 177-178, 209, 347.

<sup>4</sup> Op. cit., II (1934) pp. 370, 376.

<sup>5</sup> Op. cit., III (1935) p. 276.

<sup>6</sup> *Gazeta Sądowa Warszawska*, LXIII pp. 111-112.

<sup>7</sup> Gerd Rühle: op. cit., IV (1936), pp. 60, 123, 168, 274.

<sup>8</sup> Op. cit., VI (1938), pp. 157-158.

<sup>9</sup> IMG, XII, 169/70, PS-3459 (USA 670).

<sup>10</sup> *Das Programm der NSDAP* (Nationalsozialistische Bibliothek, Heft 1, München 1933).

<sup>11</sup> IMT, XXIX, PS-2233 (477-478).

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., (519 ff.).

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., (522 ff.).

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., (530 ff.).

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., (534 ff.).

<sup>16</sup> PS-3115, the original in the archives of the U.S. Chief of Counsel's Office.

<sup>17</sup> IMT, XXIX, PS-2233 (549 ff.).

<sup>18</sup> IMT, XXIX, PS-2233 (557).

<sup>19</sup> *Nazi Documents I-VI*. The originals in the archives of the British Prosecutor's Office at IMT.

<sup>20</sup> *Tagebuch*, 1942/I, p. 146.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., pp. 184-185.

<sup>22</sup> See 17 above.

<sup>23</sup> Frank's private diary, which he kept during the war, provides evidence of the scant regard in which he held his duties as a citizen. In January 1943

when the Nazi armies were engaged in the heavy fighting of the Battle of Stalingrad, which was to be the turning point of the war and decide the defeat of the Reich, the following comments appear in his diary, written in his own hand:

1943 1 January

*Schoherhof* (the home of Frank's family near Neuhaus in Bavaria)

Crushing troubles have cast their shadow over Germany. And over me, as well. I am thinking of my life's struggle and of my serious problems.

4 January

*Schoherhof, Monday*

11. 16 AM. The train leaves for freedom from chaos and uproar.

3. 50 PM. Arrives in Garmisch. Back with Lilli at last.

5 January

*Garmisch, Tuesday*

Inexpressibly happy with Lilli. I can do nothing about it: nature has made us for each other. I pray God that He will find the right solution for all of us.

(Frank was married with five children).

6 January

*Garmisch, Wednesday*

With Lilli. We live and we love. I am at last well. I feel that the condition of my lungs is beginning to improve.

*Garmisch, Thursday*

Blessedly happy with Lilli. The sun is shining. We are alone and the world is bright.

<sup>24</sup> Tagebuch, 1942/II, p. 436.

<sup>25</sup> Tagebuch, 1942/III, p. 986.

<sup>26</sup> Tagebuch, 1942/IV, pp. 1245–1246.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., pp. 1337–1339.

<sup>28</sup> (Tagebuch) Regierungssitzungen 1943, 22.7.1943, p. 49.

<sup>29</sup> Tagebuch, 1943/III, pp. 459–460.

## CHAPTER II

<sup>1</sup> Tagebuch, 1939, Introductory remarks; IMT XXX, PS–2537.

<sup>2</sup> Verordnungsblatt des Generalgouverneurs für die besetzten Polnischen Gebiete (VBIGGP)–(Gazette of the ordinances of the Governor General for the Occupied Polish Territories) 1939, p. 3.

- <sup>3</sup> Verordnungsblatt für das Generalgouvernement (VBIGG)—(Gazette of the ordinances for the General Government) 1941, p. 561; Weh: Das Recht des Generalgouvernements, (3 Auflage, Krakau 1941), A'124.
- <sup>4</sup> § 9 & 10 of the ordinance of 26.10.1939.
- <sup>5</sup> Weh: op. cit. A 120, p. 2, footnote 8.
- <sup>6</sup> Weh: op. cit. A 102, p. 8.; (Tagebuch) Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1939/40, 12.7.1940, p. 1.
- <sup>7</sup> VBIGG 1940, I p. 357.
- <sup>8</sup> VBIGG 1941, p. 99.
- <sup>9</sup> Weh: op. cit. A 121, p. 1 footnote 8.
- <sup>10</sup> VBIGG 1942, p. 263; PS—3812.
- <sup>11</sup> Weh: op. cit. A 100a.
- <sup>12</sup> Weh: op. cit. A 120 p. 2, footnote 7.
- <sup>13</sup> (Tagebuch) Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1939/40, 8.3.1940, p. 7.
- <sup>14</sup> VBIGGP 1940, I p. 183; Tagebuch, 1940/II, p. 414.
- <sup>15</sup> Tagebuch, 1940/IV, p. 1020—1021.
- <sup>16</sup> Organisationsbuch der NSDAP, 1940, p. 86.
- <sup>17</sup> (Tagebuch) Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1939/40, 8.3.1940, pp. 5—6, 7—8.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid., 12.7.1940, pp. 1—2; Ibid. 12.9.1940, p. 5; Ibid. 19.12.1940, p. 2.
- <sup>19</sup> (Tagebuch) Regierungssitzungen 1941 III—X, 25.3.1941, pp. 2, 33.
- <sup>20</sup> Tagebuch, 1943/V, pp. 1072, 1080—1081, 1085.
- <sup>21</sup> Tagebuch, 1942/III, pp. 968—969.
- <sup>22</sup> Tagebuch, 1.1.—29.2.1944, 17.2.1944, pp. 16—17.
- <sup>23</sup> Tagebuch, 1943/I, pp. 61—67.
- <sup>24</sup> (Tagebuch) Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1939/40, 2.12.1939, pp. 2—3.
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid., 12.7.40, pp. 1—2.
- <sup>26</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1940, II—XI, 2.3.1940, p. 11.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid., 30.5.1940, pp. 4—5.
- <sup>28</sup> Tagebuch, 1942/II, p. 494.
- <sup>29</sup> Tagebuch, 1942/III, pp. 798, 800.
- <sup>30</sup> Tagebuch, 1943/III, p. 549.
- <sup>31</sup> Tagebuch, 1.1.—29.2.1944, 12.1.1944 p. 15.
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid., 30.1.1944, p. 13.

### CHAPTER III

- <sup>1</sup> IMT, XXXVI, E.C. 344 (USA 297).
- <sup>2</sup> IMT, XXVI, PS—864 (USA 609).
- <sup>3</sup> IMT, XXIX, PS—2233 (440).
- <sup>4</sup> IMT, XXXIX, SSSR—172.

- <sup>5</sup> IMG, II, 485 ff.; PS—3047, NCA V, 768; Karl Heinz Abshagen: *Canaris* (Stuttgart, 1949) p. 208 ff.
- <sup>6</sup> Tagebuch, 1939, pp. 104—105.
- <sup>7</sup> (Tagebuch) Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1939/40, 12.9.1940, p. 6.
- <sup>8</sup> Ibid., 6.11.1940, p. 10.
- <sup>9</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1940, II—XI, 2.3.1940, p. 9.
- <sup>10</sup> Tagebuch, 1.3.—31.5.1944, 16.5.1944, pp. 7—8.
- <sup>11</sup> Tagebuch, 1.1.—29.2.1944, 14.1.1944, p. 24.
- <sup>12</sup> IMT, XXIX, PS—2233 (504).
- <sup>13</sup> Tagebuch, 1942/III, p. 810.
- <sup>14</sup> Tagebuch, 1.1.—29.2.1944, 30.1.1944, p. 13.
- <sup>15</sup> Tagebuch, 1940/I, 19.2.1940 pp. 83—94.

## CHAPTER IV

- <sup>1</sup> IMT, XXIX, PS—1918 (USA 304) (104).
- <sup>2</sup> PS—1646; the original in the archives of the U.S. Chief of Counsel's Office.
- <sup>3</sup> Tagebuch, 1939, p. 52.
- <sup>4</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1940, II—XI, 6.2.1940, p. 9.
- <sup>5</sup> Ibid., 30.5.1940, pp. 6—8.
- <sup>6</sup> (Tagebuch) Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1939/40, 8.3.1940, pp. 11—12.
- <sup>7</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1940, II—XI, 30.5.1940, pp. 4—5.
- <sup>8</sup> (Tagebuch) Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1939/40, 8.3.1940, pp. 13—14.
- <sup>9</sup> Tagebuch, 1940/II, p. 456 ff.
- <sup>10</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1940, II—XI, 30.5.1940, pp. 6, 8, 9.
- <sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 17ff.
- <sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 23.
- <sup>13</sup> Ibid., pp. 33—34.
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid., pp. 38—39.
- <sup>15</sup> Tagebuch, 1940/III, pp. 645—646, 660.
- <sup>16</sup> Ibid., pp. 689—690.
- <sup>17</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1942, 18.3.1942, p. 63.
- <sup>18</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1943, 25.1.1943, p. 53.
- <sup>19</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1942, 18.3.1942, p. 12.
- <sup>20</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1943, 15.4.1943, pp. 8—9.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid., 31.5.1943, p. 23.
- <sup>22</sup> VBIGG, 1943, p. 589 (SSSR—335).
- <sup>23</sup> Tagebuch, 1943/V, p. 1012.
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid., pp. 1035, 1038.
- <sup>25</sup> IMT, XXIX, PS—2233 (678).
- <sup>26</sup> Tagebuch, 1943/V, p. 1094.

- <sup>27</sup> Ibid., pp. 1165–1166.
- <sup>28</sup> Tagebuch, 1.1.–29.2.1944, 8.2.1944, pp. 6–7.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid., 15.1.1944, p. 13; IMT XXIX PS–2233 (678)
- <sup>30</sup> Tagebuch, 1943/V, 27.9.1943, p. 982.
- <sup>31</sup> Tagebuch, 1.6.–31.7.1944, 11.7.1944, pp. 5–6.
- <sup>32</sup> IMT, XXIX PS–2233 (695).
- <sup>33</sup> Tagebuch, 1941/IV, pp. 1170–1172.
- <sup>34</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1940, II–XI, 30.5.1941, pp. 38–39.
- <sup>35</sup> Tagebuch, 1941/IV pp. 1170–1172.
- <sup>36</sup> Tagebuch, 1.1.–29.2.1944, 8.2.1944, p. 7.
- <sup>37</sup> Tagebuch, 1.3.–31.5.1944, 4.4.1944, p. 2.
- <sup>38</sup> Tagebuch, 1942/III p. 820ff.

It is worth adding that addressing the police on 20 December, 1940 Frank, at that time full of hope, indulged in a few fantasies: "And the island over there, this pirates' den, this nest of robber barons belonging to Mr. Churchill—we'll smoke it out and then we can take Churchill off to Dachau." (Laughter). Tagebuch, 1940/IV pp. 1170–1174.

## CHAPTER V

- <sup>1</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1940, II–XI, 30.5.1940, pp. 13–14, 40.
- <sup>2</sup> Tagebuch, 1941/I, 14.1.1941, pp. 47–49.
- <sup>3</sup> Tagebuch, 1940/III, pp. 645–646.
- <sup>4</sup> See Chapter II, The Post of Governor-General.
- <sup>5</sup> VBIGGP 1939, p. 5.
- <sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 10.
- <sup>7</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1942, 18.3.1942, pp. 53–54; Tagebuch 1942/I pp. 309, 320.
- <sup>8</sup> Tagebuch, 1943/VI, pp. 1236–1237.
- <sup>9</sup> Tagebuch, 1943/IV, 9.7.1943, p. 663.
- <sup>10</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1943, 25.1.1943, p. 11.
- <sup>11</sup> (Tagebuch) Regierungssitzungen 1943, 16.12.1943, pp. 180–181, 185.
- <sup>12</sup> Tagebuch, 1943/IV, pp. 700–701; Ibid., 1943/VI, 18.11.1943, p. 1232.
- <sup>13</sup> Tagebuch, 1.1.–29.2.1944, 12.2.1944, pp. 7–8.
- <sup>14</sup> Tagebuch, 1941/I, p. 257.
- <sup>15</sup> Tagebuch, 1941/II, p. 290.

## CHAPTER VI

- <sup>1</sup> IMT, XXVI, PS–661.
- VBIGGP 1939, p. 6.



- <sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 224.
- <sup>4</sup> VBIGG 1942, p. 255.
- <sup>5</sup> Tagebuch, 1939, p. 18.
- <sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 19.
- <sup>7</sup> VBIGGP 1940, I, p. 92.
- <sup>8</sup> IMT, XXVII, PS-1375.
- <sup>9</sup> Tagebuch, 1940/I, p. 217.
- <sup>10</sup> Tagebuch, 1940/II, pp. 333-334.
- <sup>11</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1940 II-XI, 23.4.1940, pp. 21-30.
- <sup>12</sup> Tagebuch, 1940/II, p. 421.
- <sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 425.
- <sup>14</sup> (Tagebuch) Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1939/40, 10.5.1940, p. 23.
- <sup>15</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitsitzungen 1942, 18.6.1942, p. 27.
- <sup>16</sup> (Tagebuch) Regierungssitzungen 1941, X-XII, 16.12.1942, pp. 44-45.
- <sup>17</sup> Tagebuch, 1942/III, pp. 918-920.
- <sup>18</sup> (Tagebuch) Regierungshauptabteilungsleitersitzungen 1942, p. 15.
- <sup>19</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1943, 25.1.43, pp. 31, 51; IMT XXIX, PS-2233 (635ff).
- <sup>20</sup> Tagebuch, 1943/I, p. 80.
- <sup>21</sup> Tagebuch, 1943/III, pp. 474-477.
- <sup>22</sup> Tagebuch, 1940/I, 7.3.1940, p. 184.
- <sup>23</sup> (Tagebuch) Regierungshauptabteilungsleitersitzungen 1942, 9.12.1942, pp. 26-27; IMT, XXIX, PS-2233 (582).
- <sup>24</sup> Tagebuch 1.3.-31.5.1944, 12.4.1944, pp. 6-7.
- <sup>25</sup> Tagebuch, 1944, II-VII, 19.4.1944, pp. 11-13, 49-50.
- <sup>26</sup> IMT, XXIX, PS-2233 (718).
- <sup>27</sup> Tagebuch 1.6.-31.7.44, 19.7.44, p. 6.

## CHAPTER VII

- <sup>1</sup> Adolf Hitler: *Mein Kampf* (V Auflage, München 1930), pp. 428ff, 742.
- <sup>2</sup> IMT, XXVI, PS-686 (USA 305).
- <sup>3</sup> IMT, XXVI, PS-661 (217).

The chapter entitled "A few psychological hints concerning German policy towards the Poles" of the memorandum of the Academy of German Law also contains a passage on the Polish woman (p. 41): "The Polish woman constitutes a grave threat (gewaltige Gefahr). In espionage and in the underground she is known because of her fanatical nationalism as the most experienced and dangerous woman in Europe (Frauentyp Europas). For this reason Germans permanently employed in the General Government should be allowed to bring at least their wives with them as quickly as possible."

- <sup>4</sup> Ibid., (209–210).
- <sup>5</sup> Tagebuch, 1939, pp. 19–20.
- <sup>6</sup> (Tagebuch) Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1939/40, 8.12.1939, pp. 3–4.
- <sup>7</sup> (Tagebuch) Regierungshauptabteilungsleitersitzungen 1942, pp. 3, 7.
- <sup>8</sup> IMT, XXXVI, EC–305 (USA 303).
- <sup>9</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1941, I–X, 15.1.1941, pp. 1, 9.
- <sup>10</sup> Tagebuch, 1941/I, p. 19.
- <sup>11</sup> (Tagebuch) Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1939/1940, 12.4.1940, p. 8.
- <sup>12</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1940, II–XI, 30.5.1940, pp. 4–5.
- <sup>13</sup> IMT, XXVI, PS–910 (USA 310).
- <sup>14</sup> Tagebuch, 1942/III, pp. 820–821.
- <sup>15</sup> Tagebuch, 1942/I, pp. 284–285; Tagebuch, 1942/III, pp. 820–821.
- <sup>16</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1943, 25.1.1943, pp. 13–19, 32, 38–39.
- <sup>17</sup> Tagebuch, 1943/I, p. 98.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid., pp. 116–117.
- <sup>19</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1943, 31.5.1943, pp. 10–11.
- <sup>20</sup> Tagebuch, 1943/IV, 13.7.1943, pp. 698–700.
- <sup>21</sup> (Tagebuch) Regierungshauptabteilungsleitersitzungen 1943, 22.7.1943, pp. 47, 74.
- <sup>22</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1943, 31.5.1943, p. 16; Ibid., 35.1.1943, pp. 32, 38.
- <sup>23</sup> Tagebuch, 1943/IV, 2.8.1943, p. 785.
- <sup>24</sup> Tagebuch, 1.1.–29.2.1944, 12.1.1944, p. 13.
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid., 17.2.1944, p. 9.
- <sup>26</sup> Tagebuch, 1.3.–31.5.1944, 16.5.1944, p. 7.

## CHAPTER VIII

- <sup>1</sup> Adolf Hitler: *Mein Kampf* (5 Auflage, München, 1930), p. 61 ff. In the second chapter of the first volume of *Mein Kampf*, when describing his first visit to Vienna, Hitler already shows malignant symptoms of anti-Semitism as of some mental disease; there is no rational explanation for it except the one superficial charge that the Jews are the champions of Marxist ideology. The disease is all the more dangerous in that it is exacerbated by a fanaticism which Hitler with his lack of any education endows with something in the nature of religious features: he believes that by "fighting" the Jews he is fulfilling the will of the "Almighty Creator". Also at the end of his work Hitler calls for a struggle against the "world danger of Jewry" (die jüdische Weltgefahr) for the good of the "Aryan peoples". From this declaration of faith it is only a short step to the extreme monomania: the

decision to slaughter six million people, including the most loyal of German patriots. This step was motivated by a hatred of the Jews that had nothing to do with any economic considerations.

Hitler took his hatred of the Jews to such extremes that when he was head of the Reich and visited, together with Himmler, the mass extermination camp at Belzen he said the campaign to slaughter the Jews in the gas chambers should be carried on much more quickly. (cf. Stanisław Piotrowski: *Misja Odyla Globocnika* (The Mission of Odył Globocnik, p. 10).

<sup>2</sup> IMT, XXXI, PS-2663, 2664; "Der grossdeutsche Freiheitskampf", Reden Adolf Hitlers (Munich 1943).

<sup>3</sup> IMT, IX, 432, PS-3569; the original in the archives of the U.S. Chief of Counsel's Office.

<sup>4</sup> IMT, XXVI, PS-710 (USA 50)

<sup>5</sup> IMT, XXXII, PS-3663.

<sup>6</sup> VBIGGP 1939, p. 6.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 61.

<sup>8</sup> VBIGGP 1940, I, p. 31.

<sup>9</sup> VBIGG 1940, I, p. 288.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 1941, p. 595.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 211.

<sup>12</sup> Tagebuch, 1939, p. 43.

<sup>13</sup> (Tagebuch) Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1939/1940, 12.9.1940, p. 7.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 12.4.1940, pp. 10–12.

<sup>15</sup> "Der grossdeutsche Freiheitskampf", Reden Adolf Hitlers.

<sup>16</sup> (Tagebuch) Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1939/1940, 12.7.1940, p. 4.

<sup>17</sup> Tagebuch, 1940/III, p. 702.

<sup>18</sup> (Tagebuch) Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1939/1940, 2.12.1939, pp. 2–3.

<sup>19</sup> Tagebuch, 1940/II, Bromberg, 20.5.1940, p. 496.

<sup>20</sup> See 4 above.

<sup>21</sup> (Tagebuch) Regierungssitzungen 1941, X–XII, 16.12.1941, pp. 76–77.

<sup>22</sup> Tagebuch, 1940/IV, p. 1158–1159.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 1171.

<sup>24</sup> (Tagebuch) Regierungssitzungen 1941, X–XII, 16.12.1941, p. 35.

<sup>25</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1942, 18.6.1942, p. 32.

<sup>26</sup> See Chapter IX, Economic Devastation.

<sup>27</sup> Tagebuch 1941/IV, p. 945.

<sup>28</sup> See 21 above.

<sup>29</sup> (Tagebuch) Regierungshauptabteilungsleitersitzungen 1942, 24.8.1942, p. 15.

<sup>30</sup> Tagebuch 1943/IV, p. 789.

<sup>31</sup> Tagebuch 1.1.–29.2.1944, 25.1.1944, pp. 5–6.

<sup>32</sup> Tagebuch 1.3.–31.5.1944, 4.3.1944, pp. 25–26.

<sup>33</sup> IMT, XXIX, PS-2233 (582, 670).

<sup>24</sup> Tagebuch, 1.1.—29.2.1944, 6.8.1944, p. 8.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 12.2.1944 p. 21.

## CHAPTER IX

<sup>1</sup> IMT, XXXVI, EC 410, (USA 298).

<sup>2</sup> See VII/7 above.

<sup>3</sup> (Tagebuch) Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1939/1940, 2.12.1939, pp. 2—3.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 19.1.1940, p. 4.

<sup>5</sup> NCA III, PS-1375 (USA 172).

<sup>6</sup> IMT, XXIX, PS-2233 (436—437).

<sup>7</sup> VBIGGP 1939, p. 37.

<sup>8</sup> VBIGG 1940, I, p. 313.

<sup>9</sup> VBIGGP 1940, I, p. 23.

<sup>10</sup> (Tagebuch) Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1939/1940, 6.11.1940, p. 10.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 19.1.1940, pp. 11—12.

<sup>12</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1940, II—XI, pp. 8—10.

<sup>13</sup> Tagebuch, 1941/I, pp. 268—269.

<sup>14</sup> Tagebuch, 1941/III, p. 830.

<sup>15</sup> IMT, XXIX, PS-2233.

<sup>16</sup> IMT, XXIX, PS-2233 (573, 579); (Tagebuch) Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1942, 24.8.1942, p. 15.

<sup>17</sup> VBIGG 194, p. 409.

<sup>18</sup> VBIGG 1943, p. 320.

<sup>19</sup> Tagebuch, 1942/IV, p. 1276—1277.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., pp. 1331—1332.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 1332.

<sup>22</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1943, 25.1.1943, p. 5.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 14.4.1943 p. 3.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>25</sup> Tagebuch, 1943/II p. 352.

<sup>26</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1943, 31.5.1943, pp. 2—3.

<sup>27</sup> (Tagebuch) Regierungssitzungen 1943, 20.4.1943, pp. 62—63.

<sup>28</sup> Tagebuch, 1943/IV, p. 683.

<sup>29</sup> See VI/21 above.

<sup>30</sup> Tagebuch, 1943/VI p. 681.

<sup>31</sup> (Tagebuch) Regierungssitzungen 1943, 26.10.1943, pp. 118—119.

<sup>32</sup> According to Naumann the total meat quota needed for 1944 came to 110,000 tons. Though this could be found in the country, its requisitioning would depend on whether enough police could be mobilised to collect so large an amount of meat. By using 200 SS men excellent results had been obtained in the Lublin district. These had come to 115 per cent of the quota to be levied. (Tagebuch, 1.3.—31.5.1944, 10.5.1944, pp. 10, 15).

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 8.5.1944, pp. 25—26.

## CHAPTER X

- <sup>1</sup> Tagebuch, 1939, pp. 21–23.
- <sup>2</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen II–XI, 25.2.1940, p. 20.
- <sup>3</sup> Tagebuch, 1940/II, p. 613.
- <sup>4</sup> (Tagebuch) Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1939/40, 12.9.1940, p. 6.
- <sup>5</sup> VBIGGP 1939, p. 8.
- <sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 19.
- <sup>7</sup> VBIGG 1940, II, p. 513.
- <sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 515.
- <sup>9</sup> VBIGGP 1940, I, p. 103.
- <sup>10</sup> Ibid., II, p. 424.
- <sup>11</sup> VBIGG 1940, I, p. 318.
- <sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 327.
- <sup>13</sup> VBIGGP 1940, p. 106.
- <sup>14</sup> VBIGGP 1939, p. 18; Ibid., 1940, I, p. 134.
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid., I, p. 160.
- <sup>16</sup> VBIGG 1941, p. 265.

In his famous interview with Kleiss of the "Völkischer Beobachter" (6.2.40) Frank said: "If we are closing the universities and secondary schools, it is because we cannot tolerate an anti-German policy being conducted in them". (IMT XXIX, PS-2233 (465).

- <sup>17</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1940, II–XI, 20.4.40, pp. 3, 8.
- <sup>18</sup> Tagebuch, 1940/II, 16.5.40, pp. 448–449.
- <sup>19</sup> Tagebuch, 1940/III, p. 847.
- <sup>20</sup> Tagebuch, 1942/I, pp. 202–204.
- <sup>21</sup> Tagebuch, 1.1.–29.2.44, 7.2.44, p. 12.
- <sup>22</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1940, II–XI, 30.5.40, pp. 38–39.
- <sup>23</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1942, 18.3.42, p. 64.
- <sup>24</sup> Tagebuch, 1942/I, pp. 305–307.
- <sup>25</sup> Tagebuch, 1943/V, p. 1156.
- <sup>26</sup> IMT, XXIX, PS-2233 (678).
- <sup>27</sup> Tagebuch, 1.3.–31.5.1944, 3.3.1944, pp. 7–8.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid., 16.3.1944, p. 2.
- <sup>29</sup> Tagebuch, 1.1.–29.2.1944, 6.2.1944, p. 13.
- <sup>30</sup> Tagebuch, 1.8.–17.12.1944, 17.10.1944, p. 4.

## CHAPTER XI

- <sup>1</sup> Tagebuch, 1939, p. 2.
- <sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 38.

<sup>3</sup> IMT, XXXVI, EC-411 (USA 299).

<sup>4</sup> IMT, XXXVI, D-954 (GB 561).

<sup>5</sup> IMT, XXXVI, PS-3042 (USA 375).

<sup>6</sup> IMT, XXVII, PS-1600 (USA 690).

<sup>7</sup> VBIGGP 1939, p. 209.

<sup>8</sup> VBIGG 1940, II, p. 61.

<sup>9</sup> See 6 above.

<sup>10</sup> Tagebuch, 1940/I, pp. 98, 216.

<sup>11</sup> Tagebuch, 1940/II, p. 612.

<sup>12</sup> IMT, XXVII, PS-1233 (USA 377).

The catalogue covered 511 items; in addition there were four collections of coins, while the "Supplement" contained some of the works of art from Pelplin Cathedral, two headstones from Wawel Cathedral, two more from other Catholic Churches in Cracow, and the altar from Zygmunt chapel on Wawel. Apart from this Kulmbach's altar paintings were covered by two item numbers (23/24) although the former included eight and the latter five paintings.

To give some idea of the extent of the pillaging carried on by the Nazis I would like to stress this catalogue also included Raphael's Portrait of a Youth, Rembrandt's Landscape, Leonardo da Vinci's Lady with Ermine, from the Czartoryski Museum in Cracow, Fragonard's Love Vows and pictures by Boucher from the Potocki collection in Łańcut. Among the sculpture there is Wit Stwos's altar from the Church of Our Lady in Cracow. The illuminated manuscripts include the Behem Codex from the Jagiellonian Library. Other things taken included Piotr Kmit's pearl embroidered vestment, 26 tapestries from Wawel Cathedral, and the oldest and most valuable treasures of the goldsmith's art such as chalices, monstrances etc., from Church collections.

<sup>13</sup> The catalogue lists on its title-page those who took part in the work of safeguarding. They include Professor Dagobert Frey, Dr Gustaw Barthel from Wrocław, and Dr Josef Mühlmann from Salzburg (where he is still the Director): these three are particularly severely indicted in the testimony of Dr Lorentz and Dr Tomkiewicz.

<sup>14</sup> Tagebuch, 1942/IV, p. 1145.

<sup>15</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1940, II—XI, 6.2.1940, p. 1.

Ernest Palezieux explained that this was a portrait of a young man wearing a hat and a broad lace ruff, which Frank received from the Gestapo in Warsaw after the pillage of Łazienki Palace. Cf. W. Tomkiewicz: *Straty kulturalne Warszawy* (Warsaw's Cultural Losses), p. 129; Tadeusz Mańkowski: *Galeria Stanisława Augusta* (The Gallery of Stanisław August), Lwów, Ossolineum, 1932, p. 56 and table 49.

<sup>16</sup> PS-3851: the original in the U.S.A. archives of the International Military Tribunal.

<sup>17</sup> Tagebuch, 1.8.—17.12.1944 (1945), 23.1.1945.



<sup>18</sup> Ernest Wilhelm Palezieux was given a sentence of five years for his part in the pillaging of art treasures in Poland. While giving me this account, he said that the reason the Raphael was "lost" was that Nazi experts considered this original to be a copy and this was why it had been lost "in transit". If Palezieux's story is true, then the Nazi experts have shown themselves guilty of extraordinary ignorance, since "The Youth" in the Czartoryski Museum is a well-known masterpiece by Raphael, which had been reproduced in German monographs.

<sup>19</sup> PS-3835, original in the U.S.A. archives of the I.M.T.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Karol Estreicher: *Miniatury kodeksu Bema oraz ich treść obyczajowa* (The Miniatures from the Behem Codex and Their Picture of Contemporary Customs), Cracow 1933, *The Cracow Yearbook*, Vol. XXIV.

While still only a part of the art and cultural treasures lost during the war has been recovered by Poland, an idea of their extent can only be given by special publications. Cf. Władysław Tomkiewicz: *Catalogue of Paintings Removed from Poland. I, Foreign Paintings*, Warsaw, 1950.

This catalogue lists Raphael's Portrait of a Youth, Fragonard's Love Vows, pictures by Boucher, Watteau, and Breughel, Rubens' Christ Carrying the Cross, Kulmbach's altar paintings, etc., altogether 181 items.

The losses suffered among paintings by native artists were even more serious, as can be seen from the second volume of the above catalogue: *Malarstwo Polskie* (Polish Paintings), Warsaw, 1951.

Two basic works worth mentioning here are the collective editions published in English: *The Nazi Kultur in Poland*, H. M. Stationery Office, London, 1945; Ed. Wacław Borowy: *Cultural Losses of Poland, Index of Polish Cultural Losses during the German Occupation, 1939–1944*, Ed. Charles Estreicher, London, 1944.

The Wit Stwosz altar from St. Mary's Church in Cracow was discovered in storage in Nuremberg and was brought to Cracow.

Some of the art treasures plundered by the Nazis fell into the hands of the Soviet Armies and they were returned to Poland by the Soviet Union in 1956. Among them were some treasures of antiquity, including the famous Greek vases from the Czartoryski collection in Goluchow. The treasures returned also included some of the paintings listed in Tomkiewicz's Catalogue: Hans Memling's Day of Judgement (no. 80), Nicolas de Largillière's Lady with Dog and Monkey (no. 36), David's Portrait of Stanisław Kostka-Potocki (no. 38). A number of paintings by Polish artists was also returned.

<sup>21</sup> (Tagebuch) Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1939/1940, 12.7.1940, p. 2.

<sup>22</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1942, 18.6.1942, p. 27.

<sup>23</sup> Tagebuch, 1943/III, pp. 528, 533.

<sup>24</sup> Tagebuch, 1.1. – 29.2.1944, 6.2.1944, pp. 8–9.

<sup>25</sup> Tagebuch, 1.8. – 17.12.1944, 3.8.1944, pp. 2–4.

- <sup>26</sup> Ibid., 5.8.1944, pp. 4–6.
- <sup>27</sup> IMT, XXIX, USSR-128.
- <sup>28</sup> IMT, XXXVI, D-954 (GB-561).
- <sup>29</sup> Tagebuch, 1943/VI, p. 1341.

## CHAPTER XII

- <sup>1</sup> Tagebuch, 1940/II, p. 357.
- <sup>2</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1940, II–XI, 6.2.1940, p. 3.
- <sup>3</sup> (Tagebuch) Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1939/1940, 12.4.1940, p. 6.
- <sup>4</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>5</sup> See 1 above.
- <sup>6</sup> See 4 above.
- <sup>7</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1940, II–XI, 4.3.1940 p. 14.
- <sup>8</sup> (Tagebuch) Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1939/1940, 12.9.1940, pp. 7–8.
- <sup>9</sup> Tagebuch, 1941/IV, pp. 929–930.
- <sup>10</sup> (Tagebuch) Regierungssitzungen 1941, X–XII, 16.12.1941, pp. 77–80.
- <sup>11</sup> (Tagebuch) Regierungshauptabteilungsleitersitzungen 1942, 11.3.1942, pp. 6–7.
- <sup>12</sup> Tagebuch, 1943/II, pp. 410, 411–412, 426.
- <sup>13</sup> Tagebuch, 1944, II–VII, 16.2.1944, pp. 1–3.
- <sup>14</sup> Tagebuch, 1.1.–29.2.1944, 6.2.1944, pp. 3–4.
- <sup>15</sup> IMT, XXVII, PS-1526.

## CHAPTER XIII

- <sup>1</sup> (Tagebuch) Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1939/1940, 2.12.1939, pp. 2–3.
- <sup>2</sup> Ibid., 12.4.1940, p. 15.
- <sup>3</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1940, II–XI, 25.2.1940, pp. 19–20.
- <sup>4</sup> Ibid., 2.3.1940, p. 29.
- <sup>5</sup> IMT, XXXIV, PS-4043.
- <sup>6</sup> (Tagebuch) Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1939/1940, 19.12.1940, p. 14.
- <sup>7</sup> See Chapter III, Guiding Principles of Policy towards the Poles.
- <sup>8</sup> Tagebuch, 1943/VI, pp. 1342–1343.
- <sup>9</sup> See above III/32.
- <sup>10</sup> Tagebuch, 1942/IV, pp. 1229–1230.
- <sup>11</sup> Tagebuch, 1.3.–31.5.1944, 6.3.1944, pp. 2–4.
- <sup>12</sup> Ibid., 5.4.1944, pp. 2–4, 6.
- <sup>13</sup> Tagebuch, 1942/I, p. 309.
- <sup>14</sup> Tagebuch, 1.1.–29.2.1944, 17.2.1944, pp. 16–17.

## CHAPTER XIV

- <sup>1</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1940, II—XI, 30.5.1940, pp. 4—5, 25, 38—39.
- <sup>2</sup> (Tagebuch) Regierungssitzungen 1941, III—X, pp. 42—43.
- <sup>3</sup> IMT, XXVI, PS-437 (30).
- <sup>4</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1940, II—XI, 2.3.1940, pp. 47, 50.
- <sup>5</sup> Tagebuch, 1941/III, p. 897.
- <sup>6</sup> IMT, XXIX, PS-2233, (634).
- <sup>7</sup> Tagebuch, 1943/VI, p. 1366.
- <sup>8</sup> Tagebuch, 1.1.—29.2.1944, 11.2.1944, p. 14.

## CHAPTER XV

- <sup>1</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1940, II—XI, 2.3.1940, p. 3.
- <sup>2</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1943, 31.5.1943, p. 2—3.
- <sup>3</sup> (Tagebuch) Regierungssitzungen 1943, 20.4.1943, p. 33.
- <sup>4</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen 1943, 25.1.1943, p. 53.
- <sup>5</sup> The typescript signed by Frank has 643 pages and is dated 25.9.46.

Frank's widow Brigitte published his prison reflexions. They appeared in 1953 in Munich under a changed and more sensational title: *Im Schatten des Galgens* (In the Shadow of the Gallows)—*Deutung Hitlers und seiner Zeit auf Grund eigener Erlebnisse und Erkenntnisse*.

In the preface the publisher states that Frank offered the manuscript of his prison reflexions to the prison chaplain for his monastery library. The typescript endorsed by Frank was used as the basis of the edition published and none of the events described by the author or the opinions expressed by him were changed. Only a few passages were omitted which, though they were an expression of the extremely personal outlook of the author, were of no particular significance as far as the purpose, set out by the publishers in the sub-title of the edition, was concerned.

After sentence had been passed in 1946 I had the opportunity of examining both the manuscript and the typescript authorised by Frank; a comparison of the extracts made by me and the version published in Munich shows that, in spite of guarantees that the author's opinions had been preserved, some sentences which are extremely typical of Frank's prison reflexions, have been omitted, and, what is worse, some sentences, directed against the Polish nation, which the author never wrote, have been inserted. This is not the place to comment on this.

When quoting the passage omitted by the publisher, I give its page-number in the typescript.

- <sup>6</sup> Hans Frank: *Im Schatten des Galgens*, p. 54.

- <sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 328.
- <sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 393.
- <sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 142.
- <sup>10</sup> Ibid., pp. 303–304.
- <sup>11</sup> Ibid., pp. 338–339, 354.
- <sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 401.
- <sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 346.
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 380.
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 376.
- <sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 173.
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 167: "Diese beiden Erzschorken..."
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 417.
- <sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 421.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 420.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 393.
- <sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 403.
- <sup>23</sup> (Tagebuch) Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1939/40, 29.1.1940, pp. 2–3.
- <sup>24</sup> Frank: *Im Schatten des Galgens*, p. 403.
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 411.
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 392.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 404.
- <sup>28</sup> Hans Frank: *Adolf Hitler, Ein Essay*, p. 594 of the typescript. The publisher of *Im Schatten des Galgens* has omitted the last sentence of the first paragraph and the whole of the second paragraph.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 637. The publisher has here added six sentences of a chauvinistic and anti-Polish nature. Here are two of them which give a good idea of present-day attitudes in the German Federal Republic: "Silesia, Pomerania and Gdańsk have been German for thousands of years. You will never be able to keep them". (*Im Schatten des Galgens*, p. 428).
- <sup>30</sup> Hans Frank: *Adolf Hitler, Ein Essay*, p. 635. The publisher has omitted this sentence.
- <sup>31</sup> *Im Schatten des Galgens*, p. 428.
- <sup>32</sup> Ibidem.
- <sup>33</sup> *IMG*, XXII, 428.

## CHAPTER XVI

- <sup>1</sup> *Mezhdunarodnoe pravo*, ed. Korovin, Moskwa, 1951, p. 522 (in Russian); Oppenheim-Lauterpacht: *International Law*, Vol. II, War, London, 1952, pp. 433, 437ff., Schwarzenberger: *International Law*, London, 1950, p. 84.
- <sup>2</sup> Lauterpacht: *The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes*, *The British Year Book of International Law* 1944, p. 77ff.

- <sup>3</sup> Liszt: *Das Völkerrecht*, 12 Aufl. Berlin, 1925, p. 489; Stödter: *Deutschlands Rechtslage*, Hamburg, 1948, p. 54 ff.
- <sup>4</sup> Raestad: *La cassation des Etats d'après le Droit des Gens*, *Revue de Droit International et de Legislation Comparee*, 1 ser. 20/1939, p. 441; Oppenheim-Lauterpacht: *International Law*, Vol. II, p. 606.
- <sup>5</sup> Stödter: *op. cit.*, p. 48.
- <sup>6</sup> Oppenheim-Lauterpacht: *op. cit.*, p. 438.
- <sup>7</sup> IMT, I, 254.
- <sup>8</sup> Cybichowski: *Das Völkerrechtliche Okkupationsrecht*, *Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht*, 1934, p. 319.
- <sup>9</sup> J. Stalin: *O Velikoy otecestvennoy voine Sovetskogo Soiuza*, Moskva, 1952, p. 46 (in Russian).
- <sup>10</sup> Kelsen: *The Legal Status of Germany according to the Declaration of Berlin*, *American Journal of International Law*, 1945, p. 518; Anisimov, *K voprosu o suverenitetie Germanii*, *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo* 1949, No. 5, p. 18; Knieriem, *Nürnberg-Rechtliche und menschliche Probleme*, Stuttgart, 1953, pp. 353–354.
- <sup>11</sup> See Chapter II, *The Post of Governor General*.
- <sup>12</sup> See Chapter IV, *Direct Extermination*.
- <sup>13</sup> du Prel: *Das Generalgouvernement*, Würzburg, 1942, Frank's foreword.
- <sup>14</sup> Van Nispen tot Sevenaer: *L'occupation allemande pendant la dernière guerre mondiale*, The Hague, 1946, pp. 15, 19, 162ff.; Laun: *Haager Landkriegsordnung, Wolfenbüttel und Hannover 1948*, p. 24.
- <sup>15</sup> Van Nispen tot Sevenaer: *op. cit.* pp. 280, 285, 288.
- <sup>16</sup> Laun: *op. cit.*, p. 25.
- <sup>17</sup> The verdict of the United States Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, 22.12.1947, in re Friedrich Flick and others (Case V), Opinion and Judgement.
- <sup>18</sup> IMT, I, 253–254.
- <sup>19</sup> Vnešnjaia politika Sovetskogo Soiuza, I, 1944, pp. 166, 234, (in Russian).
- <sup>20</sup> Niurnberski proces, *Sbornik materialov*, Moskva, 1952, Vol. I, p. 42, (in Russian).
- <sup>21</sup> Polyansky: *Meždunarodny sud*, Moskva 1951, p. 15. (in Russian).
- <sup>22</sup> Ehrlich: *Prawo narodów*, 3rd edit. p. 389 (in Polish).
- <sup>23</sup> Oppenheim-Lauterpacht: *op. cit.*, p. 298ff.
- <sup>24</sup> Ehrlich: *op. cit.*, p. 416.
- <sup>25</sup> Oppenheim-Lauterpacht: *op. cit.*, p. 299.
- <sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 437.
- <sup>27</sup> Merignhac et Lemonon: *Le Droit des gens et la guerre de 1914–1918*, quoted in Van Nispen tot Sevenaer, *op. cit.*, p. 225.
- <sup>28</sup> See Chapter II, *The Post of Governor General*.
- <sup>29</sup> Oppenheim-Lauterpacht: *op. cit.*, p. 437; Van Nispen tot Sevenaer: *op. cit.*, p. 225.

- <sup>30</sup> Weh: *Das Recht des Generalgouvernements*, 3 Aufl., Krakau, 1941, vol. I, A. 100.
- <sup>31</sup> See Chapter IV, Direct Extermination and Chapter VIII, Persecution and Extermination of the Jews.
- <sup>32</sup> IMT, I, 43–44.
- <sup>33</sup> Yearbook of the United Nations 1948–1949, New York, p. 959—Resolution adopted on 9 December 1948 (260 III) A.
- <sup>34</sup> The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, Geneva 1949, ICRC.
- <sup>35</sup> IMG, XII, 19.
- <sup>36</sup> Oppenheim-Lauterpacht: *op. cit.*, p. 590.
- <sup>37</sup> Karl Marx: *Briefe an Kugelman*—13.12.1870, Berlin, 1952, Dietz Verlag, p. 114.
- <sup>38</sup> Van Nispen tot Sevenaer: *La prise d'otages*, The Hague, 1949, p. 90.
- <sup>39</sup> Fauchille: *Traité de droit international public*, 8th ed., Vol. II, p. 205.
- <sup>40</sup> *Mezdunarodnoe pravo*, ed. Durdenevsky i Krylov, Moskva, 1947, p. 501 (in Russian).
- <sup>41</sup> Ehrlich: *op. cit.*, p. 377ff, 417.
- <sup>42</sup> Laun: *op. cit.*, p. 47ff.
- <sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 48ff.
- <sup>44</sup> Oppenheim: *International Law*, London, 1921, Vol. II, p. 241.
- <sup>45</sup> Liszt: *op. cit.*, p. 474 (footnote 6), 493ff.
- <sup>46</sup> Oppenheim: *op. cit.*, p. 241.
- <sup>47</sup> Liszt: *op. cit.*, p. 493.
- <sup>48</sup> Van Nispen tot Sevenaer: *op. cit.*, p. 15ff.
- <sup>49</sup> Oppenheim: *op. cit.*, p. 351ff.; Liszt, *ibid.*; Van Nispen tot Sevenaer: *ibid.*
- <sup>50</sup> Van Nispen tot Sevenaer: *op. cit.*, p. 89ff.; Oppenheim: *op. cit.*, p. 353ff; A. N. Trainin: *Hitlerite Responsibility under Criminal Law*, London, 1945, p. 19.
- <sup>51</sup> Liszt: *op. cit.*, p. 494; Van Nispen tot Sevenaer, *op. cit.*, p. 90ff.
- <sup>52</sup> Oppenheim: *op. cit.*, p. 341.
- <sup>53</sup> Van Nispen tot Sevenaer: *op. cit.*, p. 85.
- <sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31ff.
- <sup>55</sup> See Chapter IV, Direct Extermination.
- <sup>56</sup> *Ibidem.*
- <sup>57</sup> *Ibidem.*
- <sup>58</sup> Tagebuch, 1.1.—29.2.1944, 15.1.1944, p. 13.
- <sup>59</sup> (Tagebuch) Arbeitssitzungen, 1940, II—XI, 6.2.1940, p. 9.
- <sup>60</sup> Tagebuch 1943/V, p. 1094; Tagebuch 1.1.—29.2.1944. 8.2.1944, p. 6–7. One of the American military tribunals set up in Nuremberg after sentence had been passed by the IMT to try the cases of former Nazi leaders in the Balkans, expressed the opinion in a verdict passed on 19.2.1948 that the shooting of hostages could be admissible in certain cases as a final means



for the maintenance of order in an occupied territory. See U.S. against W. List, Court V. Case 7: Opinion and Judgement, p. 10451ff.

<sup>61</sup> Oppenheim, op. cit., p. 240.

Deportation of the populace of an occupied territory to forced labour was already practised by the Germans during the first world war. Fauchille: op. cit., p. 204.

<sup>62</sup> Oppenheim-Lauterpacht: op. cit., p. 442.

<sup>63</sup> According to Oppenheim, the detention of the populace of an occupied territory is only admissible if the territory has been completely laid waste during hostilities. Op. cit., p. 216.

<sup>64</sup> See Chapter II; The Post of Governor General.

<sup>65</sup> See Chapter XI; Looting of Art Treasures.

<sup>66</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>67</sup> See Chapter XI; Destruction of the Royal Castle in Warsaw; Oppenheim-Lauterpacht: op. cit., p. 415.

<sup>68</sup> See Chapter X; Destruction of Culture.

<sup>69</sup> Oppenheim: op. cit., Russian Edition, Moscow 1949, Ot Redakcii, p. 430.

<sup>70</sup> Wnesnaya politika Sovetskogo Soiuza, Moscow, 1944, Vol. I, p. 172 (in Russian).

<sup>71</sup> Durdenevsky i Krylov: op. cit., p. 582.

<sup>72</sup> IMT, I, pp. 238ff, 243, 253; Oppenheim-Lauterpacht: op. cit., pp. 401, 405.

<sup>73</sup> IMT, I, 253.

<sup>74</sup> Oppenheim-Lauterpacht: op. cit., p. 448ff.

<sup>75</sup> Van Nispen tot Sevenaer: La prise d'otages, p. 47.

<sup>76</sup> Van Nispen tot Sevenaer: L'occupation allemande, p. 285.



EXCERPTS  
FROM  
HANS FRANK'S DIARY



*A lieutenant in the 7th American Army, Walter Stein, found in May, 1945, 38 volumes of documents of the Governor General of Poland, the so-called "Tagebücher von Frank" (Diaries of Frank) in his house in the pension "Berghof" near Neuhaus (in Bavaria).*

*The volumes contain the minutes of the government conferences and of the NSDAP meetings in the General Government, as well as Governor-General's Diaries.*

*In the minutes of the conferences, among the list of persons present, can be found Frank's signature in his own handwriting.*

*The documents were typed. The 33 volumes are bound in linen, and only five are kept in file covers.*

*The documents cover the period from 1939 to 1945.*

*The major part of the documents consists of the Governor General's speeches and statements. The diary kept from day to day by the defendant Frank and his secretary in the Nazi Chiefs usual way, illuminates his attitudes towards many questions which are being investigated by the International Military Tribunal. It is possible to establish, to what extent according to his own statements made on various dates and under various circumstances, he was responsible for the atrocities committed by the Nazi conspirators, on the territory of the General Government of Poland.*

*The excerpts from the diary were made by the representative of the Polish Government, Mr. Piotrowski and an officer from the Delegation of the Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.. Major Kveselava.*

*The excerpts from Franks diary are enclosed.*

Chief Prosecutor for the U. S. S. R.  
Lieut. General R. RUDENKO





DIARY OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF THE  
OCCUPIED POLISH TERRITORIES  
FROM OCTOBER 25 TO DECEMBER 15, 1939

*Introductory Remarks*

. . .

The military administration ended the October 15, 1939. The Reich Minister dr. Frank took over from this moment the administration of the General Government as the Governor General subordinated immediately to the Führer.

P. 2

*Lódź, Thursday, October 26, 1939*

*Lódź, Friday, October 27, 1939*

The Governor General accompanied by the Reichsführer SS Himmler visited Warsaw. (. . .)

P. 18/19

*Lódź, Tuesday, October 31, 1939*

11<sup>00</sup>

The Governor General received SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger, General Becker, SS-Brigadeführer Streckenbach and L.-Colonel Gudewill.

P. 19/20

Brigadeführer Streckenbach reported:

The Reichsführer SS wishes that all Jews be evacuated from the newly gained territories. Up to February approximately 1,000,000 people are to be brought in this way into General Government. The families of good racial extraction present in the occupied Polish territory (approximately 4,000,000 people) should be transferred into the Reich and individually housed

and thereby be uprooted as a people. The deadline provided for the migration transport is the 15th November. (...) The Governor General gives SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger the assignments to organize these refugee transport.

P. 20

(...) The Governor General explained (...) The difference between the German master race and the Poles should be shown quite clearly. (...)

P. 21

Arrived Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda dr. Goebbels accompanied by the ministerial counsellor Müller, Gauamtsleiter dr. Fischer (...)

The Governor General pointed out at the outset: Only such possibilities of education may be placed at the disposal of the Poles as would show them the hopelessness of their national destiny. At most bad films, or laying stress on the greatness and power of the Germans, could therefore be considered. (...)

Reich Minister dr. Goebbels agreed in principle with the explanations of the Governor General, that Polish theatres, cinemas and cabarets should not be organized. (...)

P. 22

(...) The Governor General stated, that the university colleges were closed already. The seminaries for clergy reopened by the Wehrmacht will be closed on principle as they only foment hatred towards the Germans.

P. 23

(...) Reich Minister dr. Goebbels was very pleased to hear, that the seizure of Polish cinemas was ordered already. (...)

P. 38

*Berlin, Saturday, November 4, 1939*

The Governor General had a thorough conference with the Führer from 13,20 to 15,15. The Führer discussed the general

situation with the Governor General, acquainted him with his plans, and approved the work of the Governor General in Poland, especially the destruction of the Royal Castle in Warsaw and the decision not to rebuild that city, the transfer of art treasures (. . .)

P. 39

*Cracow, Tuesday, November 7, 1939*

The Governor General received the District Chief in Warsaw dr. Fischer (. . .) He stresses that a special ghetto must be formed for the Jews. The Governor General approves these measures.

P. 52

*Cracow, Friday, November 10, 1939*

The Governor General received the District Chief dr. Wachter, who reported on the appearance in some places of inciting posters on the occasion of the 11th of November (Polish Independence Day).

The Governor General ordered that in every house where a poster remains exhibited, one male should be shot. This order is to be carried out by the Chief of Police. (. . .) Dr. Wachter reported, that 120 hostages were taken in Kraków as a preliminary measure. (. . .)

P. 53

The Governor General ordered (. . .) A marking of Jews is further to be introduced (a white armband with a blue Davids star) and is to be worn by all Jews and Jewesses from the age of 12 onwards. Any contravention of the order must be punished accordingly.

P. 99

*Thursday, December 14, 1939*

P. 101

15<sup>30</sup>

Landrat\*) dr. Siebert submits to the Governor General the decree ordered by him regarding the extension of compulsory labour service to the age groups between 14 and 18 years old and asks for a renewed signature of the order (. . .)

P. 104/105

*Friday, December 15, 1939*

The Standartenführer Janowski reports about the organization of the Polish relief work (. . .)

The Governor General warns emphatically against the danger of the Poles being able to organize themselves in any way. To avert this danger, the Governor General orders, that the organizational plan for Polish relief work should be prepared in conjunction with the Higher SS and Police Chief and then submitted to him, the Governor General, for his approval. It would be essential not to lose sight of the necessity for rigid severity and for using all means to prevent any camouflaged attempt on the part of Poles to form some sort of common organization.

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\* Head of the lowest administrative district in Germany.

## SESSIONS OF DEPARTMENTAL CHIEFS

1939--1940

### *Minutes of the first conference of Departmental Chiefs on December 2, 1939*

The Governor General Reich Minister dr. Frank opened the conference with a statement on the fundamental principles of the tasks of the administration of the General Government. It is essential that the preeminent importance of political tasks in the General Government as against purely formal administrative needs, should be maintained. For this, men were needed who had the courage to solve a new problem in an entirely new manner, who would free themselves from any pattern and from any practices which they might have brought with them from elsewhere. What is suitable in the Reich needs by no means be suitable in the General Government. That which is stated in the Reichsgesetzblatt is not valid in the General Government, unless applied on the basis of the Führers decree of the 12. 10. 1939, and the only person who has the power to do this is the Chairman of the Council of Ministers for the Defence of the Reich, and he will only use this power in agreement with the Governor General. The final structure of the General Government is not yet known, and people are equally in the dark as to whether it will remain a General Government permanently. Authoritative for the administrative activities in the General Government is the will of the Führer that this area should be the first colonial territory of the German nation. In the General Government the German point of view must prevail.

. . .

P. 2/3

As a matter of principle, it is to be added, on the subject of the administration of the General Government: this area is, in its entirety, booty of the German Reich. It thus cannot be permitted

that this territory should be exploited in its individual parts, but the area must be subjected to economic utilization as a whole, and it should benefit the German people with its entire economic value.

P. 3

The sentencing to death of an archbishop and a bishop gives rise to the fundamental remark that, in the General Government a total struggle is being conducted against resistance of every kind. Both bishops were rightly condemned, because arms were found in their possession. If, in spite of this, their sentence was commuted to penal servitude certain other considerations were responsible for this. Press reports about the shooting of Jews, aimed at frightening the Jews were undesirable.

P. 5

SS-Obergruppenführer Dr. Krüger describes it as a good thing if incidents such as the sentencing of both bishops, already referred to, were not talked about because otherwise there might be a danger of rumours arising and of considerably higher figures being mentioned than the real ones.

*Minutes of the Second Conference of Departmental Chiefs  
on December 8, 1939*

The Governor General Reich Minister Dr. Frank reports on his conversation with Field Marshal Goering. (. . .) This appointment of the Governor as Plenipotentiary of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan has as its result that in the future nothing can happen in the General Government in the field of political economy without the Governor General asserting his encouraging or restraining influence. It is the Governor General's task to extract from the economy of the General Government all that is best and most useful to the Reich. (. . .)



P. 3

SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger gives an account of questions arising from resettlement. Since the 1st of December, many trains with Poles and Jews have been arriving in the area of the General Government from the newly incorporated territories of the Reich. These transports will continue about the middle of December. (. . .)

P. 4

Dr. Walbaum reports that a few days previously a transport of children seriously ill with epidemic diseases arrived unexpectedly at the German hospital from the Eastern areas of Upper Silesia, now incorporated into Germany. (. . .)

P. 7

The Governor General Dr. Frank orders that a supplementary decree be presented, extending compulsory labour service to the age groups between 14 and 16 years old.

*Session of Departmental Chiefs*

*Friday, January 19, 1940*

10<sup>30</sup>

The Governor General Dr. Frank: (. . .)

P. 2

(. . .)But one thing is certain: this region will not be released from the sphere of German power. (. . .)

P. 2/3

(. . .)We should all have to learn to think along new lines; we should have to set ourselves free from thinking along Reich lines, above all Reich administrative lines, in order to comprehend, with a clear understanding of its aims, the peculiar colonial character and sphere of our General Government. (. . .)

P. 4

(. . .) On 15 September 1939, I received instructions to take over the administration of the occupied Eastern territories, accompanied by a special order to exploit this sphere ruthlessly as a war territory and a land of booty, to turn it, so to speak, into a heap of ruins from the point of view of economic, social, cultural and political structure. (. . .) Today the territory of the General Government is viewed as a valuable constituent part of German living space. (. . .)

P. 11/12

(. . .) My relationship with the Poles is here like the relationship between ants and aphides. If I treat the Poles reasonably, — so to speak tickle them in a friendly way — I do this in the expectation that the work they do will benefit me. This is not a political problem but a purely tactical and technical one. (. . .) In cases where, in spite of all these measures, performance does not increase, or where the slightest act gives the occasion to intervene, I shall actually not hesitate to take even the most drastic measures.

. . .

*Minutes of the conference of Departmental Chiefs  
on February 15, 1940, 10<sup>30</sup>*

P. 2

General Bührmann reports on the discussion of the Governor General with Field Marshal Goering on 12. 2. 1940 at Karin-Hall. The Field Marshal gave the strictest instructions that all transactions between any Reich departments and official departments in the General Government should be conducted only through the Governor General. Direct instructions from authorities in the Reich to official departments in the General Government are expressly forbidden. (. . .)

*Session of Departmental Chiefs in the Mining Academy*  
*Friday, March 8, 1940*

The Governor General Reich Minister dr. Frank: (. . .)

P. 5

(. . .) One thing is certain: the authority of the Governor General as the representative of the Führer and of the will of the Reich in this area is indeed strong and I have never left it in doubt that I would not allow anyone to trifle with this authority. I had all authorities in Berlin informed of this again, particularly after Field Marshal Goering had, — on the 12. 2. 40 from Karin Hall, — forbidden all Reich departments, including the police and including even the Wehrmacht, to interfere in any way in the official affairs of the General Government. The same applies to the attempt which the SS made once on the 15th or 16th December, when the Reichsführer of the SS wished to decree — with effect for the General Government too — that all art treasures and other works should be promised to the SS. This decree was cancelled following my protest. (. . .)

P. 7/8

The Führer arrived at an important decision along the same lines on the 30. 1. 1940. Several authorities in Berlin had grown uneasy at the Governor General possessing the right of reprieve to the full extent. In reply to the timid question of anxious souls, the Führer laid down minutely in writing and also issued 30. 1 a decree already published in the Reichsgesetzblatt, according to which the Governor General was to exercise the entire right of reprieve in the occupied Polish territory, together with the right to depute it. (. . .) There is no authority here in the General Government which is higher in rank, stronger in influence or greater in authority than that of the Governor General. Even the Wehrmacht has no governmental or official functions of any kind here, it has security functions and general military tasks here, but no political power whatsoever. The same applies to the Police and SS. There is no state within the state here, but we

are the representatives of the Führer and Reich here. Finally, this applies to the Party too, which has no farther-reaching influence here, except for the fact that National Socialists of very long standing and proved champions of the Führer direct general affairs. (. . .)

P. 12

For this purpose I have also, on the Führer's express orders, made immediate executions dependant on my previous authorization. No execution of the death sentence imposed by a summary court takes place without previous authorization. From this moment mass executions should cease. (. . .)

We are going to reintroduce the Poles' technical education system, about to the level of the lowest grade of the German technical secondary schools.

P. 13/14

(. . .) It is likewise clear that these measures must not mean that we entrust to Polish elements even the least share in the direction and governmental functions of the General Government. (. . .)

One can say in general, that we shall have to reckon with an increasing amount of resistance from the circles of the intelligentsia the church and former officers. Organizational forms are already in existence which are directed against our domination in this country. Upon the slightest attempt by the Poles to start anything, an enormous campaign of destruction directed against the Poles would follow. Then I would not hesitate to institute a regime of terror with all its consequences. I have given orders for some hundreds of members of such secret organizations to be kept in custody for three months, so that nothing should happen in the immediate future. The last thing the Führer said to me on departure was: "See to it that there is absolute quiet over there. I cannot make use of anything that disturbs the peace in the East." I shall see to that. (. . .)

*Session of Departmental Chiefs in the Mining Academy  
on Friday, April 12, 1940*

The Governor General (. . .)

P. 6

(. . .) Although he would not permit the creation of a great national common organization of the people of the Ukraine, it might nevertheless be possible to found a kind of self-help and welfare organization for a great number of Ukrainians. For the rest it was to be recommended that the principle, "Divide et impera" be subscribed to in the General Government.

P. 8

(. . .) The policy of a smooth germanization could commence for the General Government only when the Warthegau, West Prussia, Danzig, the South Eastern Area and Upper Silesia had become German in the sense indicated in the Führer's decree.  
(. . .)

P. 10

He had talked about this matter to several generals on the previous day, and had ascertained thereby that generals commanding divisions were forced, in view of the state of emergency in the house market, to live in houses where the only tenants apart from the general were Jews. That, as a matter of fact, applied to all categories of officials too. This state of affairs was intolerable in the long run. If the authority of the National Socialist Reich was to be maintained, it was impossible that the representatives of this Reich should be forced to meet Jews when entering or leaving their house, that they should be subjected to the risk of falling victims to epidemics. He therefore intended to clear the town of Cracow of Jews as much as possible by the 1st November 1940 and to undertake a great deportation of the Jews, for the reason that it was absolutely intolerable that thousands and thousands of Jews should slink about and have

dwelling in a town which the Führer had done the great honour of making the seat of a high Reich authority. (. . .) The town of Cracow has to become the town freest of Jews in the General Government. (. . .)

P. 15

(. . .) In the Lublin district it has been possible to prove that the priests had incited the population from their pulpits. These priests had been arrested, and the situation was already greatly improved eight days later. (. . .)

P. 16

Standartenführer Schulz observed that arrests had been carried out in large numbers. The arrested persons had been handed over to the proper tribunals; he did not know yet what action had been taken against them.

*Session of Departmental Chiefs in the Mining Academy*  
*Friday, May 10, 1940*

. . .

P. 23

The Governor General then dealt with the questions of the compulsory labour service of the Poles. Under pressure from the Reich, it had now been decreed that, since sufficient labour did not present itself voluntarily for service in the German Reich, compulsion could be used. This compulsion denoted the possibility of arresting male and female Poles. A certain amount of unrest had been caused by this, which, according to isolated reports, had spread very strongly and which could lead to difficulties in all spheres. Field Marshal Goering had once pointed out, in his big speech, the necessity for sending a million workers to the Reich. 160,000 had been delivered to date. To arrest young Poles as they left church or the cinema would lead to ever increasing nervousness among the Poles. Fundamentally he had no objections to removing people capable of work who were



lounging about the streets. But the best way would be to organize a round-up, and one was absolutely justified in stopping a Pole in the street and asking him what work he did, where he was employed, etc. (...)

*Session of Departmental Chiefs*

*on June 14, 1940*

*Beginning of the session 10<sup>45</sup>*

The Governor General opens the session informing that German forces are ready to enter Paris. (...)

P. 2

(...) France is dying, and must perish because she trusted life to little and opposed reform. But the British Empire is also facing its end. (...) Germany's greatest hour is beginning now. (...)

*Session of Departmental Chiefs*

*in the Great Hall of the Mining Academy*

*on Friday, July 12, 11<sup>20</sup>*

The Governor General opened the session with the address as follows: (...)

P. 1/2

The Führer has told me that he will not give up one square kilometre of this area. (...) Equally illuminating is the fact that the entire authority in this area rests exclusively with the Governor General and that no Reich head offices can exert any direct influence here. (...) For the town of Warsaw the Führer has ordained that a rebuilding of the town of Warsaw as a Polish metropolis is quite out of the question. The Führer desires that, in the course of the general development, the town of Warsaw should sink down to the rank of a provincial town. (...)

P. 4

The Führer's decision taken at his suggestion, that no more transports of Jews should be sent into the General Government was also of primary importance. From a general political viewpoint, I would like to add that it is planned to deport the whole Jewish community in Germany, in the General Government and in the Protectorate to an African or American colony, as soon as possible after the conclusion of peace; Madagascar has been suggested, which France would have to give up for this purpose; there will be sufficient room, in an area of 500,000 square km., for a few million Jews. I tried to obtain permission also for the Jews of the General Government to share this advantage of building up a new life on new soil. This has been granted, so that here also there will be a colossal easing of the burden before very long.

. . .

*Session of Departmental Chiefs  
on Thursday, September 12, 1940*

The Governor General opens the session (...)

P. 1

The General Government will no longer be treated as occupied territory, but as part of the German Reich. In arriving at this decision, the Führer explained to me that he was leaving it to me to submit further suggestions to him to bring about an even more final fusion of this area with the Reich. I have been given no time limit by the Führer. In this connection I have, with the Führer's authorization, given the office of the Governor General the title of "Government of the General Government".

P. 5

(...) There is no Reich authority which can influence the governing of this area directly or indirectly. Orders are issued by none but the Governor General as the immediate deputy of the Führer. (...)

P. 6

(. . .) I myself have made no contacts with Poles and I request you also to do the same. (. . .) It can only be a question of "Either or" here. Fate has decided that we are the masters here, the Poles our subordinates entrusted to our protection. I request you, gentlemen, to limit the reception of Poles, of petitioning deputations etc. to the officially necessary minimum. It is also impossible for us to provide the Poles with the German standard of living. There must be a difference between the standard of living of the master race \* and that of their subjects. The Poles must realize the limits of their possibility for development. In answer to my explicit question, the Führer decided again that the restrictions we agreed upon must continue. No Pole shall occupy a higher rank than foreman, no Pole shall be able to have the chance to acquire a higher education at state institutions. I must request you to maintain this strict line. On several grounds it is necessary for me to direct this serious exhortation to you with full emphasis. (. . .)

P. 7

As far as the treatment of the Jews is concerned, I have authorised the closing of the ghetto in Warsaw, primarily because it has been decided that the danger arising from the 500,000 Jews is so great that the possibility of mowing around must be prevented. (. . .)

*Session of Departmental Chiefs  
on Wednesday, November 6, 1940*

The Governor General opens the session with the address as follows: (. . .)

P. 10/11

(. . .) Otherwise we are not interested in the growth of this country. This is perhaps the hardest word we have to say. We

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\* Herrenvolk.

are not interested in the Poles getting richer or more secure, or in their becoming more active in dealing with their property. We are only interested in establishing German authority in this area. We cannot measure this task by the individual fortune which, according to the concepts of the governments of previous countries, we bring to individual Poles, but we measure this work according to how impossible the prospects become of Poland ever rising again. This may sound harsh and cruel, but there can be no other decision in the battle of the nations for millenia and billenia. It is quite evident that only very strong and hard characters can be used for this task. Those who are not suited to this task left our ranks long ago or went from us in some other way. We are thinking here along imperial lines in the greatest style of all ages. There can be no comparison between the imperialism we are developing and those pitiful efforts which former weak German governments undertook in Africa. (. . .) The Führer also stated explicitly the day before yesterday that this neighbour state of the German Reich had to fulfil the hard task of finishing with the Poles at all costs and that it was to be free of any obligation to carry out a policy of Germanization. The Führer further stated explicitly that he did not place any obligations on the Governor General to shape life along German lines here, that in fact there was no room for any tendencies towards Germanization. This area is called upon to provide a reservoir of man power in a big way. We have here solely a gigantic labour camp where everything that stands for power and individuality is in German hands. (. . .)

*Session of Departmental Chiefs*

*on December 19, 1940 in Government Building*

Governor General Reich Minister dr. Frank: (. . .)

P. 2

(. . .) All territorial rights of the Reich shall, in the Führer's name, be exercised here by the Governor General and his government. (. . .)

P. 12/13

Gentlemen, I wish to warn you strongly not to be lulled asleep by the quietness of your official spheres. This country is not pacified! (...) In this country the very hard characteristic of a determined leadership must dominate. The Pole here must feel that we are not building him a constitutional state, but that he has only one duty, — to work and to behave himself. It is clear that this sometimes leads to difficulties, but you must see to it, in your own interests, that all measures are taken ruthlessly to master these things. In this you can rely on me absolutely. (...)

P. 14

I observe in increasing measure that the Church is beginning to become unpleasant. While until now this mighty ideological bloc in Poland has, strangely enough, remained — let us say — loyal, the Church is beginning here and there — apparently as a result of the stiffening of certain political situations on this continent — to become an embarrassment. I would like to stress straight away that I shall not stop at anything here and even have bishops arrested immediately if the slightest thing occurs. I request you in this connection to take the severest steps to ensure that officials in uniform are strictly forbidden to visit Polish churches during a service.

WORKING SESSIONS  
ADRESSES BY THE GOVERNOR GENERAL  
FEBRUARY — NOVEMBER 1940

*Working Session of Departmental Chiefs of the Radom District,  
February 24 and 25, 1940*

P. 12

Continuation of the session on February 25, 1940.

. . .

The Governor General (. . .)

P. 19

The second matter which is very much desired in Berlin is that the executions ordered by the Summary Courts should be made subject to the previous agreement of the Governor General. I have already passed on this order by the Führer to the Higher SS and Police Chief, who has passed it on to the police offices. May I ask that you again draw your Police Chief's attention to this decree. The other Summary Courts also may carry out death sentences with my explicit agreement in writing, or, in extreme cases, by wire. (. . .) If the Security Police notice that clergy are deviating politically in any way, there is no place for mercy in such a case. (. . .)

P. 20

(. . .) Supervise the sermons and the activity of the clergyman and step in if you have any suspicion that the church is being misused in any way.

(. . .) A raising of the educational level of the Polish people is in no way in our interests. (. . .) Even if some of you may be of a different opinion, I at any rate, think that the Poles must make the sacrifice.



*Session of the Reich Defence Council in Brühl Palace-Warsaw  
Saturday, March 2, 1940*

Governor General Reich Minister dr. Frank. (..)

P. 9

(..) We nevertheless bear the enormous responsibility of ensuring that this area remains firmly in German hands, that the backbone of the Poles is broken for all time and that never again can even the slightest resistance against German policy come from this area.

P. 11

(..) The Governor General represents the Führer here. (..) The only real government of the Polish people in existence in the world at this moment is that of the General Government installed by the Führer. (..) Do not forget that Germany today stands on the threshold of being a World Reich. (..)

P. 20

(..) If necessary we shall take all steps to shape the standard of life of the Polish people in such a way that it only just supports life, but that it shows a declining graph compared with the situation in Germany. (..)

P. 30

(..) I am responsible for what has happened since the 11. 10. 1939, no matter what happened, how it happened or by whom it was done. I bear the responsibility and I am not passing it on to anybody. And because of this I also want to stress that this responsibility can be borne. Where there were here and there events which were — let us say — regrettable from the point of view of humanity in general, we must really accept responsibility. (..)

*Interview given by the Governor General  
to the "Voelkischer Beobachter" correspondent, Kleiss,  
on the 6th February 1940*

P. 3

Kleiss: It might also be interesting to define the difference between the Protectorate and the General Government.

The Governor General: I can tell you a visible difference. In Prague, for instance, large red posters were put up announcing that 7 Czechs had been shot that day. Whereupon I said to myself: If I wanted to have poster put up for every 7 Poles who were shot, the forests of Poland would not suffice for producing the paper for such posters. Yes, we had to act harshly.

*Police Session  
on Thursday, May 30, 1940*

The Governor General, Reich Minister dr. Frank:  
Gentlemen!

. . .

P. 5

(. . .) How often we have cause to wonder, when we see a blonde-eyed child, at the fact that it speaks Polish, and I then say to myself: If we were to bring this child up to be German, it would be a pretty German girl. We therefore see an absolutely German racial core in this people and the development, fostering and advancement of this racial core will, over a long period, present the possibility of guiding this area of the General Government into the German community.

I have discussed all this with the Führer, and we are quite agreed that this district must successively be brought into the German community in this manner. At present it is of no interest within what space of time this is going to happen — whether in 50 or 100 years. The decisive factors — and this is the most important point and the reason for today's meeting — that we should use every moment given to us to this aim, and to do useful work along these lines.

. . .

P. 6

The only thing I have to say to that is: I can carry out this Polish policy only with you. You must excuse my frankness. If I had not the old National Socialist guard of fighters of the Police and SS in this country with whom would we then carry out this policy? I could not do that with the help of the Armed Forces — in fact with nobody at all; those are such serious matters, and we as National Socialists are confronting such a tremendously difficult and responsible task, that we can only talk about these things at all within the narrowest circle.

P. 6/3/9\*

If we thus want to attain the goal of the complete domination of the Polish people within this framework in the face of all these difficulties, we have to utilize time. On the 10th May the offensive in the West began, i. e. on that day the world's main interest in the events here in our place ceased. All that was caused in the world by the atrocity-propaganda and the lying reports about the activities of the National Socialist rulers in this area — well, it would have been a matter of complete indifference to me whether the Americans or French or Jews, or perhaps the Pope too, had got excited about it — but for me and for every one of you it was terrible during these months always to have to hear from the Propaganda Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of the Interior and even from the Armed Forces, that it was a murderous regime, that we had to stop these atrocities etc. It was naturally clear here that we had to state that we would no longer do it. And just as clear was the fact that until now, while the searchlight of the world was directed on us, we could not do such things on a big scale.

But as from the 10th May, this atrocity propaganda in the world is a matter of complete indifference to us. We must now use the moment which is at our disposal. When every minute and second, thousands of people of the best German blood now

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\* In the original number 7 was omitted.

have to be sacrificed in the West, then it is our duty as National Socialists to remember that the Polish nation should not rise at the cost of these German sacrifices. So it was the right moment when, in the presence of SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger, together with comrade Streckenbach, I discussed this extraordinary appeasement programme, an appeasement programme which had as its contents to finish off now in quick time the mass of those insurgent resistance politicians and other political suspects whom we had in our hands, and at the same time to clear away the heirs of former Polish gangsters alone. I admit quite frankly that this will cost some thousands of Poles their lives, particularly ones from among the Polish intelligentsia. But for all of us National Socialists this time brings with it the obligation to see to it that no resistance arises again out of the Polish people. I know what responsibility we are thus assuming. But it is obvious that we can do this — and that because of the very necessity of taking over the protection of the Reich's flank in the East. But furthermore: SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger and I have decided that the pacification action is to be speeded up. I pray you, gentlemen, to help us with all your energy in the execution of this task. What I can do to facilitate its execution will be done. I appeal to you, as champions of National Socialism, and I suppose I need say no more. We shall carry this measure through. And, as I tell you in confidence, we shall do this in execution of an order given me by the Führer. The Führer said to me: The question of handling and guaranteeing German policy in the General Government is an entirely personal matter for the responsible men in the General Government. He expressed himself thus: What we have now identified in the way of a class of leaders in Poland must be liquidated: those who grow up again later must again be removed. We therefore do not need the German Reich, in order not to burden the Reich organization of the German police with this. We do not need to deport these elements to the concentration camps in the Reich first, because we should only have bothers and unnecessary correspondence with their families then; instead we shall liquidate things in the

country itself. And we shall do so in the simplest manner. Gentlemen, we are no murderers. It is a terrible task for the policeman and SS man who is officially, or as a result of his duties, bound to carry out the execution on the basis of this measure. We can easily sign hundreds of death sentences, but it means a terrible burden to pass on this task to German men, decent German soldiers and comrades. I am therefore very grateful to party member Siebert for issuing the decree in which he makes it a duty of the police to pay certain regard to the physical position of the men carrying out the execution. I should like to ask you to respect this decree if it is at all possible, under all circumstances. But not only that; every Police and SS-Chief, who has the hard duty of carrying out these sentences, must also be fully conscious of the fact that he acts here in execution of a verdict of the German Nation. Therefore the procedure of a summary police court will be maintained even for these cases of AB-Action, as I agreed with comrade Streckenbach, so that the impression of an arbitrary action or a similar impression should by no means arise. I believe that it will be possible to finish this homogeneous action by the 15th June, at any rate everything must be done to make it possible. The Reprieves Commission which is attached to me, has nothing to do with these things. The AB-Action is carried out exclusively by the Higher SS- and Police Chief Krüger, and his organs.

P. 10

This is the one purely internal action of appeasement which is necessary and which lies outside the normal procedure. (...)

P. 17

Brigadeführer Streckenbach then goes on to report about the present state of the AB-Action and points out, to begin with, that the Security Police has accomplished the task given them, between autumn of last year and March, and has carried out the actions which arose from the general work of the Police. (...)

P. 19/20

About 2,000 men and several hundred women were in the hands of the Security Police at the beginning of the extraordinary appeasement action; they had been taken into custody as functionaries of some repute of the Polish resistance movement. In fact they represented the intellectual class of leaders of the Polish resistance movement. This class of leaders was, of course, not limited to the 2,000 persons. In the documents and files of the SD there were the names of approximately another 2,000 persons, who were to be reckoned in this class. These were persons who, because of their activities and behaviour, came without exception under the decree on summary procedure which was valid for the General Government. The summary sentencing of these people began simultaneously with the order for the extraordinary appeasement action. The summary sentencing of the 2,000 prisoners was approaching its end, and there were only a few still to be sentenced.

P. 20

After this summary court procedure had been carried out, a series of arrests had now already begun, which should also bring into the hands of the Security Police a number of people for summary sentencing who were known to the SD, but had not yet been arrested. The result of these arrests has not yet been ascertained. He reckoned with a 75 per cent result. Altogether, the action would therefore include a circle of about 3,500 persons, who were actually the politically most dangerous section of the resistance movement in the General Government. (...)

P. 33/34

The Governor General summarizes the result of the deliberations. (...)

(...) If a judicial authority were crazy enough to submit the proceedings of any police department in connection with a big political action to a judicial examination in the field of criminal



law and perhaps to accuse this police department or another department of infringement of official duties etc., one could see, arising naturally from this ungenueine competition between administration and police itself, a serious breach of common interests. (. . .)

P. 38/39

As far as concentration camps are concerned, we were clear about the fact that we did not wish to set up concentration camps, in the real sense of the word, here in the General Government. Whoever is suspect in our part of the world is to be liquidated immediately. What prisoners from the General Government there are in the concentration camps in the Reich must be put at our disposal for the AB-action or dealt with there. We cannot burden the Reich concentration camps with our affairs. The trouble we had with the Cracow professors was awful. Had we dealt with the matter here, it would have taken a different course. I should therefore like to request you urgently not to deport any more people to the concentration camps in the Reich, but to carry out the liquidation here, or to impose a regular sentence. Anything else is a burden of the Reich and continually leads to difficulties. We have here an entirely different form of treatment, and this form must be maintained. I expressly point out that nothing will be altered in this treatment by an eventual peace. This would only mean that, as a world power, we would then carry through our general political actions even more intensively than to date; it would mean that we would have to colonize on an even grander scale, but it would make no change in the principle. (. . .)

DIARY 1940/I

P. 207

*Saturday, March 16, 1940*

Conference with ambassador von Wühlisch.

. . .

P. 217

The Governor General states that he had lengthy discussions in Berlin with the representatives of the Ministry of Finance and the Reich Ministry of Food. The urgent demand was put forward there that the Polish agricultural workers should be sent to the Reich in greater numbers. He explained in Berlin that, should it be demanded of him, he could of course exert pressure by doing something like getting the police to surround a village forcibly fetching out the suitable men and women and then bringing them to Germany. (. . .)

P. 333

21st April 1940

12<sup>45</sup>

Conference with Secretary of State dr. Buehler, SS Obergruppenführer Krüger and Reichshauptamtsleiter\* dr. Frauendorfer in the presence of Reich Minister dr. Seyss-Inquart.

Subject of conference is the deportation of workers, especially agricultural workers, to the Reich.

Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer reports, that so far about 160.000 agricultural workers and about 50.000 industrial workers have been sent to the Reich, however in total there should be 500.000. It is to be hoped that there would yet be enough voluntary enlistments.

The Governor General stated that the fact that all means in form of proclamations etc. did not bring success, leads to the conclusion that the Poles out of malevolence, and guided by the intention of harming Germany by not putting themselves at its disposal, refuse to enlist for working duty. Therefore he asks Dr. Frauendorfer, if there are any other measures, not as yet employed, to win the Poles on a voluntary basis.

Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer answered this question negatively.

The Governor General emphasized the fact that he now will be asked to take a definite attitude toward this question. Therefore the question will arise whether any form of coercive measures should now be employed.

P. 333/334

The question put by the Governor General to SS Obergruppenführer Krüger: does he see possibilities of calling Polish workers

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\* Head of a Reich head office.

by coercive means, is answered in the affirmative by SS Obergruppenführer Krüger. So far as he knows another 300.000 Polish workers should be sent into the Reich, and it will be possible to fill this request once the working-duty decree has gone into effect.

The Governor General closes the discussion by saying that guiding directions are now given. The officials involved must work out the details by themselves. Wherever the Labour Department does not succeed, the police must act.

P. 396

*Cracow Castle*

*Tuesday, May 7, 1940*

10<sup>45</sup>

Conference with Governor dr. Fischer.

P. 398

Governor Dr. Fischer now reports on the visit of the Reichsfuehrer SS to Warsaw. (...) The Reichsfuehrer SS had ordered that 20.000 Poles should be taken to concentration camps.

The Governor General, while not wishing to deny the need for such measures, thinks that an orderly state of affairs will be impossible in the area of the General Government in the long run in view of all such difficulties.

P. 420

*May 9, 1940*

12<sup>05</sup>

Conference with ambassador von Wühlisch.

P. 421

Ambassador von Wühlisch points out further that complaints were being raised by Polish circles that young people were being seized by the police on leaving cinemas and were being taken to the Reich for agricultural service, without the parents being notified.

The Governor General will have this matter examined, but points out with all emphasis that he was now forced to take stronger measures, after having allowed clemency to reign long enough. If all the methods that had been tried so far were of no effect, it was necessary to resort to force. He was also relying on the Foreign Office not to leave him in the lurch in any embarrassing situations that might arise.

P. 422

12<sup>40</sup>

Conference with ministerial counsellor Wolsegger, Stadthauptmann \* dr. Schmid (...)

P. 425

Stadthauptman dr. Schmid reports further that considerable nervousness prevailed in the town, as it was reported that young people had been forcibly seized in the streets and deported to Germany.

The Governor General does not wish to credit these rumours without further investigation, but points out on the other hand that it was now necessary to take more energetic action in the matter of the deportation of workers to Germany, in view of the situation in the Reich.

P. 456 a

*Conference on extraordinary measures  
to safeguard peace and order in the General Government*

The Governor General convened meeting for May 16, 1940, during which extraordinary measures to safeguard peace and order in the General Government were discussed.

The following participated in the meeting:

The Governor General  
Reich Minister dr. Seyss-Inquart

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\* Town Mayor.

Secretary of State dr. Bühler  
SS-Brigadeführer Streckenbach  
Standartenführer Schulz  
Colonel Müller

The Governor General stated:

The general war situation forced us to review the internal security situation in the General Government very earnestly. One could deduct from ample indications and acts that resistance movement of the Poles, organized on a large scale, existed in the country and that we were standing on the very brink of considerable and violent events. Thousands of Poles were already enrolled and armed in secret societies and were being incited in the most rebellious manner to commit every kind of outrage.

P. 456 b

Thereupon the Governor General decreed:

With immediate effect, the task of carrying out an extraordinary pacification programme is given to the Chief of the Security Police, to commence immediately. (. . .)

P. 456 b/456 c

(. . .) Any arbitrary action was to be most strictly guarded against.

(. . .) The more important details of the actions were discussed, and SS-Brigadeführer Streckenbach was formally given the necessary authority by the Governor General.

The Governor General ordered a detailed report to be made on the 30th May 1940.

In other respects, the period of the action has, for the time being, been set to be until the 15th June 1940.



## DIARY 1940/III

P. 644

*Wednesday, July 10, 1940 — Cracow-Castle*

11<sup>25</sup>

Arrival of the Governor General at the Castle in Cracow.

15<sup>00</sup>

Conference with Secretary of State dr. Bühler.

The Governor General reported to State Secretary dr. Bühler about his discussion with the Führer on 8 July, 1940 in Berlin. The Governor General was pleased to be able to report that the Führer was extraordinary satisfied with the work of the Governor General and the total achievements in the General Government, and that he also expressed this satisfaction repeatedly. On request of the Governor General, the Führer has consented that, effective immediately, the official designation "General Government for the occupied Polish territories" is changed to "General Government" or "The German General Government Poland". The same change also applies to the personal title of the Governor General. Thus the Führer has taken a step toward the inclusion of the General Government into the entire Reich, according to the suggestion of the Governor General. The Führer further declared to the Governor General, that it is understood, that there will never be a question about abandoning the area of the General Government, and that therefore the area of the General Government will for all the future will be and remain Reich territory.

The Führer has also decided that Cracow will remain the capital of the General Government and that Warsaw will not be reconstructed again as the Polish metropolis. In addition the Führer has again certified all authorities to the Governor General, and especially has made a most generous representation in the name of the Führer and the Reich his duty.

P. 645

17<sup>00</sup>

Conference with Brigadeführer Streckenbach

P. 645/646

Brigadeführer Streckenbach reported to the Governor General about the conclusion of the extraordinary pacification drive and about the execution of the border police tasks, which had now been transferred to the Security Police by a special order from the Governor General.

P. 689

July 23, 1940

17<sup>10</sup>

Conference with ministerial counsellor Wille and ministerial counsellor Plodeck.

P. 690

Ministerial counsellor Wille pointed out that many people in the General Government were not yet convinced that the AB drive had now been concluded. That is shown, for instance, by the circumstance that he noted a certain uneasiness in regard to this question among the judges.

The Governor General confirmed the conclusion of the AB drive and declared that this fact might be taken into account. (. . .)

P. 698

Lublin, Thursday, July 25, 1940

12<sup>15</sup>

Greeting of the Governor General (. . .)

P. 700

The Governor General then delivers the speech as follows: (. . .)

P. 702/703

The Führer has further ordered that Jews will no longer be transported into the General Government. On the contrary, those Jews also who live in the General Government will all be treated uniformly on the basis of a new programme, so that the General Government also will, within a measurable space of time, be free of Jews. As soon as overseas shipping allows the possibility of deporting the Jews (laughter), the Jews will be deported one by one, man by man, woman by woman, girl by girl. I take it that I need not commiserate with you too much on this (renewed laughter). I therefore believe, as the saying goes, that we have got through the thickest dirt, and that it will now be possible to set up a really decent official, professional and also human town here for German women and men. Once we have attained that, then we can achieve further things too. This area will, in the coming decade, be increasingly populated by members of the German people. (. . .)

DIARY 1940/IV

P. 942

*Monday, 7. 10. 1940, Warsaw*

9<sup>30</sup>

P. 943

The Governor General delivers then the speech as follows:  
My dear comrades!

. . .

P. 946

(. . .) It is obvious that here and there further education may perhaps become necessary; it is also obvious that the compensation for the sincere comradeship, for this mutual keeping in touch must be that, within the official circles, authority must be unreservedly maintained. We cannot allow offices to be turned into 5 o'clock tea rooms. It is a matter of course, however, that here our position as Germans must be such that the least one of us stands far higher than the highest Pole in this area. (. . .)

P. 1124

*Friday, December 13, 1940*

16<sup>30</sup>

Conference with Secretary of State dr. Bühler, Undersecretary of State Kundt and SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger.

P. 1126

The Governor General then discusses the question of the relations between police and administration. (. . .) Under no circumstances would he tolerate the unity of the administration being shattered in any way.

In the near future the carrying out of an extraordinary paci-

ying action would be found to be necessary. The Führer agreed in every way with this procedure.

P. 1156

*Thursday, December 19, 1940*

18<sup>00</sup>

. . .

The Governor General then delivers the following speech to the soldiers of the guard unit: (. . .)

P. 1158/1159

(. . .) I am very happy about this hour of the Armed Forces, for it unites us all. Amongst you, one man has his mother, his parents, another his wife, his fiancée, his brother, his children at home. They will now be thinking of you during all these weeks and will say to themselves: My God, there he is sitting over there in Poland now, where there are so many lice and Jews, perhaps he is hungry and cold, perhaps he dare not to write . . . Then perhaps it would be quite nice if we were to send our loved ones at home a picture, and were to say to them: Well, things here in the General Government are already somewhat changed and improved. True enough, in one year I was unable to get rid of either all the lice or all the Jews (laughter). But in the course of time, and particularly if you help me, that will no doubt be achieved. It is after all not necessary for us to do everything within a year and everything at once, for what would then be left for those that come after us to do? (. . .)

P. 1170

*Friday, December 20, 1940*

7<sup>55</sup>

The Governor General, accompanied by colonel of the police Müller attends the Feast of the Order Police at their quarters in a former priests' seminary.

The Governor General then delivers the following speech:

Comrades of the Police!

. . .

P. 1171

(. . .) When you said farewell to your homes many a worried mother and many a worried wife may have said to you: What, you are going to the Poles, where there is nothing but lice and so many Jews? (. . .) One cannot of course evict all lice and Jews in one year, that will have to take place in the course of time. (. . .)

P. 1174

(. . .) If you are not satisfied with the priests' seminary, then I shall give you the home of the Archbishop or of the Prince Bishop. And if there is anything else you are hankering after — anything that might make your duties easier, I am gladly willing to fulfil such desires. (. . .)



WORKING SESSIONS 1941  
JANUARY-OCTOBER

*Session to discuss questions of settling Poles and Jews  
in the General Government*

*Wednesday, January 15*

*11<sup>00</sup> Government Building*

. . .

P. 9

Secretary of State dr. Bühler stated that he considers it to be impossible to distribute 1 million people over the area of the General Government in the intended manner. The burden from the point of view of security, of controlling epidemics and in respect of the food policy was so great that, in the long run, one would not be able to avoid unrest. (. . .)

The Governor General replied that the most severe methods were being employed against unrest. (. . .)

P. 13

The Governor General intends to make his decision as to whether the Warsaw ghetto is to continue to exist or whether it is to be dissolved again dependent on the result of his inspection which is to take place shortly. In any event, he could not permit a town such as Warsaw being completely contaminated.

. . .

Appendix

*Report on the discussions held on the 8 January 1941 at Reich Security H. Q. concerning the resettlement of Poles and Jews in the General Government.*

During the year 1941, a total of 831,000 people from the Eastern regions of the Reich are to be resettled in the General Government, added to which there is the resettlement within the General Government of approximately 180,000 people.

GOVERNMENT SESSIONS 1941  
MARCH-OCTOBER

*Minutes of the Government Session  
on Tuesday, March 25, 1941 in the great session hall  
of the Government Building.  
Beginning of the session 10<sup>30</sup>*

Governor General Reich Minister dr. Frank opens the session:  
(. . .)

P. 2

(. . .) According to the plenary powers given to me on the 17th March, all departments exclusively of the Armed Forces are placed under the orders of the Governor General. There are only two authorities possessing powers, namely the Armed Forces and the General Government. There is no third body. I therefore forbid with immediate effect, compliance with any orders from another authority no matter whence they may come. (. . .)

P. 27

(. . .) Above all, the official relations with the Vojds \* should not be of such a nature that the Vojd to a certain extent reaches a higher social position. He was a Pole, and as such he had merely to receive orders and he should not have the feeling that he had been raised to the incomparably lofty sphere of the leaders of the General Government.

P. 28/29

Governor dr. Fischer reports (. . .)

The present cropping up of the resistance movement was remarkable. Three acts of terrorism had to be noted: the shoot-

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\* The bailiff.

ing of a person of German race in Warsaw, the wounding of a soldier at Lovicz and of another at Kielce. He requested the Governor General to give him permission to combat such acts of terrorism with the utmost severity. Above all, the punitive measures ought to be announced to the population publicly. This action had a very frightening effect and would force certain elements to refrain from such acts of terrorism.

P. 33

Governor General Reich Minister dr. Frank (..)

I therefore draw attention once more with all stress to what was said at the beginning of this conference. The General Government is a complet component of the greater German sphere of power. There are only two competencies here: that of the Armed Forces and that of the Governor General. There are no exceptions from this. I stress: I will not tolerate the slightest insubordination from any official or employee. (..)

*Government Session*

*on Friday, September 5, 1941*

P. 32

Answering a question put by the Governor General, Ober-regierungsrat \* Reeds said that so far a total of 1,4 million Polish workers had been sent to the Reich. It was impossible at the time to send special columns of workers to Galicia for the construction of roads.

Lecture of the SS and Police Chief in the Warsaw district, SS Oberführer Wigand at the Government session on October 15—16, 1941.

(...) During the past two years, about 7000 persons had to be sent to concentration camps because of political and criminal offences. At the present moment there are 2,811 prisoners in the local jails; among them, 1,290 men and 268 women for political offences. (..)

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\* Senior counsellor of the Government.

GOVERNMENT SESSIONS 1941  
OCTOBER-DECEMBER

*Government Session on Tuesday, 16. 12. 1941 in the Government Building in Cracow*

The Governor General (. . .)

P. 35

Most severe steps must and will be taken against Jews leaving the ghettos. The death sentences imposed on Jews because of that must in the future be carried out without any delay. His decree, by virtue of which every Jew found outside was to be executed, had to be carried out unconditionally. Should it be necessary, the procedure before the special court would have to be simplified.

P. 39

In connection with this, the Governor General stated that he would depute the right of reprieve, given to him by the Führer, to the Governors in those cases in which Jews were sentenced to death by special and summary courts.

P. 44/45

The Hauptabteilungspräsident \* dr. Frauendorfer gives an account of the activity of his Department. (. . .) 47% of all the foreign workers in the entire Greater German Reich were Poles. On top of that, the labour exchange offices in the General Government had recruited a further 230,000 people per month i. e. about 8,000 per day. This figure was increased by the workers won in Galicia, 35,000 of whom had gone to the Reich too. Success had been achieved also in producing in a short time the re-

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\* Chief of a Main Department.

quired number of miners, namely 11,000 for mining in the Ruhr and others for the transport of coal and for the coal trade. (..)

P. 50

Chief of the Security Police SS Oberführer colonel of the police dr. Schöngarth as the next speaker reports about his area. (..)

P. 53

(..) The number of persons who are at present in jail for participation in the resistance movement is extraordinary high. (..)

P. 64

The Amtschef \* in Warsaw dr. Hummel substituting the Governor dr Fischer, who is fallen sick (..)

P. 65/66

The danger of spotted fever has increased owing to the reduced power of resistance of the population and in particular of Jews. The feeding of the inhabitants of the ghettos was insufficient. Added to which was the lack of cleaning materials and overcrowding of living quarters.

The reported number of cases of spotted fever in the ghetto was at the present moment 2,405. But the actual number of cases was much higher. In Warsaw there were found 503 and in the various districts 589 cases of spotted fever among the Poles. The confinement of the Jews to the ghettos was a blessing in itself. The complete closing of the ghetto was now essential. An order by the chief of the Order Police, by virtue of which Jews could be shot at the high roads, had been welcomed with gratitude.

Dr. Hummel then reported on the practical effects of imposing the death penalty in cases of leaving the ghetto illegally. In War-

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\* Chief of the District Office.

saw, in spite of the additions of a third chamber, it had only been possible to pass 45 death sentences, of which only 8 had been carried out so far, as the reprieve commission in Cracow had to come to the final decision in each single case. A further 600 sentences had been demanded and were pending. An effective isolation of the ghetto was not possible by means of special court procedure. The procedure up to liquidation was too protracted, it was burdened with too many formalities and had to be simplified. (. . .)

P. 70

The Governor General closing the session delivers the speech as follows: (. . .)

P. 74/75

You should not be surprised, if I draw the bridle on the Poles somewhat tighter in the near future than has been the case to date.(. . .) I must admit that I sometimes worry about whether I should not introduce a special action by which the Polacks who do not give way to German officers or intentionally run into them are dealt with under a special penal code. (. . .)

P. 76/77

As far as the Jews are concerned, — and this I shall tell you quite openly — they must be done away with in one way or another. The Führer once said: Should united Jewry again succeed in unleashing a world-war, it will not only be the peoples who have been egged on into war who will shed this blood, but the Jews in Europe will have their end. I know that many of the measures now being taken in the Reich against Jews are being criticised. Conscious attempts are continually being made — as can be seen from the reports on morale — to speak of cruelty harshness, etc. Before I continue, I should like to ask you to agree with me on this formula: as a matter of principle, we shall have pity only for the German people and for no one else in



the world. The others did not have any pity for us either. And I must say, as an old National Socialist: should the Jewish brotherhood in Europe survive the war, whereas we had sacrificed our best blood to save Europe, this war would only be a partial success. My attitude towards the Jews will therefore be based only on the expectation that they should disappear. They must go. I have entered into negotiations for their deportation to the East. A big conference on this question is taking place in Berlin in January, to which I shall send Secretary of State dr. Bühler. This conference is to be held in the Reich Security HQ with SS Obergruppenführer Heydrich. At any rate, a great Jewish migration will begin.

P. 77

But what is to be done with the Jews? Do you think that they will be housed in settlement villages in the Ostland? We were told in Berlin: why all this bother? We can't do anything with them in the Ostland or in the Reichskommissariat either; liquidate them yourselves. Gentlemen, I must ask you to arm yourselves against all considerations based on pity. We must destroy the Jews wherever we come across them and wherever this is possible, in order to maintain the structure of the Reich as a whole here. This will of course be achieved by other methods than those of which Amtschef dr. Hummel has spoken. The judges of the special courts can not be made responsible for this either, since this just happens not to come within the framework of legal procedure. One cannot apply the views which have been current to date to such gigantic and unique events. Anyhow, we must find a path which leads to the goal, and I am thinking about it.

And the Jews are particularly harmful gluttons as far as we are concerned. We have at the moment about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  million Jews or, with those who are related to Jews and everything that goes with them, perhaps  $3\frac{1}{2}$  million. We cannot shoot these  $3\frac{1}{2}$  million Jews, we cannot poison them but will nevertheless be able to intervene in ways which will lead in some way to successful annihilation, and this in connection with the great measures

to be discussed in the Reich. The General Government must become as free of Jews as the Reich is. Where and how this is to come about is a matter for the organs which we must employ and create here and whose effectiveness I shall announce to you in good time.

DIARY 1941/I

P. 97

*Wednesday, January 22, 1941*

. . .

Party meeting in Lublin.

The SS-Brigadeführer Globocnik opened the ceremony greeting and thanking the Governor General. The Governor General then delivers the following address: (. . .)

P. 106/107

(. . .) As long as the Jews exist here, they shall work, but naturally not in the sense in which they used to before. I appeal here to your determination. We still have some humanitarian dreamers left who, out of sheer German good-nature, are in the habit of falling asleep over world history. We who for twenty years past have been fighting beside the Führer cannot be asked to have any consideration left for the Jews. (. . .) If the Jews in the world ask for pity today, this leaves us cold. (. . .)

P. 820

*Tuesday, September 9, 1941 — Cracow*  
11<sup>00</sup>

Session in Kings Hall of the Castle.

P. 830

Obermedizinalrat \* dr. Walbaum expresses his opinion about the state of health of the Polish population. Investigations carried out by his department had shown that the majority of Poles ate only about 600 calories, whereas the normal needs of a human being are 2,200 calories. The Polish population was enfeebled to such an extent that it fell an easy prey to spotted fever. The number of sick Poles already amount to 40% today. In the last week alone 1,000 fresh cases of spotted fever had been officially recorded. That was the highest figure to date. This health situation constituted a great danger for the Reich and for the soldiers entering the General Government. A spreading of the epidemic to the Reich was very possible. The increase in tuberculosis was also very worrying. Should the food rations be reduced still more, an enormous increase in the figures of illnesses could be predicted.

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\* Senior (counsellor) doctor.

DIARY 1941/IV

P. 937

*Wednesday, October 15, 1941 -- Warsaw*  
*16<sup>20</sup>*

Conference in Belvedere Palace.

P. 945

The Governor General is of the opinion that it would not be possible to provide further food supplies for the Jewish population. It will hardly be possible to provide anything more for the Polish population either apart from the increase of the bread ration to 1400 grams. Moreover, attention must be given to the creation of further facilities for mass feeding.

## WORKING SESSIONS 1942

*Working session of the NSDAP district leaders of the General Government area in Kings Hall of the Castle in Cracow on March 18, 1942*

P. 8

Districtstandortführer \* Kundt (..)

P. 12

(..) A special service man had been shot. (..) At the moment a retaliatory action on the part of the police was taking place in the villages of this district. A certain number of suspects had been arrested, and 50 of them had been put up against the wall. (..)

P. 50

Reichsleiter dr. Frank (..)

P. 53/54

(..) As you know, I am a fanatical supporter of unity of administration. (..) It is therefore clear that the Higher SS and Police Chief is subordinated to me, that the Police is a part of the Government, that the SS and Police Chief in a district is subordinated to the governor, and that the Kreishauptmann \*\* must also have authority over the gendarmerie in his county. The Reichsführer SS has recognized this; in the written agreement all these points are mentioned word for word and signed. And it is obvious that we cannot create a closed shop here which can be treated in the traditional manner of small states. It would for instance, be ludicrous should we wish to build up a security

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\* Head of the NSDAP in the district Radom.

\*\* County-chief.



policy of our own here against our Poles in this country, while knowing that the Polacks in West Prussia, in Posen, in the Wartheland and in Silesia have one and the same resistance movement. The Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police must therefore be able to carry out, with the aid of his organs, those police affairs which concern the interests of the Reich as a whole. This must however be done in such a way that the measures to be adopted are first submitted to me, and only when I give my consent thereto.

In the General Government the Police are the Armed Forces. As a result the head of this police system is also called into the Government of the General Government by me and is subordinated to me or my deputy as Secretary of State for Security. (. . .)

P. 63

Otherwise the fight for the attainment of our aims is being relentlessly continued. You can see for yourselves how the state organs are working, you can see that we do not shrink from anything, and stand dozens of people up against the wall. This is necessary even if only because simple reflection tells us that it cannot be our task to spare foreign blood at a time when the best German blood is being sacrificed. For, out of this, one of the greatest dangers could arise. One already hears from Germany now that P/W — say, in Bavaria or in Thuringia — are administering large estates independently, while every fit man from a village is at the front. If this process were to be continued, then gradually a sub-migration of the German race would set in. One must not underestimate this danger. For this reason, everything that shows up in the way of Polish leadership must again and again be destroyed with relentless energy.

P. 64

This need not be proclaimed from the housetops, it is being done quietly. And if we permit ourselves the luxury of letting

the Poles have a sort of philharmonic business which we show to the foreign correspondents, this means nothing. The people produce music the way we want them to, and when we have no more use for them we shall dissolve this institute. (. . .) We maintain agricultural schools and technical schools, we have medical practitioners trained, but they cannot obtain any academic position or title. (. . .)

*Police Session in Kings Hall of the Castle in Cracow  
on June 18, 1942*

P. 27

The Governor General calls Warsaw the main centre of all the arts of fraud. In order to seize all those people who are not willing to work, a sudden large scale combined operation should be prepared, everybody should be seized and shipped off to the Reich in waggons.

Amtschef dr. Hummel points out that the Warsaw district had, to date, supplied 45,000 labourers to the Reich. A change in the recruiting methods would be appropriate; up to now the work had been pretty clumsy, as brutal measures had at once been adopted. (. . .)

The Governor General also was of the opinion that the supply of those labourers who had voluntarily reported for work in the Reich had already been exhausted. One could now no longer get anywhere with the system of voluntary reporting.

P. 32

Replying to a question put by Secretary of State dr. Bühler as to whether there were any prospects for a speedier decline in the numbers of the ghetto population, Secretary of State Krüger said that one would probably obtain a survey of the position during the course of August. The problem of the deportation of the Jews pressed for a decision. For the carrying out of such an action, the provision of adequate numbers of transport train was necessary. Although a total railway ban had been ordered

for the next 14 days, he had managed in negotiations with President Gerteis, to see to it that trains would be provided now and again for the deportation of the Jews. At the conclusion of the period of the ban, the Jewish action would have to be carried out on an increased scale.

## SESSIONS OF MAIN DEPARTMENT CHIEFS 1942

*Government Session in the Great Conference room  
of the Government Building in Cracow*

*Monday, August 24, 1942*

*Subject: A new plan for seizure and for food of the General  
Government.*

P. 13

The Governor General opens the session with the following words: ( . . . )

P. 15

( . . . ) With all the difficulties, which you find here any place, in the form of diseases of workers of the collapse of their organisations, etc., you must always keep in mind that it is still much better if a Pole collapses than if a German succumbs. Let me mention only by way of paranthesis that we are condemning one to two million Jews to die of starvation. It is a matter of course that if the Jews are not starved it will, I hope, result in an acceleration of anti-Jewish measures.

P. 162

*Cracow*

*Friday, March 13, 1942*

*19<sup>15</sup>*

The Governor General receives the Reichsführer SS Himmler in the presence of the Secretary of State Bühler and SS-Obergruppenführer and General of the Police Krüger.

. . .

The Governor General delivers the address as follows:

P. 162/163

Dear Comrade Himmler! (...) This is even more pleasant, as we succeeded today in reaching a final and full agreement on the cooperation between police and administration based on the experiences which your men have made in the country and we made in the Government and administration. Now we shall be able to solve by common efforts this last problem to organize a national socialist modern order contrary to the traditions of a medieval antiquated bureaucratic system, which according to hearsay is still supposed to exist somewhere in the Reich.

As Governor General I remember on this occasion with special and sincere gratitude the magnificent achievements accomplished in your spirit by your men according to the direction of the SS and Police. A considerable number of best comrades of the Police and the SS have been murdered by a nation which has to be repressed for all times in the interest of the Germans, who will settle themselves in this country. Our thanks go out to the comrades, who fell in the fight for our Germany under the strokes of the murderous Polack henchmen. We can thank them with

the same proud sensation as we thank those who fell fighting at the front. These men too have died in the first front line for Führer and Reich.

You can rest assured, Reichsführer SS, that my personal efforts, as well as those of all members of the Government and the agencies of Party and State would be directed to convert the General Government into a supporting base for you and for the great task you are charged with on behalf of the Reich.

P. 164

From the talk we had just now I know that you, Reichsführer SS, on the other hand will be willing also to help me in establishing the authority of the Reich in the General Government. I am firmly convinced that from the coordinated efforts of State, Party, SS and Police, the great common task will develop more beautifully and happily as we could have ever expected before.

P. 256

26. 3. 42

12<sup>20</sup>

Conference with President dr. Frauendorfer in presence of Secretary of State dr. Boepple, ministerial counsellor Wolsegger and President \* dr. Siebert.

President dr. Frauendorfer states that the number of Poles employed in the Reich had attained the figure of 1.1 millions of whom 630,000 were recruited by the Main Labour Department alone. (...) A further 7,000—8,000 Poles were at present going to the Reich every week.

. . .

P. 297

14. 4. 1942

16<sup>40</sup>

Press conference in Kings Hall of the Castle in Cracow.

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\* Department-chief.



P. 305

The Governor General summarized up the issues of the conference as follows:

. . .

P. 307

On the subject of Polish press policy, it is to be stated as a matter of principle that the Poles have to have the impression that they are not being treated as pigs in the press but as Europeans and human beings. This is also to hold good for government work in general. We are already so much concerned with the Poles that we must say: Although they have a very bad time, the Poles live better in the General Government than the Italians in Italy or the Greeks in Greece, the Serbs in Serbia, etc. (. . .)

P. 309

(. . .) And if, as is claimed, Catholicism is really a dishonour for a nation, then all the more Catholicism must I wish for the Polish race. (. . .) If Catholicism is a poison, the one can only wish this poison on the Poles. The same applies to other things as well. (. . .)

P. 389

*Tuesday, 21. 4. 1942*

11<sup>00</sup>

Conference with SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger.

. . .

The Governor General then states his general attitude towards the problem of the SS and Police; he stresses in particular that the Police is always only the executive arm of a Government — that the Government cannot, on the contrary, rank parallel with the Police or be subordinated to them. As far as other matters are concerned, the Governor General refers to his agreement with the Reichsführer SS, Himmler, concerning the future position of the Higher SS and Police Chief Krüger and of the SS and

Police in the General Government. The Governor General orders that this agreement, which runs as follows, is to become a part of the diary:

P. 390

In order to achieve a final pacification of the problem of the relations of the state administration and the police and SS in the General Government, the following is agreed:

#### I

The Higher SS and Police Chief in the General Government enters the Government of the General Government as Secretary of State for Security.

The assignment of official business will take place according to the special plan accepted by both sides.

#### II

The Higher SS and Police Chief (Secretary of State for Security) is directly subordinated to the Governor General, or in case the latter is otherwise engaged, to his deputy.

#### III

According to the Führer decree to be issued, the Reichsführer can give direct instructions to the Secretary of State. Before carrying them out the Secretary of State will make sure the Governor General agrees in the sense of the Führer's decree. On the other side, the agreement of the Reichsführer will be ascertained in the case of decrees by the Governor General.

#### IV

The district SS and Police Chief is directly and personally subordinated to the Governor, in the same way as the Secretary of State for Security to the Governor General.

## V

The chief of the county gendarmerie is subordinated to the chief of the county.

Cracow the 14th March, 1942.

Signed Frank. Signed Himmler.

The Governor General also states that according to the decree of the Führer the Governor General is the proper authority in the General Government for problems of the consolidation of German Folkdom.

P. 487

*Sunday, June 7, 1942—Cracow*  
*11<sup>00</sup>*

A morning demonstration of the Hitler-youth on occasion of a visit of the Reichsjugendführer\* Arthur Axmann in Cracow.

(. . .) The Governor General delivers the following speech: (. . .)

P. 489

(. . .) You are to bear here the strong roots of a new German living space which will one day be like Württemberg or Baden or the Province of Brandenburg, like Bavaria or Austria. Like Vienna or Hamburg, towns like Cracow and Warsaw, Lwow, Lublin or Radom must also grow into the German community of life and of the feeling of being part of the home country.

P. 493

*13<sup>10</sup>*

Lunch in honour of the Slovakian Defence Minister General Catlos and the Reichsjugendführer Axmann in Gdańsk Hall of the Castle in Cracow.

The Governor General delivers the welcome address as follows: (. . .)

P. 494

(. . .) This country is and will for all time remain German. (. . .)

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\* Reich Youth Leader.

P. 793

1. 8. 1942

20<sup>00</sup>

Great mass demonstration of the NSDAP District Galicia in Lwow.

P. 794

Reichsleiter Governor General dr. Frank:

Comrades, Soldiers!

. . .

P. 795

(. . .) The beauty of this war is that what we once possess we shall never give up again. (Applause and cheers).

P. 796

(. . .) I shall therefore say only this about the Jewish question: This problem is being solved. No Jew will ever go to Germany again. (Lively applause).

P. 798

(. . .) We must be clear about the fact that the whole war means for us the natural enlargement of the living space of our people.  
(. . .)

P. 800

(. . .) We stand today on the Vistula and on the Dniestr, tomorrow perhaps we will be in the same position on the Volga as our ancestors were in 800 years ago on the Elbe. At that time the Slavonic belt cut deep into what is now the German Reich. They did not hesitate or tremble either at that time but said

that this land would be made German first by the German sword and then finally by the German plough. And they succeeded. (Lively applause).

P. 820

*Cracow*

*Tuesday, 4. 8. 1942*

*10<sup>50</sup>*

Session in the Kings Hall to discuss special problems of the Lublin district.

P. 830

Secretary of State Kruger states thereto that by the Reich Commissioner for the consolidation of German Folkdom Reichsführer SS Himmler first of all two counties Zamosc and Lublin are provided for settlement.

P. 830/831

Secretary of State Krüger then goes on to say that the Reichsführer's next short term plan is to settle the following racial German groups in the two counties Zamość and Lublin by the end of the next year: 1,000 peasant homes (1 home per family of about 6 persons) for Bosnian Germans; 1,200 other homes; 1,000 homes for Besarabian Germans, 200 for Serbian Germans; 2,000 for Leningrad Germans; 4,000 for Baltic Germans; 500 for Volhynian Germans and 200 for Flemish, Danish and Dutch Germans, being a total of 10,000 homes for 50,000 to 60,000 persons.

P. 832

The Governor General gives orders for the resettlement plan to be discussed co-operatively and in detail by the competent authorities and declares his readiness to agree to the final plan at the end of September, when all questions connected there-



with—in particular the guaranteeing of peace and order,—have been satisfactorily settled, so that the resettlement could be begun in the middle of November, as the most favourable time.

P. 859

*Saturday, 15. 8. 1942*

12<sup>20</sup>

The arrival of the Governor General at the NSDAP House.

The Governor General closes the session of the NSDAP Political Leaders General Government area with the following address:

Comrades!

P. 866

(. . .) The situation with regard to the Poles is unique insofar as, on the one hand, we must push German interests forward—I speak quite frankly—in such a way as to make the area of the General Government a purely German colonized land within a reasonable number of decades—and insofar as, on the other hand, in the present war conditions, we have to get foreign racial groups to perform such work in this area as they must perform in the service of Greater Germany. (. . .)

P. 867/868

In this, the Ukrainians form a special exception. I must state that in the interests of German policy, strained relations are being maintained between the Poles and the Ukrainians. The 4.5 or 5 million Ukrainians whom we have in this country are extraordinary important as a counterweight to the Poles. I have therefore always tried to keep them in some form of politically satisfied frame of mind, in order to prevent them joining in with the Poles.

P. 868

I need not say anything much else regarding the Jews. They have to place their entire labour at our disposal. (. . .) Above

all we must realize that pity is out of place here. They have not deserved better either, for it was they after all who started the war. ( . . . )

P. 884

15. 8. 1942  
19<sup>10</sup>

NSDAP Annual meeting.

P. 885

The Governor General Reichsleiter dr. Frank:  
Comrades!  
. . .

P. 892

( . . . ) It is nice for me to be able to say that, in the last 1½ years alone, it was possible to send 800,000 labourers from the General Government into German agriculture and industry. This is by far the greatest number of foreign workers from any one country to be put up in Germany.

P. 896

( . . . ) What a filthy race of Jews it was that swaggered around here before 1939. And where are the Jews today? You hardly see them at all any more. If you see them, they are working. ( . . . )

P. 898/899

( . . . ) No that I am worried, as the foreign press puts it, that we are all very much afraid of the Poles, or, as it was stated the other day, that I created the SA for fear that the Poles would drive us out of the country one day. I should like to see that! I can only say: the very attempt would mean that Poland would lose the very last remnant of life as well. ( . . . )

P. 918

*Cracow*

*Tuesday, 18. 8. 1942*

*10<sup>00</sup>*

The Governor General is driven with the Gauleiter Sauckel to a conference at the Main Department Labour.

At the beginning of the session the Governor General delivers the following address:

Dear Comrade Sauckel! Gentlemen!

I am pleased to be able to report to you, Party Comrade Sauckel officially that we have up to now supplied more than 800,000 workers for the Reich. (. . .)

You recently requested the supply of a further 140,000 workers. I am pleased to be able to inform you officially that, in accordance with our agreement of yesterday's date, we shall deliver 60% of these newly requested workers to the Reich by the end of October and the remaining 40% by the end of the year. (. . .)

P. 920

(. . .) Over and above the present figure of 140,000, you can however, count on a further number of workers from the General Government next year, as we are going to use the police to get hold of them.

P. 921

(. . .) I will tell you in confidence that we are to supply 600,000 tons of grain to the German Reich. (. . .)

P. 968

Final thoughts on the developments of the last three months.  
. . .

Since 1920, I have constantly dedicated my services to the NSDAP. (. . .)

As a National-Socialist I took part in the events of November 1923 and received the Blutorden for this. After the resurrection

of the movement in 1925, my real greater activity in the movement began, which made me first increasingly and later almost exclusively,—as the legal adviser of the Führer and of the Reich Leadership of the NSDAP—the strong representative of the legal interests of the growing Third Reich both in a legal ideological and in a practical legal way. (. . .)

P. 969

I see the culmination of this work in the great Armed Forces trial at Leipzig, in which I succeeded in getting the Führer admitted to the famous oath of legality—a fact which in a legal connection, made it possible for the movement to expand widely.

In recognition of these achievements, the Führer actually made me head of the National-Socialist League of lawyers in 1926; Reichsleiter of the Reich legal department of the Reich Leadership of the NSDAP in 1929; Bavarian Minister of Justice in 1933; Reich Commissioner of Justice the same year; President of the Academy of German law in 1934—an establishment founded by myself; Reich Minister without Portfolio in December 1934 and finally Governor General for the occupied Polish territories in 1939.

Thus I was, am and shall remain the representative jurist of National Socialism's period of struggle. (. . .)

P. 983

(. . .) I profess myself, now as previously, as a National Socialist and as a faithful follower of the Führer Adolf Hitler, whom I have now been serving since 1919 and to whom I hope to be able to appeal some day as I believe he should be better informed.

. . .

P. 985

*Kressendorf, the 28. 8. 1942*

*Frank \**

---

\* Signed personally by him.

DIARY 1942/IV

P. 1273

*Monday, December 7, 1942*

15<sup>45</sup>

Governors Session in Kings Hall of the Castle.

. . .

P. 1276/1277

Governor dr. Fischer (. . .)

If the new food plan is to be carried out, this would mean that, in the city of Warsaw and its immediate surroundings alone, 500,000 people would get no more food. (. . .)

P. 1303

*Monday, December 14. 1942—Cracow*

16<sup>00</sup>

Working session of the NSDAP Political Leaders General Government area.

The Governor General: (. . .)

P. 1329

(. . .) You know that we have delivered over 940,000 Polish workers to the Reich. The General Government thereby stands absolutely and relatively at the head of all European countries. This achievement is enormous, and has also been recognized as such by Gauleiter Sauckel. (. . .)

P. 1331

(. . .) I shall endeavour to get out of the reservoir of this territory everything that can still be got out of it.

P. 1331/1332

(. . .) When you consider that I was able to deliver 600,000 tons of bread grain to the Reich, to which another 180,000 tons for the Armed Forces here must be added; also an abundance of other commodities such as seed, fats and vegetables, amounting to many thousands of tons, as well as the delivery of 300 million eggs to the Reich, etc., you can estimate what importance the territory possesses for the Reich. In order to make clear to you the significance of the delivery of 600,000 tons of bread grain from the General Government, you are referred to the fact that with this one contribution alone the General Government is covering two-thirds of the increase in the bread ration in Greater Germany for the current rationing period. We can claim this as a vast achievement with all justice. (. . .)

P. 1332

Now this delivery to the Reich had one great drawback, which was that the deliveries imposed on us exceed the area's real needs for food, so that we are facing the following problem: can we, as from February, completely exclude over 2 million members of the non-German population of this area from the general food supplies or not? (. . .)

## WORKING SESSIONS 1943

### *Secret Reich Affair*

*Working Session in Belvedere Palace  
on 25. 1. 1943.*

*Subject: Police and Security Matters.*

. . .

Secretary of State dr. Krüger: (. . .)

P. 5

We know definitely that the output of the foreign nationals is decreasing from day to day. It is not sufficient to improve their wages and norms somewhat. The ability to work comes ultimately from the stomach; they can only work if they are given something to eat. After all, we in the General Government are not living under normal conditions where our currency is concerned. For the 33 zloty which a foreign national perhaps earns in the General Government today, he can no longer buy himself anything in practice. The money is spent for the most part on rent, light, coal, gas etc., in fact on all the essentials which a man needs for himself and his family. (. . .)

P. 13

The next basic problem, which also appertains to the security situation, is the task of the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Folkdom. (. . .) As a representative of the Reich Commissioner I have often asked myself: is it right that this resettlement should be undertaken now, or would it be more practicable, in view of the political situation, to defer this question? There is no doubt that the area of the General Government must and will be colonised by Germans. Basically, indeed, Germany and Europe too can only live on what comes from the East. (. . .)



## P. 15

It is primarily a question of the districts of Lublin and Galicia. It is reported from there that the present time is unsuitable for the settlement of a colony there. On the other hand such a task should be fulfilled even during the war. (. . .)

## P. 16

When we recently settled the first 4,000 or so in the county of Zamość before Christmas, I had the opportunity to speak with these people. (. . .) It is understandable that we are not making ourselves the friends of the Poles by colonizing this area. (. . .)

## P. 17

In colonizing this area with racial Germans, we are forced to drive away the Poles. (. . .) We will remove those persons who constitute a burden in this new colonization area. (. . .) They are being deported, first of all taken to concentration camps and then passed on to work in the Reich.

So the whole of this first operation has, from the point of view of propaganda towards the Poles, again had unfavourable results. For the Poles said: After the Jews have been destroyed, they are trying to get the Poles out of this area by the same methods and to liquidate them like the Jews. (. . .)

## P. 19

As I have mentioned, a great deal of unrest has arisen in the Polish area as a result of this deportation. (. . .)

The Governor General dr. Frank:

We shall in future continue to discuss each individual case of resettlement in exactly the same manner as in the case of Zamość, so that you, Mr. Secretary of State, will appear before me and render me a report.

P. 31/32

Governor dr. Fischer (. . .) The murder of German soldiers can undoubtedly be traced back to the operation of the 10th/18th January. The attacks on German cinemas and on the Main Railway Station are also a direct result of this operation. He was firmly convinced, together with the Armed Forces and his collaborators, that the security situation had undoubtedly grown worse, as a result of the method and the execution of the operation in Warsaw. No anti-social elements whatsoever had been arrested during this operation, but people had been fetched from the streets, cinemas, churches and houses, and in various cases passes drawn up by the German authorities had also been torn up. (. . .)

P. 32

Much unrest had been caused by the resettlement in the Zamość county. In this connection the deportation of children to Warsaw had also played its part. This deportation, which had at first only been on a small scale, had caused great unrest. Numerous Poles had discussed this incident in the streets and had commented on it. A dementi issued over the radio had had a very good effect, at any rate in the town of Warsaw. A few days later, however, children from Zamość, for whom a racial German mayor could not find accommodation in his village, had again arrived in Warsaw. 45 children were then placed in a hospital. It could be seen from the reports of the county chiefs that the attitude of the peasant was very uncertain as a result of this resettlement; unless their minds were set at rest soon, the peasants might abandon the willingness to collaborate which they had shown so far. (. . .)

P. 35/36

Governor Zörner (. . .)

The security situation in the Lublin district has shown considerable improvement as a result of the action carried out in

Chelm. Various gangs had been seized and experience had been gained in fighting them. Unfortunately there had been occasions in the course of the action when Polish or Ukrainian foresters and woodcutters had been taken for bandits. 18 foresters had been shot as hostages or in reprisal.

P. 36/37

The evacuation of the Jews had been regarded as a necessary measure by most Germans. Unfortunately overhasty measures had, towards the end, led the numerous Jews taking to the woods and joining the bandits. It had, for instance, been ascertained in Pulawy that one gang had consisted of 3 Russians and 24 Jews. (...) During the police action in the Pulawy county, 18 Polish foresters with their families had unfortunately been killed. It had also frequently happened during the beginning of the action that peasants who wanted to deliver their quota at the railway stations had been seized as hostages, and had been shot on the following day. (...)

P. 38

50 percent of the Poles still remained in the Zamość county after the resettlement. (...) While the racial Germans had not really been molested previously, several attacks on settlers and cases of arson had occurred since the new settlement. In view of the resettlement in the Zamość county, a large part of the police and gendarmerie which was at the disposal of the district, was being withdrawn from the fight against the bandits. The effect on the neighbouring districts was, furthermore, very bad, and there was occasion for great doubt regarding the spring cultivation. (...)

P. 39

Secretary of State Krüger (...) The order for this resettlement had been issued by the Reich Commissioner and a thorough

discussion had taken place at the Castle\* at the proper time, under the chairmanship of the Governor General.

P. 51

Secretary of State Krüger regards it as desirable that a final figure should at last be supplied with reference to the Polish manpower to be seized. How necessary that was, was shown, for instance, by the fact that people in the country were already running away when a police official appeared. Plenipotentiary Pehle had also confirmed this to him; when he had appeared in a village, the peasants had deserted their vehicles and had fled with their wives and children. In reply to this question, he had been told that he was regarded as the person entrusted with effecting the seizure of labourers.

. . .

P. 53

Governor General dr. Frank closed the session with following words: (. . .)

I would like to stress one thing: we must not be squeamish when we learn that a total of 17,000 people have been shot. These persons who were shot are also war victims. If we compare this number against the irreplaceable blood sacrifices which the German people uninterruptedly day by day and every hour are making, then it weighs as nothing in the balance. We are now duty bound to hold together. Each must bring with him understanding for the other, he must be convinced that he is doing his best. The main thing is that we do not allow any personal slackness to arise. We must remember that we, who are gathered here, figure on Mr. Roosevelt's list of war criminals. I have the honour of being Number One. We have, so to speak, become accomplices in the world historic sense. Just because of this we must hold together and be in agreement with one another, and it would be ridiculous if we were to let ourselves get involved in any squabbles over methods.

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\* Wawel castle in Cracow.

*Working Session**in Kings Hall of the Castle in Cracow**Wednesday, April 14, 1943*

*Subject:* Nourishment of non German population of the General Government.

Secretary of State dr. Buhler: (...)

P. 3

I can state already at this stage that the Polish worker in the General Government is being looked after worse than the foreign worker in Germany, than the worker from the East in the Reich provinces, than the Polish and also the Russian prisoner of war, to say nothing of the consumers' scale of rationing granted to the Czech populacy in the Protectorate and to the Polish populacy in the incorporated Eastern areas. In spite of this, the same output is demanded from the Polish population as from that in the other regions. (...)

P. 20/24

President Naumann: (...) Last year the livestock in the General Government was truly cut to the tune of over 20%. Cattle which were really needed for the production of milk and butter were slaughtered last year in order to be able to keep up, to some extent, deliveries to the Reich and the Armed Forces and the supply of meat. If the aim is to get hold of 120,000 tons of meat, the remaining livestock will have to be cut to the tune of 40%. This will mean that, at the end of the financial year of 1944, only 600,000 head of cattle will be left in the General Government. (...)

P. 31/32

In answer to a question by the Governor General, President Naumann stated that, as far as grain was concerned, 383,000 tons had been got hold of in 1940, 685,000 in 1941 and 1.2 million in 1942, which in itself went to show that requisitions had in-

creased from year to year, and were approaching nearer and nearer to the limit of what was possible. They now intended to get hold of 200,000 tons more again, thus reaching the utmost limit. The Polish peasant's hunger could be increased still further only to the point where he still remained strong enough to till his field and to perform the other work demanded of him as well, for example the haulage of wood for the forestry administration. (. . .)

*Working Session*

*on April 15, 1943*

*in Kings Hall of the Castle in Cracow*

*Subject: Security situation in the General Government.*

P. 2

Secretary of State Krüger (. . .)

P. 3

The considerable deterioration in the food situation of the persons of foreign race was still of prime importance. (. . .)

P. 8

Secretary of State dr. Bühler (. . .) The "combing out" operations no doubt produced quiet for a few days, but the resistance movement formed itself again before long. The system of seizing hostages and of shootings, which was still being practised, could bring about no fundamental pacification.

P. 9

When SS-Brigadeführer dr. Schöngarth protested that he had not ordered any shooting of hostages, Secretary of State dr. Bühler replied that, according to reports he had received, 30 hostages had been shot both in the case of the murder of a Land\*-Commissary and in that of a Kreishauptmann.

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\* County.

P. 10

Secretary of State Krüger: (. . .) A political pacification of the population is definitely feasible if, above all, the feeding of the families of that part of the population who are in German service could be assured. The Polish worker can not satisfy his hunger today with the food allotted to him, his output is steadily decreasing and he is forced to stop work two or three days a week to procure himself some food by illegal means. (. . .)

P. 11/12

President dr. Struve (. . .) It is also to be noted that the onus for a series of police measures had been laid in the labour offices, who were in no way responsible for them.

*Secret Working Session*

*Subject: Security situation in the General Government  
on May, 31, 1943*

11<sup>00</sup>

After the session was opened the Governor General introduced the discussion as follows: (. . .)

P. 2/3

The General Government has been established by the Führer as a kind of special administration. The General Government is a so-called latent emergency state. This follows from the fact, for example, that we have still maintained Police Courts of Summary Procedure which, as executive organs, may carry out their sentences immediately. We have carried this emergency state so far that we have imposed sacrifices upon the native population utterly different from those in other territories, which have contributed to the increasing insecurity in the country. The main thing to be taken into consideration here is the absolutely inadequate food situation of the entire population of this territory which we have to inflict systematically upon the population in view of the requirements of the Reich exceeding



the wildest imagination. The food situation of the native population is so disastrous that only a few weeks ago we asked for the return of several thousand tons from the quota imposed by the Reich in order to cover the most urgent needs of the armament plants. (. . .)

P. 7

President dr. Losacker (. . .)

P. 10/11

The Government of the General Government has for a long time be clear on the point that the scale of food rations allowed to racial foreigners can under no circumstances be continued without the population being allowed to resort to self-help or being driven to insurrection. (. . .) The difficulties of the food situation, which naturally have a bad effect on the frame of mind of the population, the enormous rise in prices, the in part overdone and narrow-minded policy over salaries and wages, had led to parts of the Polish population being driven to despair. (. . .) That the resettlement in the Lublin district had also had particularly unhappy results, had already been proved. (. . .) In addition, some operations had taken place in the General Government which had had the most unfavourable effects on the frame of mind of the population, especially such ones as the mass seizing of workers in January 1943, when people in the streets, in churches and in homes were seized without any plan. (. . .)

P. 13

Secretary of State Krüger thanks the Governor General that he had spoken with such a great appreciation about the work of the Police. (. . .)

P. 15

The elimination of Jews (. . .) had been, for the Police, one of the most difficult and most disagreeable tasks, but it had had

to be carried out on the order of the Führer, because it was necessary in the interests of Europe. (. . .)

P. 16

A further factor leading to insecurity was the resettlement of the population. The first colonization was carried out in the Zamość county of the Lublin district. The Reich Commissary for the consolidation of German Folkdom had declared this district to be a region for German colonization. It was estimated that between 8,000 and 12,000 people had been settled there. (. . .)

P. 23

General Hännicke: (. . .) People are saying that a state of emergency should be proclaimed in the regions concerned. It was here a question of a political matter, and he warned against even using this expression, as the British papers would at once point out that the Germans had been compelled to proclaim a state of emergency in the General Government. (. . .) The expression "a state of emergency" must therefore never be used. If it were carried out in practice, this must rest on an arrangement between the departments concerned. (. . .)

## GOVERNMENT SESSIONS 1943

*Government Session on April 20, 1943 (Führer's Birthday)  
in Kings Hall of the Castle in Cracow*

P. 2

Secretary of State dr. Bühler: (..)

P. 4

(..) A few weeks ago the Governor General sent the millionth worker off to the Reich. At present 10,000 more have already been gained for the Reich. (..)

P. 29/30

SS Brigadeführer dr. Schöngarth speaks (..)

(..) No people has ever before had to suffer such oppression as that being suffered by the Polish people. (..)

P. 43

*Government Session  
on Thursday, July 22, 1943  
in Kings Hall of the Castle  
11<sup>00</sup>*

P. 46

After the session has been opened the Governor General Reich Minister dr. Frank delivered the following speech: (..)

P. 52

(..) A harvest delivery from the General Government of 730,000 tons of grain alone, such as occurred in 1942, is truly a marvel which has not yet been copied by anybody. (..) From our region over 1.3 million workers were sent to the Reich,—an achievement which is also unique.

P. 54

(...) I believe that substantially we will again realise, if not the famine export figure of 730,000 tons, then certainly 500,000 tons which we intend to place at the disposal of the Reich. It is by oneself an achievement already. (...)

P. 73/74

Lieutenant General Becker (...) In the regions recognized as the home of the bands, i. e., in the Bilgoraj forest, directly to the north and to the south of it, evacuation should have taken place. This, in his opinion, would have prepared the ground for a total success.

In this connection the Governor General states that the evacuation measures had been carried out in full agreement between him and the Reichsführer SS, Himmler.

P. 79

*Government Session  
on October 26, 1943*

P. 82

After the Secretary of State dr. Bühler has read the Government report the Governor General delivered the following final speech: (...)

P. 87

(...) It is madness for the Poles even to consider any sort of restoration of the Polish State. From this historic place I would like to declare that, for the Führer and the German people, all historic problems connected with all that is Polish, have been solved, and that we are not in the least interested if somewhere in the wide world things of the past are discussed with a lot of imagination. (...)

P. 81

The Chief of the General Government, Secretary of State dr. Bühler, reads out a long account of the work and the achievements of the General Government in the service of the war and the Reich.

P. 120

In spite of the constantly growing volume of its own industry, the General Government supplied further very large numbers of workers to the Reich. In 1939,—40,000 were sent to Germany, in 1940,—302,000, in 1942,—390,000. Altogether, between September 1939 and the end of August 1943—1,124,000 workers were delivered to the Reich. These are figures which speak for themselves!

P. 153

*Government Session  
in Kings Hall of the Castle in Cracow  
on December 16, 1943*

P. 175/176

President Ohlenbusch points out (. . .)

Police measures in the sphere of martial law and of executions had had an advantageous effect and, anyway, no other way than these hard measures was left for German domination. One must consider whether, for reasons of expediency, one should not, as much as possible, carry out executions on the spot where the attempt to murder a German was made. One must perhaps also consider whether special places of execution should not be created for this, for it had been ascertained that the Polish population streamed to places of execution which were accessible to all, in order to put the blood-soaked earth into containers and take these to the church. (. . .)

P. 179/180

SS-Obergruppenführer Koppe states (. . .) For the railway outrage 150 Polish terrorists and for the two German officials—

50 were executed either on the spot or in the immediate vicinity. It must be remembered that the shooting of 200 people affects at least 3,000 people (the nearest relatives). (. . .)

P. 182

The resistance organizations and the partisans aimed at the restoration of former Poland. (. . .)

P. 184/185

(. . .) The centre of gravity lay in attack; in future, checks in streets and trains, searches of homes and mass arrests in dwellings and restaurants would be carried out. It was also necessary to get round to making it possible to seal a city like Warsaw off entirely, in case of need. (. . .) He had allotted his men the task of working out preparatory plans of attack and action for every town and also for the open countryside. During air raids, the greater part of the police and firefighting police will be taken out of the town, so as to enable them to go into action after the raid at full strength. He had also ordered that his chiefs and deputy chiefs should receive instruction in demolition work. Several hundred kilos of explosive materials had already been made into concentrated charges. (. . .)

P. 185

The Governor General expresses his gratitude and recognition to SS-Oberführer Koppe for his effective work, and voices his satisfaction at the fact that an expert with such high qualifications was at the head of the police organization in the General Government. He promises SS-Obergruppenführer Koppe the active cooperation of all official departments in the General Government and wishes him Good Speed and success in his work.

P. 78

2. 2. 1943

16<sup>10</sup>

Working Session

Present:

The Governor General  
Secretary of State dr. Bühler  
Secretary of State dr. Boepple  
President dr. Struve  
President dr. Losacker  
Oberlandesgerichtsrat \* dr. Weh

The subject for discussion is a draft order for compulsory registration for work.

The Governor General is prepared if necessary to ask for several companies from the Wehrmacht for carrying out these measures, so that they could then seize those parts of the population which were not willing to work. Unfortunately, the Police and Special Service were too weak to carry such a task. He therefore entrusted Secretary of State dr. Bühler with the task of working out a suitable project.

P. 115

*Cracow*

*Monday, February 22, 1943*

14<sup>50</sup>

Conference of Governors.

P. 116

Secretary of State dr. Bühler then reports (. . .) In this connection he pointed in particular to the resettlement action in the

---

\* Senior judge of the district court.



Lublin district, i. e., in the Zamość county, which had clearly not been completed yet. In the whole territory this action had led to unrest which was still growing. It was evident that this measure resulted in great economic harm, especially in the sphere of food supplies. (. . .)

P. 117

The Governor General (. . .) Apart from this, it was the Führer's wish that German colonization should gradually begin in the General Government. It was, therefore, necessary to consider this problem not only from the point of view of its benefits and its harm, but from the point of view of its urgency. (. . .)

In reply to Amtschef Engler's pointing out that, as a result of the transfer of the population, a fall in agricultural production of about 100,000 tons was expected—the Governor General reminded them that, after all, when the Germans were able to conduct their economy there properly, they would perhaps also achieve even higher results. (. . .)

DIARY 1943/III

P. 549

*Warsaw*

*19. 6. 1943*

*18<sup>35</sup>*

Great demonstration of the NSDAP in "Roma" House.

. . .

The Leader of the NSDAP Governor General dr. Frank being greeted lively delivers the following speech: (. . .)

P. 565

The Polish Republic or any really Polish state—however constituted—will never rise again. (Lively applause).

DIARY 1943/IV

P. 781

2. 8. 1943

17<sup>15</sup>

Reception of 30 Reich speakers in the Kings Hall.

. . .

The Governor General addresses the Reich speakers as follows: (. . .)

P. 789

Things are quite clear where we are concerned. To anyone who asks what can become of the NSDAP, we can answer: The NSDAP will certainly outlive the Jews. Here we started off with 3½ million Jews, of whom only a few labour companies are left, all the others have—let us say—emigrated.

P. 1012

*Cracow*

*Saturday, October 2, 1943*

16<sup>40</sup>

Conversation with Secretary of State dr. Bühler and ministerial counsellor dr. Weh.

The subject of the conversation is the draft of a decree re the combatting of attacks on the German work of reconstruction in the General Government, submitted to the Governor General by dr. Weh. After a short explanation by Secretary of State dr. Bühler and dr. Weh, the Governor General withdraws his objections and signs the draft decree.

P. 1035

*Tuesday, October 19, 1943*

10<sup>30</sup>

Security Session in Kings Hall.

The Governor General (...) By a decree which came into force on the 10th October, he gave the Security Police extraordinary plenary powers, eliminating all limiting formal objections. (...)

P. 1036/1038

SS-Oberführer Bierkamp (...) On the other hand, the resistance movement had now moved its forces into Warsaw, and now intended to reply to terror by counter-terror. However, they had so far not yet dared to this, but pamphlets had already been found stating: "We counter terror by terror, the German oppressors will have to give in". (...)

P. 1070

*Cracow*

*Saturday, October 23, 1943*

11<sup>00</sup>

The opening of the winter semester in the Academy for Administrative Law (. . .)

P. 1071/1072

The Governor General then gives the following lecture "On the Leadership principle in administration" (. . .)

As a country adjoining the Greater German Reich, the General Government is—in the eyes of national and international law—part of the Greater German sphere of power in Europe. (. . .) Sovereignty over this area is vested in the Führer of the Greater German Reich and is exercised in his name by the Governor General, who combines in himself, in the form of a deputy, all the Führer's rights.

. . .

P. 1080/1081

(. . .) To lead means to bear responsibility—nothing more! (. . .) To bear responsibility means: deciding about direction and method, the allotment of tasks with regard to time and subject, deciding, who is to carry them out and what has been achieved. These six principles are inherent in the concept of responsibility. The leadership principle in administration means accordingly to rule responsibly. (. . .)

P. 1093

*23. 10. 1943*

15<sup>00</sup>

Conference with Secretary of State dr. Bühler, President Ohlenbusch, Press Chief Gassner, and Oberlandesverwaltungsrat \* Weirauch.

---

\* Senior Provincial Administrative Counsellor.

The subject of the conversation is a letter sent to the Governor General by the Chairman of the Main Polish Board\* count Ronikier, in which the latter expresses his regret at the recent shootings of Poles, and, in view of the painful excitement aroused among the Polish population, makes participation in the harvest festival dependent on certain guarantees being given in future against such police measures.

The Governor General instructs Senior Provincial Administrative Counsellor Weirauch to inform count Ronikier that he had to decide by 18<sup>00</sup> hours the same day whether he intended to participate in the next day's harvest festival with the members of the Main Polish Board. If this declaration were not given within the time laid down, he would take the steps he considered suitable and would not even hesitate to dissolve the Main Polish Board. (. . .)

P. 1094

There follows a short discussion of the measures recently taken by SS-Oberführer Bierkamp.

Secretary of State dr. Bühler considers it necessary to sentence in advance by a regular summary trial, those Poles who are to be shot. One must also in future avoid calling these Poles hostages, for the shooting of hostages cannot but be a deplorable business, and only gave foreign countries arguments against German conduct in the General Government.

P. 1164

27. 10. 1943

16<sup>45</sup>

Conference on the security situation. (. . .)

SS Oberführer Bierkamp (. . .) The Security Police have in their hands many persons who have committed criminal offenses since 10 October against the decree of the same date. They have been sentenced to death and will be shot to expiate for their

---

\* Polish relief organization.

crimes. Their names will be made known to the population by posters stating that certain persons may expect to be pardoned if no more murders of Germans will occur. For one German murdered 10 of these Poles will be executed. For crimes committed by Poles Poles only will be executed, and the same goes for Ukrainians respectively. For offenses of the national resistance movement communists will not be shot and vice versa. If the findings are not clear communist criminals will be shot. (. . .)



## DIARY 1943/VI

P. 1232

*Cracow*

*Thursday, 18. 11. 1943*

*15<sup>00</sup>*

Conference of the Governor General with the Reichsführer SS Himmler. The State Secretaries dr. Bühler and dr. Boepple, the Governors dr. Fischer, Kundt, dr. Wachter, Hauptabteilungspräsident Naumann, Maj. General Grunwald and SS-Oberführer Bierkamp also took part in the conferences.

*16<sup>45</sup>*

The Governor General goes to a session with the Reichsführer-SS Himmler in the Government Building.

There, the induction of the new Governor of the District Cracow dr. von Burgsdorff, and the new chief of the Main Department of Inner Administration, dr. von Craushaar, takes place, as well as the dismissal of SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger and the introduction of his successor, SS-Obergruppenführer Koppe.

In the presence of leading members of the Government and numerous SS and Police Chiefs, the Governor General delivers the following speech:

P. 1233

Reichsführer SS, Reich Minister, Dear Comrade Himmler, Gentlemen:

. . .

P. 1236/1237

With the consent of the Reichsführer-SS, you Comrade Koppe, will take over the leadership of the security system as successor to SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger. In a formal sense, the Führer order relating to the establishing of a State Secretariat for Security

in the General Government is authoritative for security in the General Government. This order is, shall we say, the basic rule according to which you have to serve. Your position is one of the most important in the General Government. It is the backbone of the authority of the State and, therefore, it is of importance that in this position you are also one of the most important liaison men between the Reichsführer-SS and myself. With your office, the Führer created a well-balanced position which makes it easy for you to fulfil all your functions. I reckon with true cooperation based on your efficiency. We welcome you heartily as a new comrade and collaborator in the German leadership of this area.

LOOSE-LEAF FOLDER DATED 1st JANUARY  
TO 28th FEBRUARY 1944

*Wednesday, January 12, 1944*  
*12<sup>15</sup>*

The Governor General takes part in the closing session of the 3, German Agricultural Leaders conference in General Government in Zakopane.

P. 4

The Governor General then delivers the following speech: (. . .)

P. 13

(. . .) If one forcibly and senselessly drives hundreds and thousands of Polish peasants from their farms, then there is nothing to wonder at if they take to the forest as robbers. (Long, loud applause).

P. 15

(. . .) We Germans only constitute 1% of the total population in this country, including the Police and everything else, and we govern 99%. (. . .)

P. 17

*14. 1. 1944*  
*15<sup>00</sup>*

The inauguration of the Governor dr. v. Burgsdorff as the NSDAP Leader of Cracow district.

(. . .) The Governor General addresses the Political Leaders as follows: (. . .)

P. 24

(. . .) Once we have won the war, then, for all I care, mince-meat can be made of the Poles and Ukrainians and all the others who run around—come what may. (. . .)

*Saturday, 15. 1. 1944*

11<sup>10</sup>

Session of the NSDAP Political Leaders of the General Government area in Cracow.

P. 2

The Governor General then delivers the following speech: Comrades!

. . .

P. 13

(. . .) I have not been afraid to declare that, when a German is shot, up to a hundred Poles will be shot. (. . .)

*Tuesday, January 25, 1944*

8<sup>30</sup>

Arrival of the Governor General in Berlin.

P. 2

16<sup>50</sup>

Governor General delivered lecture for the representatives of the German press in Pompeian Hall of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda.

P. 4/5

(. . .) Do not ever forget that with the most favourable calculations, the proportion of persons of German race to those of foreign race in the General Government is as 1 to 99, that, in other words, out of a population of 16 millions in the whole territory, there are hardly 250,000 Germans. (. . .)

P. 5

We perhaps have 100,000 Jews left in the General Government at the moment. (. . .)

P. 16

If you now say: But we are always hearing of the extermination of the Polish intelligentsia, which is said to be so necessary, then I can only retort: Whoever speaks of the extermination of the intelligentsia, does not know that the intelligentsia is, thank God, independent of the final academic examination. (...)

P. 18

We have also made mistakes, such as the mistake of believing that we could settle Germans in this area by force now. (...)

30. I. 1944

11<sup>00</sup>

Great Demonstration of the NSDAP in Lwów.

. . .

The Governor General then delivers the following speech:  
German men! German women! German youth!

. . .

P. 13

(...) I confirm that the Polish problem in Europe has been settled for all time by victorious Germany taking over the direction of this territory. (...)

*Sunday, February 6, 1944*

14<sup>30</sup> till 17<sup>00</sup>

In the head-quarters of the Führer the Governor General has a conversation with the Führer.

The Governor General reports on the contents and course of his conversation as follows:

P. 8/9

(...) The Führer then inquired about Warsaw and thought Warsaw should cause me the greatest sorrow. I could but to confirm him, Warsaw means to me the darkest point in General

Government. The Führer pointed out as absolutely right, we chose Cracow as the capital. Warsaw should be pulled down as soon as possible.

8. 2. 1944

P. 6

12<sup>40</sup>

Conference with counsellor of the embassy dr. Schumburg.  
. . .

Counsellor of the embassy dr. Schumburg, then points out that the question of amnesty and particularly the question of the so-called shooting of hostages are always brought up in Polish circles.

P. 7

In regard to this, the Governor General emphasizes that hostages are no longer shot. The shootings affect exclusively proven members of the resistance movement who have confessed to that effect. These elements have to be eliminated once and for all. Besides, all classes of the Polish population must always be conscious of the fact that they are being protected by the German leadership of the General Government.

Counsellor of the embassy, dr. Schumburg, considers it necessary that the posters announcing the shootings to the public should be worded somewhat more clearly. They do not make it sufficiently clear that it is a question of cancelling reprieves.

The Governor General authorizes counsellor of the embassy dr. Schumburg, to take up this question with State Secretaries dr. Bühler and Koppe.

Counsellor of the embassy, dr. Schumburg, then takes up the question of a possible amnesty of Poles who have been brought to the concentration camp Auschwitz partly for minor crimes or transgressions and who have been kept there for months.

The Governor General will perhaps consider the possibility of an amnesty for the first of May of this year. At the same time,

one must insist that the German leadership of the General Government must not show any weakness at this moment.

. . .

*Poznań*

*Saturday, February 12, 1944*

2<sup>11</sup> Arrival of the Governor General in Poznań.

P. 2

19<sup>30</sup> till 21<sup>00</sup>

Conversation between the Governor General and the Reichsführer SS Himmler in the presence of SS Obergruppenführer Koppe.

The Governor General gives the following account of the contents and course of the conversation: (. . .)

Immediately after the salutations, the Reichsführer SS, Himmler, entered into conversation with me and SS Obergruppenführer Koppe. The Reichsführer asked me right at the beginning how I was co-operating with the Secretary of State for Security, SS Obergruppenführer Koppe. I expressed my deep satisfaction at the fact that, between myself and SS-Obergruppenführer Koppe as well as between Secretary of State dr. Bühler and him, there existed extraordinarily good relations of friendly cooperation. (. . .)

P. 7/8

I discussed with SS-Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner the results of the conversation of today in regard to the general policy concerning Poles. SS-Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner told me that he received only yesterday a teletype from SS Oberführer Bierkamp inquiring what his attitude was toward the new "Polish" policy. I drew SS Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner's attention to my address made on the Führer's instruction to the foreign press and was able to inform him immediately that the new policy met with the full approval of the Reichsführer. I asked him to



give instructions to SS Oberführer Bierkamp to this effect and to emphasize that he should now follow the principles of my policy. SS Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner willingly promised to do so and asked that I issue on my part a respective directive to SS Obergruppenführer Koppe because he has the impression that, in regard to the penal sanctions, SS-Obergruppenführer Koppe sometimes asks more than the Security Police demands.

17. 2. 1944

11<sup>00</sup>

Festive farewell for the deputy leader of the NSDAP in General Government (. . .)

The Governor General there delivers the following speech: My comrades!

. . .

P. 9

(. . .) It is a luxury to do anything which can be done better after the victory. The question as to how this land will be colonized in due course is clear. I am also clever enough to know that it will not be the Poles who will remain here. (. . .)

P. 16/17

Last June it was 25 years since I got to know the Führer, and I have now been with him for 25 years; during many and difficult hours we were bound to each other. I belong to the circle of the few representatives of the earliest National Socialist development. I was present when the Party programme was formulated. I know the preparations for the first party meeting in the Mathaeser Brewery. I know the history of the movement right from the beginning. For me, looking back on the 25 years of this work is a retrospect of one of the most marvellous epochs of development of our people and today also of the history of the world. That the enemies we had in Germany have organized themselves internationally and have international support, we

recognize from the fact that the carrying out of the Führer's programme in the world historical sense leads to the same enemy front which we saw as victors over us in 1918: The Jews, the Jesuits and the masons. These enemies of ours are today present again in the world drama. (. . .)

# LOOSE-LEAF FILE BEGUN IN FEBRUARY 1944

*Government Session*

*Wednesday, April 19, 1944*

*in Kings Hall of the Castle in Cracow*

P. 9

President Struwe: (. . .)

The labour employment authorities have obtained the following foreign labour:

For the General Government		For the Reich
477,000	1940	300,000
734,000	1941	223,000
979,000	1942	398,000
840,000	1943	184,000

4. 3. 1944

P. 12

16<sup>00</sup>

Speech of the Governor General at the convention of the Speakers of the NSDAP General Government area in the House of the NSDAP.

. . .

P. 25/26

(. . .) If we had today those two million Jews in full activity in the country—and, at the same time so few Germans—we should no longer be masters of the situation. We would have sabotage in the country on such a scale that we would no longer be able to save ourselves. That is also a success of the national-socialism, because nobody else could over have handled it. Only because we began with antisemitism in 1919, did we find the power to put into effect twenty years later. That this did not suit the Jews in the whole world—we counted upon that from the very beginning; but that does not matter to us. The Jews are a race which must be wiped out; whenever we catch one—he will be exterminated. (. . .)

18. 3. 1944

P. 22

18<sup>45</sup>

Trip of the Governor General to the Home of Guests of the Aircraft Factory in Rzeszów.

19<sup>45</sup>

Meeting of the German workers. After the meeting was opened

by the manager the Governor General delivers the following speech: German men and women!

. . .

P. 38

(. . .) If I had gone to the Führer and told him: "My Führer, I report that I have destroyed another 150,000 Poles", he would have said: "Fine, if it was necessary". (. . .)

P. 39

(. . .) Millions and millions of these foreign people are being sent to work. Here the General Government is marching, as always, at the head, for it has delivered almost 2 million workers to the Reich. Fundamentally the Poles, when they are well and decently treated, are the most reliable workers in the whole of Europe, and indeed, just for continual simple work. (. . .)

24. 3. 1944

P. 5

15<sup>00</sup>

Conference with ministerial counsellor Burmeister from the Reich Finance Ministry in presence of the Secretary of State dr. Bühler, President dr. Senkowsky, ministerial counsellor von Streit and dr. Weh about the budget of the General Government for the budget year 1944/45.

. . .

The Governor General defines the budget figures as fictitious. (. . .)

The subsistence minimum of the Polish and Ukrainian officials and employees was inexcusably sad and they were not even in a position to buy those foods which were officially allotted to them. (. . .)

*Cracow*

*Wednesday, the 5 April 1944*

10<sup>00</sup>

The Governor General receives the Prince Archbishop Sapieha accompanied by the Prelate Domasik.

Present also: Secretary of State dr. Boepple, President dr. von Craus and Landgerichtsdirektor\* Wilden.

P. 5

The Prince Archbishop refers then to the murders upon Germans, which he opposes decisively. (. . .)

P. 6

(. . .) The life of the entire population is rather unprotected. It has happened that it has been left to lower administration offices to decide whether to shoot Poles or not. (. . .) The deportation of workers to the Reich has been carried out in a bad manner. (. . .)

Archbishop Prince Sapieha refers then to the arrest and shooting of Polish priests. He states that many of them were quite innocent. Twenty priests had already met their death in Auschwitz and a further twenty were still in gaol. (. . .)

P. 7

The Governor General (. . .) He could quote the small figure of 20 dead and 20 arrested priests as a proof that, in spite of everything, they had succeeded in making it possible for the Poles to have a religious life. (. . .)

. . .

12. 4. 1944

P. 3

12<sup>30</sup>

Labour conference in the Green Room of the Castle.

*Subject:* Railway questions.

. . .

---

\* Senior presiding judge of the district court.

P. 6/7

In this connection President Gerteis spoke of the treatment of the Poles in the Reich. This statement, which was still worse than the meted out to any other foreign worker, had led to hardly any Poles reporting voluntarily any more for work in Germany. There were 21 points in which the Polish workers in the Reich were treated worse than other foreign workers.

. . .

*Cracow*

*Tuesday, May 16, 1944*

10<sup>00</sup>

Continuation of the working conference of the NSDAP General Government area in the Kings Hall of the Castle.

. . .

P. 3

At the end of the conference the Governor General summarizes (. . .)

P. 7/8

(. . .) In the course of the coming decades, intensification of a German colonization will certainly take place. It is as clear as daylight that the Vistula country will be just as German as the Rhineland.

(. . .) One was compelled to be ambiguous: On the one hand, one had to keep 16 millions working, and on the other hand one had to say how nice it would be if one could do everything absolutely differently. The Party did not need to bother itself with these political necessities. It could say, very well, that is all necessary politically, but the programme is in the drawer.



LOOSE-LEAF FOLDER  
FROM 1st AUGUST to 14th DECEMBER 1944

3. 8. 1944

P. 2/3

21<sup>10</sup>

The Governor General has a telephone conversation with Col. General Guderian and again urgently requests help for the city of Warsaw. Col. General Guderian thereupon tells him the following: (. . .) The Governor General can rest assured that everything would be done that was humanly possible to help the city of Warsaw. A verdict would then be executed against the city of Warsaw with all severity. (. . .)

22<sup>00</sup>

Telephone conversation with Secretary of State dr. Bühler.

P. 3/4

The Governor General describes to Secretary of State dr. Bühler the course of his day and points out the rather serious situation. He was talking with the colonel general Guderian a little while ago. Colonel general Guderian had told him, that the Führer was firmly resolved to crush the revolt in Warsaw with all the means available. (. . .) The Luftwaffe could attack only when it was clear which parts of the city were in German hands and which in the hands of the insurgents. (. . .)

P. 4

22<sup>15</sup>

Telephone conversation with Governor dr. Fischer. The Governor General informs Governor Fischer of the telephone conversation with Col. General Guderian.

*Krzeszowice—Residence**Saturday, August 5, 1944*

P. 5/6

20<sup>05</sup>

The Governor General sends the following telegramm to Reich Minister dr. Lammers: The city of Warsaw is in flames for the most part. The burning of the houses is also the surest method of getting the insurgents out of bolt-holes... After this insurrection and its crushing Warsaw will be completely destroyed as it deserves.

## EXTRACT FROM HANS FRANK'S TESTIMONY

Given in Nurnberg, Germany on the 8.10.1945 at 15<sup>45</sup>—16<sup>15</sup> hours before  
Lieut. Col. Hinkel, I.G.D., O.U.S.C.C.

Also present: Bernard Reyman, interpreter and Pvt. Clair van Vleck, Court  
Reporter.

. . .

Q. On several occasions you have mentioned your diary. Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. We have two boxes behind you on your left, which purport to contain your diary, and I would like to show the contents of these boxes to you and ask you if you can identify the boxes as being your diaries.

A. (After examining books) Yes.

Q. The witness is referring to eight books with grey and red bindings. Do you identify the eight books as being your diary?

A. I take it they are, yes.

Q. Take a good look at them and see if there is any doubt in your mind.

A. Yes. I gave them myself to the Americans.

Q. I show you a series of other documents in grey-green covers. Do these belong to your diary too?

A. I won't hide anything. It is a historical document.

Q. Do you identify these volumes, these grey-green volumes, as your diary?

A. Yes.

Q. There are other red and grey bound volumes—12 in all—in the box. Do you identify these as your diary?

- A.* Yes, that's right. I handed them over personally.
- Q.* Besides this, there are 19 volumes in the second box, also bound in red and grey. Do these too form part of your diary?
- A.* Yes. I gave them to the Americans myself.
- Q.* That makes a total of 31 volumes with the red and grey bindings, in addition to the 5 volumes in a greenish binding.
- A.* Yes.
- Q.* Are all the statements contained in those diaries true and correct to the best of your knowledge and belief?
- A.* To the best of my knowledge; in particular, to the best of my knowledge.

. . .

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